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Ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) play an important role in providing surgical and 
diagnostic services in an outpatient setting. They can be owned by physicians who staff them. 
Previous studies focused on patient “cherry picking” and over-utilization of services due to 
physician ownership. Few studies examined the relationship between physician ownership and 
quality of care. Using a retrospective cohort of patients who underwent colonoscopy, this study 
examined the effect of physician ownership of ASCs on the occurrence of adverse events after 
outpatient colonoscopy. 
Agency theory is used to as a conceptual framework. Depending on the extent to which 
consumers are able to assess quality of care differences across health care settings, physician 
 
 
 
ownership can function as a mechanism to improve quality or as a deterrent to quality. Four 
adverse event measures are used in this study: same day ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day 
serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day other 
gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, and 30-day non-gastrointestinal 
events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Physician ownership status is determined based on 
a court decision in California in 2007. Data sources include the State Ambulatory Surgery 
Databases (SASD), State Inpatient Databases (SID), Emergency Department Databases (SEDD), 
State Utilization Data Files, the Area Resource File (ARF), and HMO/PPO data from Health 
Leaders. 
After controlling for confounding factors, the study found that colonoscopy patients 
treated at a physician-owned ASC had similar odds of experiencing same day ED visit or 
hospitalization and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization as 
those treated in a hospital-based outpatient facility. But the former had significantly higher odds 
of experiencing 30-day serious gastrointestinal events and 30-day other gastrointestinal events 
resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. The results are robust to changes in propensity score 
adjustment approach and to the inclusion of a lagged quality indicator. They suggest that 
physician ownership of ASCs was not associated with better quality of care for colonoscopy 
patients. As more complex procedures are shifted from hospital-based outpatient facilities to 
ASCs, expanded efforts to monitor and report quality of care will be worthwhile.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Specific Aims 
Containing health care costs while improving quality of care have been priorities of 
policy makers for many decades and is increasingly important given objectives of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010). Shifting surgical 
services to outpatient settings, especially ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) has the potential to 
achieve cost reduction and quality improvement at the same time (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 
2003). ASCs are health care facilities that specialize in providing surgical services that do not 
require an overnight stay. Most ASCs are freestanding facilities independent from other facilities 
while about 1% are owned and operated by hospitals (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 
2003; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2011). ASCs play an important role in 
providing surgical and diagnostic services in an outpatient setting. The number of Medicare-
certified ASCs reached 5,260 in 2009, up from 336 in 1985 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2002; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2010).  
ASCs can be owned by physicians who staff them. Physician owners collect both 
professional fees and a share of the facility’s profits. A multitude of concerns arise about the 
potential conflicts of interest because physician owners are in a position to self-refer patients for 
procedures. Issues regarding patient “cherry picking” and over-utilization of services due to 
physician ownership of health care facilities are at the forefront of research and policy 
discussions (Hollingsworth et al., 2009; Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Mitchell, 2010; Strope et al., 
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2009; Strope, Sarma, Ye, Wei, & Hollenbeck, 2009; Winter, 2003). However, the potential 
relationship between physician ownership and quality of care has not been examined in 
substantial depth. Proponents argue that physician-owned health facilities, including ASCs, 
provide better quality of care because physician ownership may enhance physician’s 
accountability (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009; Office of Inspector General, 
1999). By contrast, others contend that quality of care in physician owned facilities may be 
compromised due to potential financial conflicts of interest (Mitchell & Sass, 1995; O’Neill & 
Hartz, 2012). Yet, limited empirical study has been conducted to assess the potential influence of 
physician ownership of health care facilities on quality of care and no research has specifically 
examined this issue for physician-owned ASCs.  
This study aims to address this knowledge gap by examining the effect of physician 
ownership of ASCs on the occurrence of adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy. 
Colonoscopy is widely used for the screening, diagnosis and treatment of colonic disorders. It 
has been accepted as the most effective colorectal cancer screening method (Rex, Johnson, 
Lieberman, Burt, & Sonnenberg, 2000). Examination of the quality of outpatient colonoscopy is 
needed to monitor and improve its quality and safety. The task is especially important given that 
colonoscopy has been migrating out of hospital-based outpatient facilities and into ASCs. The 
market share of Medicare-covered colonoscopies provided in ASCs increased from 22% in 2000 
to 41% while the market share of these procedures at hospital-based outpatient facilities fell from 
73% to 54% during the same period (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009). 
Through this study, we will gain a better understanding of the implications of physician 
ownership of ASCs on quality of outpatient colonoscopy care as well as a clearer picture about 
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factors that affect the occurrence of adverse events after this procedure in outpatient surgical 
settings.  
Study Overview and Research Questions 
Physician ownership is common among ASCs. But the question of how physician 
ownership affects the production of quality outpatient surgical care needs to be assessed. This 
study addresses this question by examining how physician ownership affects the occurrence of 
adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy. Specifically, this study compares the rates of 
experiencing adverse events within 30 days of the procedure by patients who were treated at a 
physician-owned ASCs and those treated by a hospital-based outpatient facility.  
The following research questions guide the investigation: 
• Research question I: How does physician ownership affect the incidence of 
adverse events following outpatient colonoscopy? 
• Research question II: Does the competitiveness of the health care market change 
the effect of physician-ownership on quality of care?  
• Research question III: What patient-, facility-, and market-level factors are 
associated with the incidence of adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy? 
Conceptual Framework 
This study focuses on the relationship between physician ownership and quality of care in 
outpatient surgical settings. Agency theory is used to explain how physician ownership may 
shape two agency relationships, the one between other owners of an ASC (principals) and 
physicians (agents) who perform surgical procedures in the facility and the relationship between 
patients (principals) and physicians (agents) and ultimately affect patient outcomes. Depending 
on the extent to which consumers are able to assess quality of care differences across health care 
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settings, physician ownership can function as a mechanism to improve quality or as a deterrent to 
quality. In addition to physician ownership, the study will also investigate the moderating effect 
of the market competition on ASC ownership. 
Patient characteristics, financial incentives and other organizational factors, and market 
environment all affect physician choices of quality of output (Conrad & Christianson, 2004a). In 
order to isolate the potential effect of physician ownership, the study also controls for 
confounding factors. These include factors from patient-, facility-, and market levels.  
The graphical depiction in Figure 1 presents the groups of factors that may influence the 
ultimate quality of care in outpatient surgical settings. 
 
Figure 1. Brief Depiction of Multi-dimensional Factors that Affect Quality of Care for Outpatient 
Procedures 
Study Approach 
This study will examine the provision of colonoscopy services in the State of California.  
Several reasons lead to this choice of geographic location for the analysis. First, California has 
the largest number of ASCs and nearly three million ambulatory surgeries were performed in 
2007 in California. Because there is no ambulatory surgery database at the national level, a study 
based on California is a good option given the large number of procedures in this state. Second, a 
court decision in California made it possible to identify full or partial physician ownership of 
 Market Characteristics  
Organizational Characteristics 
• Physician ownership 
• Physician ownership* 
market competition 
• Other facility-level 
 
Patient Outcomes 
 
Patient Characteristics 
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ASCs in the state. Third, information related to organizational factors can be obtained from 
national sources and also California state agencies. 
The study examines a retrospective cohort of patients who underwent colonoscopy in 
physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities between 2005 and 2007 in 
California.  Primary data for the analysis comes from the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, specifically the Agency's State 
Ambulatory Surgery Database (SASD).  This database contains Current Procedural Terminology 
codes, which were used to identify patients receiving colonoscopy procedures.  AHRQ also 
provides a revisit data file that allows researchers to examine whether patients in the SASD 
database had a subsequent emergency department visit or hospitalization. This study links 
AHRQ's State Inpatient Databases (SID) and Emergency Department Databases (SEDD) to the 
SASD for California. Adverse events that may be precipitated by the colonoscopy procedure 
were identified using the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical 
Modification (ICD-9 CM) diagnosis codes reported in previous studies (Levin et al., 2006; 
Warren et al., 2009). The analytical database also includes information on (1) ASC and hospital-
based outpatient facility characteristics from the State Utilization Data Files of Specialty Clinics 
and State Utilization Data Files of Hospitals; (2) community socioeconomic characteristics from 
the Area Resource File (ARF); and (3) data on HMO/PPO market shares from Health Leaders.  
Four adverse event measures are used in this study: same day ED visit or hospitalization, 
30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day other 
gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day non-gastrointestinal events 
resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Physician ownership status is determined based on a 
court decision in California in 2007, which changed the licensing requirements for ASCs wholly 
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or partially owned by physicians. The study controls for patient-, facility-, and market-level 
factors using three-level generalized hierarchical linear models (GHLMs) to account for the 
clustering of patients within outpatient surgical facilities and the clustering of those facilities 
within health care markets.   
Significance of the Study 
The care provided by ASCs is seen by many to be a less costly alternative to the care 
furnished by hospital-based outpatient facilities. While existing studies largely focus on the 
relationship between physician ownership of health care facilities and potential over-utilization 
of services due to self-referral as well as issues of patient selection, limited evidence exists on 
the potential relationship between physician ownership and quality of care. In addition, the 
quality of outpatient surgical care is relatively understudied in terms of patient outcome 
measurement and the scope of factors that may affect it.  
The study contributes to the body of existing research in several ways. First, it focuses on 
the effect of physician ownership on the quality of care in outpatient surgical settings, 
complementing prior studies of the impact of physician ownership on potential patient selection 
and overuse of services.  Second, the study uses a heterogeneous and large sample to identify 
procedure-specific complications that result in ER visit or hospitalization after outpatient 
colonoscopy. Samples used by previous studies were limited to just Medicare or Medicaid 
patients or were restricted to a few hospitals (Ko & Dominitz, 2010). The largest sample size was 
53,220 patients (Warren et al., 2009). Third, the study uses multilevel analysis techniques to 
account for the hierarchical structure of the data.  
Results of the study have potential implications for theory, health policy, and health care 
management. First, this study serves as an example of applying agency theory to the examination 
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of physician ownership and patient outcomes of care. It also assesses relationships noted in the 
outpatient surgical literature, such as the positive relationship between procedure volume and 
quality (Chukmaitov et al., 2008). From a policy perspective, a better understanding of the 
relationship between physician ownership and quality may help policy makers and payers 
evaluate the value of care provided by physician-owned ASCs and develop informed disclosure 
and payment policies. From a clinical or management perspective, the research findings could be 
used to identify subgroups of surgical patients who are at greater rates of developing 
complications after the procedure. Extra efforts may be needed to monitor high risk patients both 
in the facility and at home for potential complications that require medical attention. Targeting 
care for these vulnerable subgroups can be much more cost-effective than delivering 
interventions to the general patient population. This is especially the case considering that the 
rates of adverse events after outpatient surgery are low.  
Summary of Remaining Chapters 
 The dissertation is organized into six chapters. This chapter provided a general 
introduction and discussed the aims, conceptual framework, scope and approach, and the 
significance of the study. Detailed information is given in subsequently chapters. Chapter 2 
reviews the development of the ASC industry, relevant literature, and policies related to 
physician ownership in ASCs. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework based on agency 
theory. Chapter 4 covers research methods used in this study, including research design, 
empirical models, specification issues involved, and approaches for dealing with these 
specification issues. Chapter 5 presents study findings. Results of descriptive analysis, 
multivariate models, and sensitivity analysis are discussed. Chapter 6 summarizes research 
findings and discusses the implications and limitations of the study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Studies of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) have grown substantially in number in 
recent years. This chapter reviews the literature related to physician ownership of ASCs and its 
implications. The chapter is organized into five sections. The first section provides background 
on ambulatory surgery centers. Specifically, it covers the growth of the ASC industry, common 
surgical procedures provided by ASCs, and Medicare ASC payment policy. The second section 
discusses the prevalence and measurement of physician ownership among ASCs. The third 
section reviews the literature on the quality of outpatient surgery in general and that focused on 
outpatient colonoscopy specifically. The fourth section summarizes the effects of physician 
ownership on care in ASCs. The related literature can be grouped into studies examining patient 
selection and those focusing on services use. The fifth section summarizes the limitations of the 
literature and outlines how this study addresses the gap identified in the review.    
Background on Ambulatory Surgery Centers  
Over the last thirty years, there has been significant change in how surgical services are 
delivered. With the advances in medical technology and the external pressure to reduce costs, 
traditionally inpatient surgeries are increasingly performed in outpatient settings. In 1981, 
outpatient surgeries accounted for only 19% of all surgeries (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & 
Xanthopoulos, 2009). The most recent data indicate that the proportion has increased to a range 
between 60% and 70% (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2004).  
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In addition, complex surgical procedures traditionally rendered in hospital-based 
outpatient facilities are migrating into ASCs and physician’s office. During the period from early 
1980s to 2005, the share of outpatient surgeries performed by hospital-based outpatient facilities 
has fallen from over 90% to 45%, while the shares performed in ASCs and physician’s offices 
has increased from less than 5% each to 38% and 17%, respectively (American Hospital 
Association, 2006). Data from Pennsylvania suggest the same trend. From 2000 through 2009, 
ASC’s share of outpatient diagnostic and surgical procedures performed on all patients rose from 
10% to 33% (Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, 2010).  
The number of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) has increased substantially since 
the1980s. The first ASC was started by two surgeons back in early 1970s. In 1985, there were 
336 Medicare-certified ASCs around the country. In 2010, the number had increased to 5,316 
(Figure 2.). However, the growth of ASCs has slowed in recent years due to the economic 
downturn, Medicare payment system change in 2008, higher payments rates for the same 
outpatient surgical services in the hospital-based outpatient facility setting, and limited 
opportunities to develop new ASCs as most physicians are already affiliated with extant ASCs 
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2012).  
ASCs tend to be concentrated geographically. As of 2007, five states, California, Florida, 
Maryland, Texas, and Georgia, had more than 39 percent of all ASCs while Arkansas and Rhode 
Island had fewer than 10 ASCs and Vermont had none (Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, 2009). California has the largest number of ASCs. The number of licensed ASCs in 
California grew by 15% from 2003 to 2007 (Figure 2.). But the number has dropped since 2007 
because of the Capen v Shewry decision in 2007, after which about 450 ASCs were delicensed.   
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Figure 2. Number of Medicare-certified Ambulatory Surgical Centers, 1985 – 2010 
Source:  Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2002. Data Compendium, 2002 Edition; Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission. March 2003/2009/2012. Report to Congress: Medicare Payment Policy; 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). Surgical Clinics 2003-2007 Trends, 
Specialty Clinics Annual Utilization Data Files (2008-2010). 
This decision provides the opportunity to distinguish physician-owned ASCs from non-
physician-owned ASCs and will be discussed in detail below.        
Since 1982, Medicare has covered certain surgical procedures provided in ASCs under 
Part B. CMS is responsible for determining whether a procedure can be performed safely in an 
ASC and thus can be eligible for Medicare payment. The list of procedures payable by Medicare 
in ASCs has expanded over time, especially in the 2008 revision to the ASC payment system. 
Medicare covers about 3,500 surgical procedures according to a MedPAC report (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, 2012). Cataract surgery and endoscopy procedures are among 
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the most common procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries in ASCs (Table 1.). In many 
states, such as Florida, Nevada, Tennessee, and Washington, ASCs furnished more than half of 
all colonoscopies as of 2007 (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009). Even though 
CMS implemented no positive updates to ASC payment rates between 2004 and 2008, the 
volume of services provided by ASCs to Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries still 
increased by 10.2% per year from 2003 through 2007, with a 10.5% increase in 2008 (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, 2010b). 
Table 1  
Most common categories of procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries in ASCs, 2007 and 
2010 
 2007  2010 
Surgical service Percent of 
volume 
Rank  Percent of 
volume 
Rank 
Cataract surgery w/ IOL insert, 1 stage 19.9% 1  17.6% 1 
Upper GI endoscopy, biopsy 7.9% 2  8.0% 2 
Diagnostic colonoscopy 5.9% 3  4.2% 5 
Colonoscopy and biopsy 5.5% 4  5.6% 3 
After cataract laser surgery 5.4% 5  4.0% 6 
Lesion removal colonoscopy, snare technique 4.8% 6  4.3% 4 
Injection spine: lumbar, sacral (caudal) 4.3% 7  3.5% 8 
Injection foramen epidural: lumbar, sacral 3.1% 8  3.8% 7 
Injection paravertebral: lumbar, sacral add on* 2.9% 9  1.9% 11 
Injection paravertebral: lumbar, sacral* 1.9% 10  2.1% 9 
Total 61.6%   55.0%  
Note: IOL (intraocular lens), GI (gastrointestinal). *The description of these services changed in 2010 to include 
imaging guidance.  
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. March 2012. Report to Congress: Medicare Payment Policy  
Medicare’s payment policy for ASCs underwent substantial revision in 2008, which 
added uncertainties to the growth of ASCs (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2007; 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2010a). First, CMS loosened the criteria a surgical 
procedure must meet to be eligible for Medicare payment. Any surgical procedures, except for 
 
 
12 
 
those that usually pose significant safety risk or may require an over-night stay, will be covered 
under the new ASC payment system (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2010a). Second, 
qualified procedures are grouped into several hundred ambulatory payment classification (APC) 
groups and all services within an APC group have the same payment rate. The old ASC payment 
system had only nine procedure groups. Third, CMS implemented separate ASC payments for 
ancillary services, including certain radiology services, brachytherapy sources, many drugs, and 
some implantable devices. Finally, CMS set the payment rates for most procedures based on the 
relative weights in the hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS). Overall, except 
for office-based procedures and device-intensive procedures, CMS on average pays ASCs about 
60% of the hospital-based outpatient facility payment rate for providing the same services 
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2012).The revisions in the ASC payment system 
resulted in substantial changes in payments for a large number of procedures. To help ASCs 
adapt to the new payment system, CMS decided to phrase in the new payment system over a 4-
year period, from 2008 through 2011.  
To sum up, ASCs represent an innovative force in the health care delivery system. In the 
past thirty year, ASCs experienced rapid growth. However, ASCs face a number of uncertainties 
caused by the general economy and Medicare payment policy. The next section discusses a 
specific feature of ASCs, namely, physician ownership.  
Physician Ownership of Ambulatory Surgery Centers 
Physicians are allowed to invest in the ASC where they perform procedures (Office of 
Inspector General, 1999). However, it remains unclear that how many ASCs are owned partly or 
wholly by physicians1. Two studies have used trade association surveys to identify physician 
                                                 
1 In the literature, physicians are called owners once they gain equity interests, regardless of the size of ownership. 
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ownership and estimate its prevalence among ASCs. One study reported that 83% of ASCs had 
physician owners based on a survey conducted by the American Association of Ambulatory 
Surgery Centers (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). Another study stated that the percentage 
of ASCs with physician owners reached 91% in 2008, citing a survey conducted by the same 
association (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009). The percentage of physician-
owned ASCs based on surveys conducted by the Ambulatory Surgery Center Association (the 
successor of the American Association of Ambulatory Surgery Centers and the Federated 
Ambulatory Surgery Association) may not be nationally representative because the Association 
has about 650 member ASCs while there are more than 5, 300 ASCs around the nation 
(Ambulatory Surgery Center Association, 2012; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 
2012).  
It is difficult to determine the physician ownership structure of an ASC, and it is even 
tougher to identify physician owners since no public information is available (Gabel et al., 2008). 
Researchers in previous studies tried to determine the physician ownership status of ASCs via 
public records or by directly contacting individual facilities. Mitchell (2010) combined 
information from public records maintained by a state agency and a private insurer and that from 
facilities with incomplete records. She reported that Idaho had 42 ASCs in 2007, 39 of which 
were owned entirely by referring physicians (Mitchell, 2010). Gabel et al (2008) used 
information from hospital association, insurers, phone calls and web search to determine the 
ownership of facilities. They found that 28 out of 43 ASCs in the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia 
metropolitan areas were owned by physicians (65%) (Gabel et al., 2008). Identifying physician 
ownership status by contacting providers directly has several limitations. First, it is time-
consuming and resource-intensive, which has limited its application to broader geographic areas. 
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Second, since the survey involves a sensitive matter (i.e., reporting physician investment in a 
health care facility, which may be deemed as a conflict of interest), elicitation of accurate 
responses is a major concern. Finally, it is difficult to follow up changes in ownership over time. 
 Two other studies used proxy measures to distinguish physician owners from physician 
non-owners (Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Strope et al., 2009). The safe harbor rule issued by the 
Office of Inspector General (1999) requires that owners of multispecialty ASCs must perform at 
least one-third of their procedures in the facility in which they have invested. Strope et al. (2009) 
claimed that the ASCs that provided outpatient urological procedures were multispecialty and 
defined physician-owners as those who performed more than 30% of their cases within a single 
ASC in each year. They attempted to validate this definition using the public records made 
available by the Florida Department of State Division of Corporation. The validation was 
conducted by first identifying a sample of ASCs with physicians listed as registered agents, 
counting all physicians practicing in these facilities as owners, and comparing the total numbers 
of physician owners with the number identified using the empirical definition (Strope et al., 
2009). Hollingsworth et al. (2010) applied the same method to identify physician owners in 
ASCs that provided carpal tunnel release, cataract excision, colonoscopy, knee arthroscopy, and 
myringotomy with tympanostomy tube placement (Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Strope et al., 
2009). It is unclear whether all these ASCs were multispecialty and thus subjected to the one-
third of procedures rule.  
Defining physician owners as those performing a large proportion of their procedures at 
an ASC also has some flaws. First, only physician owners practicing in multispecialty ASCs are 
required to perform at least one-third of procedures in the facilities they own. Second, 
performing more than 30% of one’s procedures in an ASC is a necessary condition for being an 
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owner, but not a sufficient condition. A physician may choose to perform a large proportion of 
his or her cases in an ASC merely out of personal preference. In short, identifying physician 
ownership status of ASCs remains to be challenging. A method that can reliably determine the 
physician ownership of ASCs within a large geographic area is still missing.  
To sum up, this section reviews the prevalence of physician ownership among ASCs as 
reported in the literature and the empirical methods used by some studies to determine the 
physician ownership status of ASCs. The next section reviews studies that examined the outcome 
variables of interest-the quality of outpatient surgery and then more specifically the quality of 
outpatient colonoscopy.  
Quality of Outpatient Surgery 
Enormous importance has been attached to health care quality, both in relation to 
inpatient and outpatient care, since the release of the Institute of Medicine report “Crossing the 
Quality Chasm” (Institute of Medicine, 2001). This section reviews the literature examining the 
quality of outpatient surgeries in general and outpatient colonoscopy in particular. Specifically, it 
covers the following topics: how quality of outpatient surgery is measured, empirical approaches 
adopted by researchers, and factors found to affect the quality of outpatient surgery. After a 
general discussion of analyses focusing on outpatient surgery, the section then reviews studies 
specifically examining the quality of outpatient colonoscopy.  
Quality measures of outpatient surgery. 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) proposed one of the widely accepted definitions of 
quality, which defines it as the “degree to which health services for individuals and populations 
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional 
knowledge.” (Lohr, 1990) Although quality of outpatient surgery can also be captured by process 
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of care indicators, postoperative morbidity, and patient satisfaction (Shnaider & Chung, 2006), 
researchers often use patient outcome indicators, such as mortality and adverse events after the 
outpatient surgical procedure to quantify the quality of care. These two types of quality measures 
are described below with detail shown in Table 2.  
Mortality measures. 
Mortality or patient death that occurs during a patient stay in a facility or within a period 
of follow-up is a traditional measure of quality and safety for surgery and anesthesia (Shnaider & 
Chung, 2006). As Table 2 reports, few studies in the literature used in-facility mortality to 
measure patient outcomes. One exception is the study conducted by Fleisher et al. (2004), which 
reported that out of 564,267 outpatient surgical procedures, no deaths occurred the day of 
surgery at a physician’s office, 4 deaths the day of surgery at an ASC (2.3 per 100,000 outpatient 
procedures), and 9 deaths the day of surgery at an hospital outpatient department (2.5 per 
100,000 procedures). Instead, researchers use mortality within 7 days (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; 
Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & 
Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007) or 30 days 
(Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher,  
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Table 2  
Measurements of Quality of Outpatient Surgery 
Authors, Year, and 
Journal 
Data Source /Study Period Procedure(s) studied Quality measures and 
definitions 
Fortier et al. 1998. 
Candian Journal of 
Anethesia 
Medical records from the 
outpatient department of Toronto 
Hospital, Western Division/32-
month period (date unknown) 
Nine surgery groups including 
ENT, dental, general surgery, 
ophathalmology, orthopaedic, 
etc. 
Unplanned immediate 
hospitalization (documented 
by nurses while patients were 
still  in the facility) 
Fleisher, et al. 2004. 
Archives of Surgery 
5% random sample of Medicare 
beneficiary claims data/1994-1999 
cataract, femoral hernia, 
umbilical hernia, laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy, etc. 
Death, hospitalizations, and 
ED visits within 7 days  
Tan, et al. 2011. The 
Journal of Urology 
Medical records from the 
outpatient department of the 
University of Michigan/1998-2008 
Ureteroscopy Unplanned immediate 
hospitalization (defined as a 
change in visit type to 
inpatient or outpatient 
observation) 
Strope et al. 2009. 
The Journal of 
Urology 
Florida SASD and SID from 
AHRQ/ 2004 
Urinary stone surgeries Rates of immediate 
hospitalization and death 
Leffler et al. 2010. 
Archive of Internal 
Medicine 
Medical records from the 
outpatient department of Beth 
Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 
Boston, Massachusetts/March 1 to 
November 30, 2007 
Esophagogastroduodenoscopy 
(EGD) and colonoscopy 
14-day Related ED visit 
and/or hospitalization 
Menachemi et al, 
2007, American 
Journal of Medical 
Quality  
Hospital discharge data set, 
ambulatory discharge data set, and 
vital statistics data from 
Florida/1997-2004 
Colonoscopy, cataract removal, 
upper gastrointestinal 
endoscopy, arthroscopy, and 
repair of inguinal hernia 
7-day and 30-day mortality 
and 7-day and 30-day 
unexpected hospitalizations 
Chukmaitov et al, 
2008, Journal of 
Ambulatory Care 
Management 
Hospital discharge data set, 
ambulatory discharge data set, and 
vital statistics data from 
Florida/1997-2004 
Colonoscopy, cataract removal, 
and upper gastrointestinal 
endoscopy  
7-day and 30-day mortality 
and 7-day and 30-day 
unexpected hospitalizations 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Authors, Year, and 
Journal 
Data Source /Study Period Procedure(s) studied Quality measures and 
definitions 
Chukmaitov et al, 
2008, Health 
Services Research 
Hospital discharge data set, 
ambulatory discharge data set, and 
vital statistics data from 
Florida/1997-2004 
Twelve most common 
ambulatory surgical procedures 
including colonoscopy 
7-day and 30-day mortality 
and 7-day and 30-day 
unexpected hospitalizations 
Menachemi et al, 
2008, The Joint 
Commission Journal 
on Quality and 
Patient Safety 
Hospital discharge data set and 
ambulatory discharge data set 
from Florida/2004 
colonoscopy, cataract removal, 
upper gastrointestinal 
endoscopy, arthroscopy, and 
biopsy of the prostate 
 7-day and 30-day 
unexpected hospitalizations 
Chukmaitov et al, 
2010, Medical Care 
Research and 
Review 
Hospital discharge data set and 
ambulatory discharge data/1997 to 
2004 and ASC organizational 
characteristics data/2007 
outpatient arthroscopy and 
colonoscopy procedures 
30-day unexpected 
hospitalizations 
Note: N/A: not available; BMI: body mass index; AHRQ: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
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Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Levin et al., 2006; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, 
Saunders, & Brooks, 2007) following an outpatient procedure.  
There are some limitations with the mortality measure. First, although it may be 
applicable to outpatient surgery, this measure often reflects the overall health status of the patient 
undergoing the procedure, rather than the quality of care (Shnaider & Chung, 2006). Patient 
death may also be associated with anesthesia, surgery, medical conditions, or even unrelated 
factors, such as a car accident (Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004). In empirical 
research, it could be difficult to determine the cause of death. Exceptions are studies using vital 
statistics data to identify mortality cases that were able to exclude deaths related to suicides and 
homicides (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 
2008; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007). Second, mortality is not a 
sensitive quality indicator because it is only observed in a very small proportion of outpatient 
surgical patients. Even when a 30-day follow-up is used, the morality rate in the outpatient 
surgical setting is still no more than 0.5 per 1,000 procedures (Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & 
Anderson, 2004). Because of these limitations, many studies did not include mortality in the 
multivariate models and only used adverse events as outcome variables to reflect the quality of 
outpatient surgery (Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Ko et al., 2010; 
Warren et al., 2009).   
Adverse event measures. 
Adverse events in the literature of outpatient surgery are usually captured by emergency 
department (ED) visits and/or hospitalizations following the outpatient surgical procedure 
(Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; 
Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, 
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Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Ko et al., 2010; Menachemi, 
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & 
Hollenbeck, 2009; Tan et al., 2011; Warren et al., 2009). The period of follow-up varied across 
studies. As shown in Table 2, two studies examined immediate unplanned hospital admission 
after outpatient ureteroscopy (Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Tan et al., 2011). Fleisher et al. (2004) 
examined hospitalizations and ED visits within 7 days of the outpatient procedure. Leffler et al. 
(2010) evaluated 14-day related ED visit and/or hospitalization after endoscopy procedures. A 
series of studies examined both 7-day and 30-day hospitalizations after common outpatient 
surgical procedures (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & 
Brooks, 2008; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, 
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). In a recent article, Chukmaitov et al. (2010) 
focused on 30-day unplanned hospitalizations after arthroscopy and colonoscopy. Similar to 
mortality measures, adverse events after outpatient surgery are also relatively rare (Chukmaitov 
et al., 2008). 
Adverse event measures have the same issues that plague mortality measures, namely, 
how to exclude adverse events caused by extraneous factors that may be unrelated to the 
outpatient surgical procedure. For example, hospital admissions may have been planned for some 
surgical outpatients as part of their protocol. Fleisher et al. (2004) found that among elderly 
Medicare patients, about one third of physician Medicare claims associated with inpatient 
hospital admissions after outpatient surgery were related to the pre-existing medical conditions. 
Additionally, Leffler et al. (2010) reported that only about 30% of 14-day ED visits and 
hospitalizations were procedure-related. As a result, only a few studies (Fleisher, Pasternak, 
Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & 
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Hollenbeck, 2009) included all-cause adverse events within a certain period of follow-up. Many 
studies examined medical records or the diagnosis codes and diagnoses related group (DRG) 
category listed in the discharge records to identify unexpected medical services use (Chukmaitov 
et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, 
Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Leffler et al., 2010; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, 
Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Tan et 
al., 2011). Some studies further narrowed down ER visits or hospitalizations to those caused by 
specified complications related to the surgical procedure or sedation (Ko et al., 2010; Warren et 
al., 2009).  
An ED visit may or may not lead to a hospital admission. One study reported that a 
higher proportion of outpatient surgical patients paid visits to the ED but did not get hospitalized 
(Coley, Williams, DaPos, Chen, & Smith, 2002). In the literature, Fleisher et al. (2004) examined 
different adverse events separately. The study constructed independent models for 7-day ED visit 
and 7-day hospitalization. Alternatively, Leffler et al., (2010) combined ED visits with 
hospitalization into hospital use.  
Data sources used in the literature for constructing mortality and adverse event measures 
include administrative data sets, medical charts, and death certificates. As Table 2 presents, 
researchers often combined multiple data sources in their studies. For example, in the study of 
Fleisher et al. (2004), mortality was assessed from the Medicare enrollment files, emergency 
department visits were captured by any new physician claim with emergency department as the 
place of service, and hospitalization by any Medicare Part B physician claims with the place of 
service coded as “inpatient.” A series of studies led by Menachemi and by Chukmaitov used a 
hospital discharge data set, an ambulatory discharge data set, and vital statistics data from 
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Florida to study mortality and hospitalization after common outpatient surgeries (Chukmaitov et 
al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Menachemi, 
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & 
Brooks, 2008). 
Using administrative data costs less than medical chart review. Consequently, the sample 
size of studies based on administrative data is typically large. By contrast, studies using medical 
chart review are often limited to one or a few facilities. For example, Tan et al. (2011) used 
medical records from the University of Michigan and found that there were only 70 immediate 
unplanned hospitalizations after outpatient ureteroscopy over a 11-year period (Tan et al., 2011).  
Similarly, Leffler et al. (2010) found that there were only 134 related ED visits and 76 
hospitalizations within 14 days after 6,383 outpatient esophagogastroduodenoscopies and 11,632 
outpatient colonoscopies. 
This subsection reviewed two types of quality measures- mortality and adverse events-
used by prior studies of outpatient surgery. It also discussed the pros and cons of each type of 
measures and typical sources of data used to obtain these measures. Next, empirical methods 
used in these studies will be reviewed.  
Empirical approaches used in the literature. 
The vast majority of the literature related to the empirical assessment of quality of 
outpatient surgery used a retrospective observational study design to assess practice patterns and 
compare patient outcomes (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, 
& Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, 
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 
2008). Only one study had a prospective study design (Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998). To address 
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the issue that mortality and adverse events are relatively rare after outpatient surgery, many 
studies had a pooled cross-sectional design to combine observations over a period of multiple 
years (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; 
Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & 
Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008).  
Two studies adopted different analytical strategies. Tan et al. (2011) matched each patient 
with unplanned hospital admission (cases) to three patients without admission (controls) based 
on surgeon, gender and date of surgery, with all controls having surgery within the month of the 
corresponding case. Chukmaitov et al. (2010) conducted a longitudinal study at the facility-year 
level. The unit of analysis in this study was facility-year. The total number of patients who were 
hospitalized after receiving outpatient procedures was used as the outcome variable and 
independent variables were also at the facility level.  
As shown in Table 3, most previous studies used various risk adjustment strategies when 
studying the outcomes of outpatient surgery since the severity of patients undergoing outpatient 
surgical procedures can vary greatly (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, 
Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, 
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & 
Brooks, 2008). One common approach to account for patient risk factors is to calculate Charlson 
et al. (1987) Index and its modified version (Deyo, Cherkin, & Ciol, 1992). This approach is also 
adopted by studies of outpatient surgery (David & Neuman, 2011; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, 
& Anderson, 2004). Strope et al. (2009) used Elixhauser et al. (1998) Comorbidity Index to 
measure the comorbidity of patients. Increasingly more studies adopted the Diagnosis Cost 
Groups-Hierarchical Condition Categories (DCG-HCC) methodology (Pope et al., 2004) to do 
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Table 3  
Empirical studies of the quality of outpatient surgery 
Authors, 
Year, and 
Journal 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Quality 
measures 
Independent 
variables 
Risk 
adjustment 
method 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major Findings 
Fortier et al. 
1998. 
Candian 
Journal of 
Anethesia 
Patient 
level/15,179 
consecutive 
outpatient 
surgical 
patients 
Unplanned 
immediate 
hospitalization  
Preoperative, 
intraoperative, 
and postoperative 
factors 
N/A Descriptive 
analysis and 
logistic 
regression 
Male, ASA status II and 
III, long duration of 
surgery, surgery finishing 
after 3 pm, postoperative 
bleeding, excessive pain, 
nausea and vomiting, and 
excessive drowsiness or 
dizziness are risk factors 
Fleisher, et 
al. 2004. 
Archives of 
Surgery 
Patient level/ 
Elderly 
beneficiaries 
undergoing 
16 outpatient 
procedures  
Death, 
hospitalizations, 
and ED visits 
within 7 days  
Location of care, 
age group, sex, 
race, prior 
hospital 
admissions, and 
comorbidity 
The 
modified 
Charlson 
Index by 
Deyo et al. 
(1992) 
Descriptive 
analysis and 
logistic 
regression 
More advanced age, prior 
hospital admission, being 
treated at a physician's 
office or outpatient 
hospital, and invasiveness 
of surgery were linked to 
increased risk of inpatient 
admission or death  
Tan, et al. 
2011. The 
Journal of 
Urology 
Patient 
level/1,798 
consecutive 
outpatient 
ureteroscopy 
Unplanned 
immediate 
hospitalization  
Clinical factors 
that are 
potentially 
associated with 
unplanned 
hospitalization 
N/A Conditional 
logistic 
regression 
Any previous admission 
related to stone disease, 
history of psychiatric 
illness and bilateral 
procedure are associated 
with increased risk for 
immediate unplanned 
admission while a 
diagnosis of distal ureteral 
stones is a protective 
factor.  
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Table 3 (continued) 
Authors, 
Year, and 
Journal 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Quality 
measures 
Independent 
variables 
Risk 
adjustment 
method 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major Findings 
Strope et al. 
2009. The 
Journal of 
Urology 
Setting 
(hospital-
based 
outpatient 
facility or 
ASC) 
level/Patients 
who 
underwent 
surgery for 
stone disease  
Rates of 
immediate 
hospitalization 
and death 
Location of care N/A Descriptive 
analysis 
The ratios of short-term 
hospital transfer at a 
hospital-based outpatient 
facility and those at an 
ASC were 0.4/100,000 
procedures and 
2.5/100,000 procedures. 
Overall, stone surgery 
appears to be safely 
delivered outside of the 
hospital setting.  
Leffler et al. 
2010. 
Archive of 
Internal 
Medicine 
Patient level/ 
patients of 
outpatient 
EGD and 
colonoscopy  
14-day Related 
ED visit and/or 
hospitalization 
N/A N/A Descriptive 
analysis 
About 30% of the 
hospitalizations and ED 
visits 14 days after the 
procedure were procedure-
related. Fourteen-day 
related hospital visits 
occurred in about 1% of 
outpatient endoscopy.  
Menachemi 
et al, 2007, 
American 
Journal of 
Medical 
Quality  
Patient 
level/3, 174, 
436 patients 
receiving 5 
common 
outpatient 
surgical 
procedures 
7-day and 30-
day mortality 
and 7-day and 
30-day 
unexpected 
hospitalizations 
Race/ethnicity 
and gender, Age 
group, payer 
type, facility 
type, and severity 
of illness. 
DCG/HCC Logistic 
regression 
models with 
a pooled 
cross-
sectional 
design 
African Americans were at 
a significantly increased 
risk for either mortality or 
unexpected hospitalization 
in 4 of the 5 procedures 
examined. Female gender 
was associated with lower 
level of unexpected 
hospital admission or 
mortality.  
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Table 3 (continued) 
Authors, 
Year, and 
Journal 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Quality 
measures 
Independent 
variables 
Risk 
adjustment 
method 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major Findings 
Chukmaitov 
et al, 2008, 
Journal of 
Ambulatory 
Care 
Management 
Patient 
level/patients 
receiving 
colonoscopy, 
cataract 
removal, and 
upper GI 
endoscopy  
7-day and 30-
day mortality 
and 7-day and 
30-day 
unexpected 
hospitalizations 
Physician and 
facility volume, 
gender, age, race, 
insurance type, 
severity, and 
location of care  
DCG/HCC Logistic 
regression 
models with 
a pooled 
cross-
sectional 
design 
Patients treated by high-
volume physicians or 
facilities had lower odds 
ratios for hospitalizations 
and mortality. Physician 
volume had a bigger 
impact on unexpected 
hospitalization compared 
with facility volume.  
Chukmaitov 
et al, 2008, 
Health 
Services 
Research 
Patient 
level/patients 
receiving 12 
common 
outpatient 
surgeries 
7-day and 30-
day mortality 
and 7-day and 
30-day 
unexpected 
hospitalizations 
Location of care, 
gender, age, race, 
insurance type, 
severity, and time 
trend 
DCG/HCC Logistic 
regression 
models with 
a pooled 
cross-
sectional 
design 
The relative performance 
of ASCs and hospital-
based outpatient facilities 
depended on the procedure 
examined. Risk-adjustment 
for comorbidities may 
affect the result.  
Menachemi 
et al, 2008, 
The Joint 
Commission 
Journal on 
Quality and 
Patient 
Safety 
Patient 
level/patients 
receiving 5 
common 
outpatient 
surgeries 
 7-day and 30-
day unexpected 
hospitalizations 
Accreditation 
status, gender, 
age, race, 
insurance type, 
severity, and 
facility volume 
DCG/HCC Multivariate 
logistic 
regression 
models  
Patients treated by Joint 
Commission–accredited 
facilities were still 
significantly less likely to 
be hospitalized after 
colonoscopy. No 
differences in unexpected 
hospitalization rates were 
detected in the other 
procedures examined. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Authors, 
Year, and 
Journal 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Quality 
measures 
Independent 
variables 
Risk 
adjustment 
method 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major Findings 
Chukmaitov 
et al, 2010, 
Medical 
Care 
Research 
and Review 
Facility-year 
level/facility-
years 
providing 
arthroscopies 
and 
colonoscopies 
30-day 
unexpected 
hospitalizations 
Specialization, 
ownership type, 
facility volume, 
payer-mix, % of 
minority patients, 
mean severity 
measure, and 
time effects 
DCG/HCC Poisson 
regression 
models with 
a panel 
design and 
both fixed-
effects and 
random-
effects 
The rate of specialization 
in ASCs was associated 
better patient outcomes 
(though at a diminishing 
rate). In addition, facility 
volume was weakly 
associated with improved 
patient outcomes.  
Note: N/A: not available; BMI: body mass index; AHRQ: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; GI: gastrointestinal; EGD: 
esophagogastroduodenoscopy; DCG/HCC: Diagnostic cost groups/hierarchical condition categories risk-adjustment methodology
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risk adjustment (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 
2008; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, 
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). This method has been validated as a proper measure of risk 
adjustment in the outpatient setting, but the cost of the software (DxCG, ) constitutes a barrier to 
widespread adoption (Chukmaitov, Harless, Menachemi, Saunders, & Brooks, 2009).  
Besides controlling for patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, some studies also accounted 
for previous medical use history (Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Tan et al., 
2011). For example, Fleisher et al. (2004) included the number of prior admissions to an 
inpatient hospital within 6 months prior to the quarter as a proxy for the propensity to use 
medical services. Using data abstracted from medical records, Tan et al. (2011) controlled for 
receipt of preoperative prophylactic antibiotics, preoperative imaging, and stone burden (size, 
location, and number) when studying the quality of ureteroscopy. 
Previous studies noted that the accuracy and completeness of the coding of some 
variables might be problematic. Chukmaitov et al. (2008b) reported that healthcare professionals 
other than physicians were listed as operating physicians in some discharge records, which were 
likely to result from coding errors. In another study, Chukmaitov et al. (2008a) found that fewer 
secondary diagnoses were reported among ASCs compared with hospital-based outpatient 
facilities and some ASCs did not report secondary diagnoses at all during the study period. To 
address this concern, many studies eliminated providers with very low volume to minimize 
potential coding errors (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; 
Tan et al., 2011). For example, Tan et al (2011) excluded patients without renal or ureteral 
calculi as the primary indication from the sample of ureteroscopy patients. Chukmaitov et al. 
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(2008a) conducted sensitivity analyses to assess the effect of under-reporting of secondary 
diagnoses on risk adjustment. 
As seen in quality of care research in inpatient settings (Gowrisankaran & Town, 1999), 
some independent variables may be endogenous. For example, high procedural volume may lead 
to high quality of care because it can improve the clinical skills and coordination efficiencies of 
medical teams in a facility. But it is also possible that a facility’s high quality level attracts more 
patients that results in high procedural volume. Chukmaitov et al. (2010) argued that in the 
presence of potential reverse causation between independent variables and patient outcome 
variables, it is only possible to examine the association rather than causal relationship between 
the two groups of variables. They suggested that prospective study designs may resolve this 
reverse causality issue in the outpatient surgical setting.     
To account for the fact that patient outcomes can vary widely across different outpatient 
surgeries, most studies stratified the sample by types of surgical procedures instead of mixing all 
outpatient surgical procedures (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, 
Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Leffler et al., 2010; 
Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, 
& Hollenbeck, 2009). These researchers focused on a narrow scope of procedures by selecting 
specific Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes. On one hand, stratification of the study 
population improves the homogeneity of the sample and the internal validity. But on the other 
hand, it may be difficult to generalize research findings based on patients of one outpatient 
surgery to other patient populations.  
In many studies, the outcome variables were binary (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; 
Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & 
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Anderson, 2004; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Leffler et al., 2010; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, 
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; 
Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & Hollenbeck, 2009; Tan et al., 2011). As Table 3 presents, 
descriptive analysis and logistic regressions were major analytical approaches used in these 
patient level analyses (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & 
Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; 
Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, 
Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). Two studies used only descriptive analysis method (Leffler et al., 
2010; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & Hollenbeck, 2009). One study used conditional 
logistic regression analysis, corresponding to the case-control study design (Tan et al., 2011). 
Chukmaitov et al. (2010) used the total number of patients who were hospitalized unexpectedly 
after receiving an outpatient procedure in a facility as the outcome variable. They used Poisson 
regression models with a panel design in the study. Both fixed effects and random effects models 
were estimated.   
The data used by many prior studies had hierarchical structures (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; 
Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, 
Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, 
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & 
Brooks, 2008; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & Hollenbeck, 2009). If a group of patients 
were nested within hospital-based outpatient facilities or ASCs, patient outcomes might be 
correlated among patients treated by a single facility. Therefore, in the quality analysis of 
providers, both the variability between providers and that between patients nested within the 
providers should be considered. Chukmaitov et al. (2010) recognized that estimation of facility-
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level factors may be spuriously significant in nested models with patient level quality measures. 
To address this issue, they aggregated patient information to the facility level, as suggested by 
the literature (Bach, 2009). Another approach to address this issue is hierarchical linear modeling 
(Normand, Glickman, & Gatsonis, 1997). The advantage of the hierarchical modeling approach 
is that it accounts for the hierarchical or nested structure of the data by including random effects 
at each level of the hierarchy. This approach results in a more conservative estimation of the 
factors at higher levels.  
Factors associated with quality of outpatient surgery. 
Table 3 includes several empirical studies that examine the impact of patient 
characteristics, clinical factors, and characteristics of the facility where patients received 
outpatient surgery on patient outcomes. Patient-specific factors were found to be important 
predictors of mortality and adverse events following outpatient surgery (Fleisher, Pasternak, 
Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007). For 
example, Fleisher et al. (2004) used multivariate logistic regression models and found that 
compared with a white patient aged 65-69 years, advanced age (above 85), and being African 
American or Hispanic were associated with a significantly higher rate of 7-day ED visit or 
hospitalization. After controlling for age group, payer type, facility type, and severity of illness, 
Menachemi et al. (2007) found that African Americans were at a significantly increased rate for 
either mortality or unexpected hospitalization in 4 of the 5 procedures examined. They also 
found that patients aged above 84 were at greater risk for at least 1 negative outcome in all 5 
procedures examined. Finally, they found that female gender was associated with lower level of 
unexpected hospital admission or mortality. 
Clinical characteristics such as previous inpatient hospital admission, invasiveness of the 
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procedure, and number of procedures performed in the encounter may also affect patient 
outcomes. Tan et al. (2011) found that the odds ratio of immediate hospitalization for patients of 
bilateral ureteroscopy were 2.88 compared with patients receiving the unilateral procedure. The 
invasiveness of the procedure was found to be linked to higher risks after outpatient surgery. 
Fleisher et al. (2004) reported 156 deaths within 7 days after the outpatient surgery in a sample 
of 546,267 elderly Medicare patients undergoing 16 outpatient surgical procedures. But no 
deaths happened to patients who underwent simple mastectomy, femoral hernia, or rotator cuff 
repair.  
Various facility-level factors such as location of care, accreditation, volume, and 
specialization have also been examined in previous studies. The location of care (namely, 
physician’s office, ASC,  and hospital-based outpatient facility) may affect the quality of 
outpatient surgery in that different type of facilities vary greatly in term of patient population, 
level of volume and specialization, technologies, staffing, and access to emergency care 
(Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). Fleisher et al. (2004) compared 
the quality of multiple outpatient surgical procedures in physician’s office, ASCs, and hospital-
based outpatient facilities using 5% Medicare beneficiary claims data and found that patients 
treated at ASCs have relatively better outcomes than those treated at physician’s offices and 
hospital-based outpatient facilities. Specifically, in the 7-day ED visit model including multiple 
procedures, the study found that patients treated at ASCs had worse outcomes than those in 
physician’s offices but better outcomes than those in hospital-based outpatient facilities. In the 7-
day hospitalization model, patients treated at ASCs had best outcomes across all three settings. 
When each procedure was evaluated individually, patients treated at ASCs were associated with 
less negative outcomes such as hospitalization and mortality compared with those treated at 
    
 
33 
 
physician’s offices in 7 of 8 procedures of sufficient sample size while controlling for patient 
severity. Chukmaitov et al. (2008a) examined the quality of 12 common outpatient procedures 
performed in ASC and hospital-based outpatient facility settings. They reported that for 10 of the 
12 procedures studied, there was no quality difference between ASCs and hospital-based 
outpatient facilities. For the unplanned hospitalization measure, hospital-based outpatient 
facilities performed better than ASCs in 9 out of 12 procedures when using all available 
diagnoses in risk adjustment. They concluded that neither ASCs nor hospital-based outpatient 
facilities was consistently associated with better quality of care. They also noted that the results 
of comparison of quality between the two types of facilities were sensitive to risk adjustment 
method used. The current study primarily builds on these latter two studies by further controlling 
for the physician ownership status of ASCs.  
One study examined the relationship between accreditation status of ASCs and the 
quality of outpatient surgery. Menachemi et al. (2008) found that for outpatient colonoscopy, 
patients treated by Joint Commission–accredited facilities were significantly less likely to be 
hospitalized after controlling for patient characteristics and facility volume. But such effect was 
not observed in four other procedures examined.  
Chukmaitov et al. (2008) examined whether an association exists between physician and 
facility volumes and patient outcomes in the outpatient settings. Two types of volume variables 
were used: a tertile variable created by ranking providers into low-, medium-, or high-volume 
categories and a continuous variable of the natural logarithm of providers’ case load. They found 
a consistent, dose-responsive pattern that linked higher volumes to improved patient outcomes 
for the 3 types of procedures they studied. Moreover, when both physician and facility volumes 
were included, the physician volume variable demonstrated stronger effects than the facility 
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volume variable in terms of magnitude and levels of significance in the hospitalization models 
and in the mortality models, facility volume had stronger effects.  
Chukmaitov et al. (2010) further examined the relationship between several 
organizational characteristics and quality of arthroscopy and colonoscopy procedures provided 
by ASCs. Different from most previous studies, this study developed hypotheses regarding the 
potential effects of specialization, ownership type, and volume on quality of outpatient surgery, 
based on multiple organizational behavior and organizational theory perspectives and health 
services research literature. They found a positive association between the rate of specialization 
in ASCs and patient quality outcomes (though at a diminishing rate). Additionally, they found 
that facility volume was weakly associated with improved patient outcomes.    
To summarize, patient characteristics, clinical factors, facility characteristics all can 
potentially affect patient outcomes in outpatient surgical settings. These factors explored by prior 
studies should be included in future studies. The current literature is limited to factors at patient 
level and facility level. Competition between hospital-based outpatient facilities and ASCs 
reported by previous studies (Bian & Morrisey, 2007; Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2011; 
Courtemanche & Plotzke, 2010) could have implications for quality. Therefore, it is necessary to 
further investigate whether health care market features such as the level of competition are 
associated with quality of outpatient surgery in future studies.  
Quality of outpatient colonoscopy. 
The previous subsection reviewed the literature on the quality of outpatient surgery in 
general. The literature related to the quality of outpatient colonoscopy deserves a separate review 
because procedure-specific quality measures, better defined study samples, and procedure-
related control variables were used in these studies. Because this study is interested in examining 
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all related complications after colonoscopy, this review includes studies that examined multiple 
quality measures in large patient populations. Studies that centered solely on colonic perforation 
are not included in the review. Similar to the last subsection, this subsection discusses the quality 
measures, data sources, and empirical methods used in prior studies of quality of outpatient 
colonoscopy. Finally, factors that were found to be associated with quality of care are reviewed.  
Colonoscopy is recommended for polyps and cancer screening in average risk person, 
aged between 50 and 75 (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2008). Medicare started to cover 
colonoscopy for colorectal cancer screening in 1998 (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 
2011). It is estimated that over 14 million colonoscopies are performed annually in the United 
States (Seeff et al., 2004). With the aging of the population, the demand for colonoscopy will 
continue to increase. Therefore, it is important to investigate what factors affect patient outcomes 
after the procedure.  
Ideally, quality indicators of colonoscopy should include measures in preprocedure, 
intraprocedure, and postprocedure periods as proposed by the American Society for 
Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE) and the American College of Gastroenterology (ACG) (Rex 
et al., 2006). But in the literature, a majority of studies still concentrated on mortality and 
adverse events after colonoscopy. Most colonoscopies are performed with the patient under 
moderate sedation (“conscious sedation”) (Standards of Practice Committee et al., 2008). Similar 
to other types of outpatient surgeries, mortality after outpatient colonoscopy is also rare. Ko et al. 
(2010) identified 3 deaths following colonoscopy among 21, 375 patients. Additionally, Levin et 
al. (2006) identified 1 death related to colonoscopy while Rabeneck et al. (2008) identified 3 
related deaths and 2 possibly related deaths out of 67,632 outpatient colonoscopy patients. As a 
result, many studies did not examine mortality measures in the multivariate regression models 
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because the number of death were too small to support statistical analysis and the cause of death 
could not be determined (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009).  
Unlike studies that spanned multiple procedures as discussed in the prior subsection, 
colonoscopy studies that examined subsequent ED visits and/or hospitalizations that were 
potential quality issues focused on specific complications related to colonoscopy (Table 4). 
Many studies calculated the rates for certain complications by counting the number of ED visits 
and/or hospitalizations for such complications per 1000 colonoscopy (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et 
al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009). However, previous studies defined and reported colonoscopy 
related complications in various ways. Levin et al. (2006) defined any complication related to 
colonoscopy that led to hospitalization as a “serious complication.” They reported incidence 
rates of lower gastrointestinal bleeding, colonic perforation, postpolypectomy syndrome, 
diverticulitis and other serious illness, including complications related to procedural sedation 
such as aspiration pneumonia, complications of procedures, complications secondary to 
anesthesia, et cetera. Warren et al. (2009) designated 3 adverse events (perforation, 
gastrointestinal bleeding, or the administration of blood transfusions) as serious gastrointestinal 
events. They included two other groups of adverse events, other gastrointestinal events (such as 
paralytic ileus, nausea, and vomiting) as well as cardiovascular events (such as myocardial 
infarction, arrhythmias, and congestive heart failure). Ko et al. (2010) operationalized serious 
events as perforation, postpolypectomy syndrome, gastrointestinal bleeding requiring 
hospitalization and/or transfusion, and diverticulitis. Besides these adverse events, they also 
examined cardiovascular events, neurological events, and other potentially related complications.  
As can be seen in Table 5, medical record and administrative data were major sources of 
data in prior studies. One exception is the study conducted by Ko et al. (2010), which combined 
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Table 4  
Quality measures used in previous outpatient colonoscopy studies 
Authors, Year, 
and Journal 
Data Source /Study 
Period 
Quality measures and definitions 
Warren et al, 
2009, Annals of 
Internal 
Medicine  
5% Medicare claims data 
in SEER cancer registry 
areas/ 
July 1, 2001 to October 
31, 2005 
30-day ED visit or hospitalization for serious gastrointestinal events 
(perforation, gastrointestinal bleeding, or the administration of blood 
transfusions);  
30-day ED visit or hospitalization for other gastrointestinal events (paralytic 
ileus, nausea, vomiting and dehydration, abdominal pain);  
and 30-day ED visit or hospitalization for cardiovascular events (myocardial 
infarction or angina; arrhythmias; congestive heart failure; cardiac or 
respiratory arrest; or syncope, hypotension, or shock) 
Ko et al, 2010, 
Clinical 
Gastroenterology 
and Hepatology 
CORI, two waves of 
phone interviews, and 
National Death Index/NA 
30-day hospitalization for complications directly related to colonoscopy 
(perforation, postpolypectomy syndrome, gastrointestinal bleeding requiring 
hospitalization and/or transfusion, and diverticulitis);  
30-day hospitalization for complications potentially related to colonoscopy 
(angina, myocardial infarction, stroke, transient ischemic attack, and other 
potentially related complications such as abdominal pain or sedation-related 
events); 30-day hospitalization for complications directly and potentially 
related to colonoscopy;death within 30 days 
Levin et al. 
2006. Annals of 
Internal 
Medicine 
Electronic medical 
records from KPNC/ 
January 1994 and July 
2002 
30-day hospitalization for perforation only; 
 30-day hospitalization for perforation, bleeding requiring transfusion, and 
diverticulitis requiring surgery;  
30-day hospitalization for any serious complications (including complications 
listed above and other conditions (colitis, aspiration pneumonia, pneumonia, 
abdominal pain, complications of procedure, complications secondary to 
anesthesia, myocardial infarction, and stroke);  
death within 30 days 
Rabeneck et al, 
2008, 
Gastroenterology 
CIHI Discharge Abstract 
Database/April 1, 2002, 
to March 31, 2003 
30-day hospitalization for bleeding or perforation;  
death within 30 days 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Authors, Year, 
and Journal 
Data Source /Study 
Period 
Quality measures and definitions 
Viiala et al, 
2003, Internal 
Medicine 
Journal 
Medical records from 3 
Australian hospitals, 
death certificates, and 
hospital records/5 
September 1989-31 
December 1999 
30-day hospitalization for bleeding, perforation, and other complications 
(abdominal pain, nausea/vomiting, excess sedation, angina, atrial fibrillation, 
hypotension, transient ischemic attack, reversible ischemic neurologic deficit, 
and aspiration); death within 30 days 
Abbreviation:  SEER: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results; KPNC: Kaiser Permanente of Northern California; CORI, Clinical Outcomes Research 
Initiative National Endoscopic Database; CIHI: Canadian Institute for Health Information. 
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Table 5  
Summary of studies of the quality of outpatient colonoscopy 
Authors, Year, 
and Journal 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Quality measures and 
definitions 
Independent 
variables 
Risk 
adjustment 
method 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major 
Findings 
Warren et al, 
2009, Annals of 
Internal 
Medicine  
Patient 
level/53, 220 
Medicare 
beneficiaries 
aged 66 
through 95 
years 
30-day ED visit or 
hospitalization for 
serious gastrointestinal 
events, other 
gastrointestinal events, 
and cardiovascular 
events  
patient age, race, 
sex, state/county, 
urban/rural, ZIP 
code level 
indicators, and 
comorbid 
conditions 
The 
modified 
Charlson 
Index by 
Romano et 
al (1993) 
Logistic 
regression 
with a 
matched 
cohort 
design 
Rates of 
adverse 
events 
increased 
with age, 
polypectomy, 
comorbidities, 
and some 
conditions  
Ko et al, 2010, 
Clinical 
Gastroenterology 
and Hepatology 
Patient 
level/21, 375 
patients aged 
40 and over 
30-day hospitalization 
for 4 serious events 
and other potentially 
related events; death 
within 30 days 
Age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, use 
of some 
medications, 
biopsy or 
polypectomy, 
indication, trainee 
participation, and 
practice setting 
N/A Forward 
step-wise 
logistic 
regression 
The risk of 
complications 
increased 
with 
preprocedure 
warfarin use, 
and 
polypectomy 
Levin et al. 
2006. Annals of 
Internal 
Medicine 
Patient 
level/16,318 
patients aged 
40 and over 
30-day hospitalization 
for  (1) perforation 
only; 2) perforation, 
bleeding, or 
diverticulitis requiring 
surgery; and 3) any 
serious complication; 
death within 30 days 
 age, sex, and the 
performance of 
biopsy or 
polypectomy 
N/A Bivariate 
Poisson 
regression 
with a 
generalized 
estimating 
equation 
approach 
Biopsy or 
polypectomy 
was 
associated 
with an 
increased risk 
for any 
serious 
complication.  
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Table 5 (continued) 
Authors, Year, 
and Journal 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Quality measures and 
definitions 
Independent 
variables 
Risk 
adjustment 
method 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major 
Findings 
Rabeneck et al, 
2008, 
Gastroenterology 
Patient 
level/97,091 
patients aged 
between 50 to 
75 years in 4 
Canadian 
provinces 
30-day hospitalization 
for bleeding or 
perforation; death 
within 30 days 
 age, sex, 
comorbidity, 
polypectomy, 
endoscopist’s 
specialty and 
experience, and 
location of care.   
The 
modified 
Charlson 
Index by 
Deyo et al. 
(1992) 
Generalized 
estimating 
equations 
model 
Older age, 
male sex, 
polypectomy, 
and being 
treated by 
low-volume 
endoscopist 
were more 
likely to have 
bleeding or 
perforation. 
Viiala et al, 
2003, Internal 
Medicine 
Journal 
Patient 
level/23,508 
patients aged 
between 13 to 
102 
30-day hospitalization 
for bleeding, 
perforation, and other 
complications; death 
within 30 days 
Provider’s 
experience and the 
type of procedure 
N/A Descriptive 
analysis 
The 
complication 
rates were 
not higher 
among 
trainees 
compared 
with 
endoscopists.  
Abbreviation:  N/A: not available; SEER: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results; KPNC: Kaiser Permanente of Northern California; CORI, Clinical 
Outcomes Research Initiative National Endoscopic Database; CIHI: Canadian Institute for Health Information. 
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information from two waves of phone interviews about 7 and 30 days after patients underwent 
colonoscopy, procedure reports based on medical records, and the National Death Index. The 
advantage of using patient surveys is that the researchers were able to ask patients about 
preprocedure use of aspirin, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agents, warfarin, and clopidogrel to 
examine the influence of these medications on complication risks. However, the study was also 
limited by the survey data. With a 53% overall response rate, the estimates of complication rates 
might be biased.  
Compared with studies that examined multiple types of procedures, studies that focused 
on outpatient colonoscopy had better defined study samples. Levin et al. (2006) only included 
colonoscopies that had one of these indications: a family history of colorectal cancer or 
adenomatous polyp, a follow-up to a positive screening test, for surveillance because of a 
previously detected adenomatous polyp or colorectal cancer, or for primary screening. Excluded 
procedures fell into one of these categories: those performed for excluded indications or for 
symptoms, those with poor preparation (with a second procedure rescheduled in 90 days), those 
performed less than 6 months since a previous procedure, or those performed in patients with 
previous colon surgery, inpatient or outpatient visits 6 month before the procedure for abdominal 
pain, lower gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, diarrhea, or constipation. Specific rules were used 
as to the inclusion/exclusion of multiple colonoscopies received by a single patient. If a 
colonoscopy was incomplete and a second colonoscopy was performed within 3 months, only the 
second one was included. If a second colonoscopy was performed to finish removal of a polyp, 
only the first colonoscopy was included. If a patient received more than one colonoscopy during 
the 7 year study period and the interval between the colonoscopies was greater than 6 months, 
these colonoscopies were included in the cohort. Rabeneck et al. (2008) excluded those patients 
    
 
42 
 
who had a colonoscopy, a diagnosis of colorectal cancer, a hospitalization caused by 
inflammatory bowel disease, or a colonic resection in the 5 years preceding the index 
colonoscopy. They also excluded patients who had an endoscopy in the 7 days prior to or on the 
day of the index colonoscopy and who had the colonoscopy for endoscopic hemostasis, insertion 
of a colonic stent, endoscopic colonic dilatation, or endoscopic reduction of a sigmoid volvulus. 
Warren et al. (2009) excluded procedures coded by the physician as incomplete, and those done 
in patients at a high risk for perforation. Specifically, persons with preexisting conditions such as 
diverticulitis, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, and colorectal cancer were excluded. Patients 
who received more than 2 colonoscopies during the study period or those who had 2 
colonoscopies in less than 60 days were also excluded. Ko et al. (2010) excluded patients with a 
history of inflammatory bowel disease or recent visible gastrointestinal bleeding. They also 
restricted to the study sample to patients who received their first colonoscopy during the study 
period. Excluding atypical colonoscopy procedures from the study sample improved the 
homogeneity of studied cases and reduced the influence of confounding factors on the 
complication rates.  
Most prior studies had a pooled cross-sectional design. An exception is that Warren et al. 
(2009) used a matched cohort study design to determine whether the risk for adverse events in 
colonoscopy patients was higher than that in the general Medicare population. Patients 
undergoing colonoscopy were matched to Medicare beneficiaries who had not undergone 
colonoscopy during the same period based on birth year, procedure year, race, sex, state or 
country of residence, and comorbidity score. As shown in Table 5, most studies controlled for 
patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, and the type of colonoscopy technique used. Warren et al. 
(2009) included the socioeconomic characteristics of patient’s neighborhood. Rabeneck et al 
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(2008) and Warren et al. (2009) controlled for the severity of illness, using a modified Charlson 
Index. Rabeneck et al (2008) and Ko et al. (2010) also accounted for the effects of location of 
care (Ko et al., 2010; Rabeneck et al., 2008).  
While Viiala et al. (2003) used mainly descriptive analyses to capture the incidence of 
multiple complications and compared the complication rates among providers with different 
training and among different types of procedures, other studies used both descriptive and 
multivariate regression analysis methods. Levin et al. (2006) conducted bivariate Poisson 
regression analyses to describe the association among complications and independent variables. 
Rabeneck et al. (2008) used generalized estimating equations models to assess risk factors for 
complications. Warren et al. (2009) estimated 3 separate logistic regression models for three 
dependent variables: serious gastrointestinal events, other gastrointestinal events, and 
cardiovascular events. In addition to demonstrating unadjusted rates for adverse events, they also 
calculated the predictive 30-day marginal rate per 1000 procedures associated with an 
intervention or risk factor by averaging the individual predicted rates. Ko et al. (2010) used 
forward step-wise logistic regression models to study the association between the incidence of 
complications and risk factors of interest. Except for age and sex, variables with global P<.1 
were retained in the final model.  
Overall, prior studies found that patient age and biopsy or polypectomy procedures were 
reliable predictors of complications related to colonoscopy (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; 
Rabeneck et al., 2008; Warren et al., 2009). Male gender was found to be associated with higher 
rates for adverse events after colonoscopy, which is consistent with the conclusion reached by 
Menachemi et al. (2007). The invasiveness of the intervention patients received during 
colonoscopy significantly influences the risk of complications. Prior studies indicated that 
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polypectomy was associated with significantly higher risk of developing complications (Ko et al., 
2010; Rabeneck et al., 2008; Warren et al., 2009). 
Prior studies examining adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy had some limitations. 
First, existing studies were limited to Medicare patients (Warren et al., 2009), a few health care 
facilities (Levin et al., 2006; Viiala, Zimmerman, Cullen, & Hoffman, 2003), or patient 
populations with a narrow age range (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Rabeneck et al., 2008; 
Warren et al., 2009). Only one of the prior studies examined complications after outpatient 
colonoscopy in the general population (Viiala, Zimmerman, Cullen, & Hoffman, 2003). Two 
prior studies selected patients above 40 years old, arguing that colonoscopy is used much less by 
young adults (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006). Warren et al. (2009) limited the cohort to 
persons aged 66 through 95 years at the time of their procedure. Rabeneck et al. (2008) restricted 
the study sample to patients 50 to 75 years old who underwent screening colonoscopies. Several 
studies examined large general patient population (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, 
Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & 
Brooks, 2010; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, 
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008) but these studies did not report specific adverse 
events related to colonoscopy.  
Second, the diversity of definitions and reporting of adverse events after outpatient 
colonoscopy makes comparison of complication rates across studies problematic (Ko & 
Dominitz, 2010). Comparison of incidence rates of adverse events other than serious 
complications is even more challenging because many studies only reported aggregated 
measures (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009). In addition, no study 
examined a full spectrum of colonoscopy-related adverse events. For example, Warren et al 
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(2009) examined serious gastrointestinal events, other gastrointestinal events, and cardiovascular 
events, but they did not include sedation-related complications, as did Levin et al. (2006).  
Third, prior studies did not account for market-level factors or fully control for clustering 
among observations. As mentioned in the last subsection, some local health market features, such 
as the level of competition between hospital-based outpatient facilities and ASCs may affect 
providers’ quality production decisions. Previous studies suggested that market-level factors 
such as HMO penetration and competition level affect providers’ volume, revenues, costs and 
profits (Bian & Morrisey, 2007; Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2011; Courtemanche & Plotzke, 
2010). Two prior studies recognized the issue of hierarchical structures in the data. Levin et al. 
(2006) accounted for the nested structure of data (colonoscopies were nested within individual 
colonoscopist) by using a generalized estimating equations approach. Rabeneck et al. (2008) also 
used generalized estimating equations models. In a study of patients in Canada, they clustered 
within province in a model that used data from four provinces, and clustered within physicians in 
the model that included endoscopist information. As mentioned in the last subsection, the 
method of hierarchical linear modeling is another promising approach that should be explored by 
future studies. While generalized estimating equations models account for the correlation 
between observations by use of empirical variance estimator, hierarchical modeling is able to 
model variability at each level of the hierarchy.  
This subsection reviewed the quality measures, data sources, empirical methods used, and 
important factors of quality found in prior studies that specifically examined the quality of 
outpatient colonoscopy. It also discussed some limitation associated with these studies. These 
findings will be used to inform the design of the current study. 
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Effects of Physician Ownership on Care in Ambulatory Surgery Centers 
The literature review in the previous section implies that prior studies of outpatient 
surgery in general as well as studies centered on outpatient colonoscopy largely overlooked the 
potential effect of physician ownership. In fact, the literature on the effects of physician 
ownership of ambulatory surgery centers generally followed two lines (Table 6). One line of 
research focused on how physicians’ investment in ASCs affects their referral patterns. It has 
been demonstrated that physicians practicing in physician-owned ASCs are more likely than 
other physicians to refer Medicare and privately insured patients to their own facilities while 
directing Medicaid recipients to non-physician-owned facilities (Gabel et al., 2008; 
Hollingsworth et al., 2010b). Such type of patient profiling based on insurance types may create 
access barriers for less resourced patients to receive ASC services (Strope, Sarma, Ye, Wei, & 
Hollenbeck, 2009). Moreover, selective referral of patients to their own facilities and general 
hospitals by physician owners may weaken the ability of the latter to provide safety net services 
(Gabel et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2010).  
The second line of research examined the effect of physician ownership on the use of 
surgical procedures. Prior studies indicated that the financial incentive linked to physician 
ownership of ASCs was associated with physicians’ practice patterns. Physician owners were 
found to have higher use rates for 3 common orthopedic procedures compared with physician 
nonowners (Mitchell, 2010). Strope et al. (2009b) found that the increase in the rates of 
outpatient urological surgery with time coincided with greater utilization by new physician 
owners. Furthermore, these new owners increasingly performed a larger proportion of lucrative 
procedures. Hollingsworth et al. (2010) found that physician-ownership was associated with 
greater use of five common outpatient procedures and the acquisition of ownership status by a 
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physician was associated with significant increases in the use of four surgical procedures. One 
possible interpretation of these research findings is that when physicians’ income is tied to the 
profitability of the facility, they may induce demand for medical services. They may not only 
increase the volume of procedures performed by themselves, but may also refer patients to other 
doctors working in the physician-owned facility (Mitchell, 2005). If the financial incentive 
linked to physician ownership of ASCs results in greater overall volume of surgical services (part 
of which may not be medically necessary), savings due to lower payment rates in ASCs could be 
offset or eliminated and total health care spending may be driven to an even higher level. 
Nevertheless, a competing explanation is that high volume physicians are more likely to acquire 
ownership of an ASC. With the absence of a study that appropriately addresses the potential 
reverse causal relationship between physician ownership and volume, it remains unclear whether 
physician ownership results in increased utilization of outpatient surgical procedures.  
While empirical studies that centered on the effect of physician ownership are not 
available, there is qualitative evidence from related areas that may provide some insights about 
the implication of physician ownership of ASCs for the quality of care. Medical group leaders 
participating in the Community Tracking Study asserted that physician-owned ASCs could 
improve quality because of physician owners’ involvement in the design of the delivery system, 
dedicated staff and surgical equipment, and the focus of providing a limited scope of services 
(Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). If they can attract a large number of patients, physician-
owned ASCs can function as focused factories which are able to control costs and improve 
quality by delivering a narrow range of procedures (Herzlinger, 1997). However, if newly built 
ASCs represent excess capacity in a community, the demand for outpatient surgery may not be 
able to support ASCs to perform a high volume and thus achieve improved quality (Casalino, 
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Devers, & Brewster, 2003; Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003). Moreover, if physician 
ownership results in overutilization in physician-owned ASCs, the quality of care may be worse 
in these facilities in that patients are exposed to the unnecessary risk associated with 
inappropriate medical interventions (Chassin MR, Galvin RW,and the National Roundtable on 
Health Care Quality, 1998; Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003). By contrast, hospital-based 
facilities may benefit from hospital-wide quality improvement initiatives. Overall, there is 
inconclusive qualitative evidence for the effect of physician ownership of ASCs on quality.  
Two empirical studies examined the effect of physician ownership on quality of care in 
physician-owned facilities. The seminal work by Mitchell and Sass (1995) examined the effect of 
physician ownership of physical therapy facilities using survey data (Table 6). They found that 
clinics that completely relied on physician owners’ referrals treated patients for 50% more visits 
than clinics with no referrals from physician owners. They found no difference in quality of care 
across ownership structures. In addition, they found that physical therapists were less likely to 
work in physician-owned clinics in states that allowed them to practice independently. Overall, 
the findings suggested that it was more likely that physicians invested in ancillary facilities to 
induce and benefit from the demand for services than to exercise influence over the quality of 
such services. O’Neill and Hartz (2012) examined outcomes for patients who underwent 
percutaneous coronary interventions in 6 cardiac hospitals and 18 general hospitals in Texas. 
They found that the risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality rate for patients treated at specialty 
hospitals was significantly lower than the average level. However, the rate was significantly 
higher when physicians who owned cardiac hospitals treated patients in general hospitals. Their 
overall outcomes (mortality rate for patients treated at both cardiac and general hospitals) were 
not significantly different from the average outcomes. They suggested that both lower patient 
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Table 6  
Empirical Studies of the Effect of Physician Ownership 
Authors,  
year, and 
journal 
Data Source/ 
Study Period 
Outcome 
Measures 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Measurement of 
physician 
ownership 
Control 
Variables 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major Findings 
Gabel et 
al, 2008,  
Health  
Affairs 
Pennsylvania 
Health Care 
Cost  
Containment 
Commission/ 
2003 
Patient socio-
demographic 
characteristics
, diagnostic 
group, and 
referral 
patterns 
Facility 
level/ 
1,008,038 
outpatient 
surgery 
discharges in 
the Pittsburg 
and 
Philadelphia 
metropolitan 
areas 
Physician-owned 
ASCs were 
identified by 
checking with 
public records and 
individual facilities. 
Physicians who 
account for the top 
50% of referrals to 
these ASCs are 
regarded as 
physician owners. 
NA Bivariate 
analyses 
Physician-owned 
ASCs treated 
less indigent, 
Medicaid, and 
African 
American 
patients. 
Physician-
owners tended to 
refer well-
insured patients 
to their facilities. 
Strope et 
al, 2009,  
Medical 
Care 
Florida State 
Ambulatory 
Surgery  
Database 
(SASD)/ 
1998-2002 
The rate of 
ambulatory 
surgery, the 
proportion of 
procedures 
with 
misaligned 
incentives, 
and the extra 
cost of 
changing 
procedure mix 
Physician 
level/ 
543,031 
patients 
undergoing 
procedures of 
male 
genitourinary 
system and 
female 
urinary 
system 
Physician owners 
were 
operationalized as 
those surgeons who 
performed more 
than 30% of their 
ambulatory surgery 
cases within a 
single ASC in a 
year.  
Year, 
ownership 
status, 
and the 
interactio
n term of 
both 
Chi-square 
tests, 
Poisson 
regression 
model 
with an 
exposure 
variable 
and linear 
regression
s 
. This increase in 
rates of 
ambulatory 
surgery was 
associated with 
the conversion 
of nonowners to 
owners and a 
shift to lucrative 
procedures 
among these 
new owners. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Authors,  
year, and 
journal 
Data Source/ 
Study Period 
Outcome 
Measures 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Measurement of 
physician 
ownership 
Control 
Variables 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major Findings 
Mitchell, 
2010, 
Archives 
of 
Surgery 
State 
documents 
and claims 
data from a 
large private 
insurer/ 
2003-2007 
The ratio of 
patients who 
received the 
surgical 
procedure of 
interest to all 
patients with 
same 
diagnoses 
treated by a 
physician  
in a year 
Patient 
level/office 
visits of 
patients with 
diagnoses 
associated 
with three 
orthopedic 
surgical 
procedures 
Physician 
ownership status of 
ASCs and specialty 
hospitals and 
physician owners 
were identified 
using data from 
state records and an 
insurer as well as by 
contacting facilities 
with incomplete 
records. 
physician 
age and 
sex 
Tests of 
differences 
between 
proportion
s,  logistic 
regression
s 
The use for each 
of the orthopedic 
procedures 
examined was 
significantly 
higher for 
physician 
owners 
compared with 
physician 
nonowners. 
Hollings
-worth, 
et al, 
2010, 
Health 
Affairs 
HCUP State 
Ambulatory 
Surgery 
Databases of 
Florida/ 
2003-2005 
A physician's 
annual 
caseload (a 
count of one 
of the five 
procedures 
that a given 
physician 
performed 
over a year) 
physician-
year level/ 
patients who 
underwent 
five 
procedures  
A physician was 
considered to be an 
owner if he or she 
carried out 30% or 
more of his or her 
ambulatory 
surgeries at a given 
ASC in a year. 
patient 
characteri
stics 
aggregate
d to 
physician 
level; 
Hospital 
Referral 
Region, 
and the 
year  
Bivariate 
analyses, 
two-level 
linear 
mixed 
models, 
and linear 
regression 
models  
Physician 
owners operated 
on relatively 
healthier patients 
and performed 
more 
procedures. The 
use of 4 
procedures rose 
much more 
rapidly among 
physicians who 
acquired 
ownership. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Authors,  
year, and 
journal 
Data Source/ 
Study Period 
Outcome 
Measures 
Unit of 
Analysis/ 
Study sample 
Measurement of 
physician 
ownership 
Control 
Variables 
Statistical 
Technique 
Major Findings 
Mitchell 
and 
Sass, 
1995, 
Journal 
of 
Health 
Economi
cs 
A survey of 
physical 
therapy and 
rehabilitation 
facilities in 
Florida in 
1989 and a 
salary survey 
conducted in 
1988 by PT 
Forum/1988-
1989 
Consumption 
(the number of 
physical 
therapy visits 
per patient); 
quality/input 
mix (the 
minutes of 
physical 
therapist labor 
per visit); and 
the incidence 
of physician 
ownership 
Patient level, 
encounter 
level, and 
physician/the
rapist 
level/patients 
who 
underwent 
physical 
therapy 
Physician 
ownership status 
was measured as 
the fraction of 
referrals emanating 
from physician 
owners 
Supply 
/demand 
factors, 
physician 
characteri
stics, 
induce 
demand 
incentives
, 
existence 
of some 
regulation
s 
Ordinary 
linear 
regression 
and probit 
regression 
models 
A physical 
therapy clinic 
that 100% relied 
on referrals from 
physician 
owners provided 
50% more visits. 
No quality of 
care difference 
was found across 
ownership 
structures.  
O’Neill 
and 
Hartz, 
2012, 
Health 
Affairs 
Inpatient, 
hospital and 
physician 
information 
from the 
Texas 
Department 
of State 
Health 
Services 
/2004-2007 
In-hospital 
mortality rate   
Physician 
level/ 48,460 
patients who 
underwent 
percutaneous 
coronary 
interventions 
The physician 
ownership status of 
hospitals was first 
identified. 
Physician owners 
were defined as 
those performing a 
high percentage of 
procedures at a 
cardiac hospital 
Admissio
n type, 
comorbidi
ties, age, 
Hispanic 
ethnicity, 
, hospital 
and 
physician 
volumes  
A logistic 
regression 
model was 
used to 
predict the 
risk of 
mortality 
rate.  
The outcomes 
for cardiologists 
who owned 
specialty 
hospitals were 
not significantly 
different from 
the average.  
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acuity and higher procedural volumes may have contributed to cardiac hospitals’ nominally 
lower mortality rates.  
In sum, research findings from prior studies found that physician ownership of ASCs was 
associated with patient “cherry-picking” and increased use of services in the outpatient surgical 
settings. Qualitative studies suggested that many factors may affect the relative quality 
performance of physician-owned ASCs in comparison with other non-physician-owned facilities. 
Yet no empirical studies focused on the effect of physician ownership on the quality of care in 
the outpatient surgical settings.  
Summary 
Ambulatory surgery centers are playing an increasingly important role in providing 
outpatient surgical and diagnostic procedures. A review of the literature reveals that a growing 
number of studies examined the quality of outpatient surgery in general and outpatient 
colonoscopy in particular. But it is still unclear that how prevalent physician ownership is among 
ASCs. Prior studies of physician ownership largely focused on its effects on patient selection and 
services use. Only two studies outside of the outpatient surgical settings investigated the 
relationship between physician ownership, services use and quality.  
This review has identified a number of limitations and gaps in prior studies. First, a 
method that can reliably determine physician ownership of ASCs within a large geographic area 
has not been identified. Second, as with quality analysis in other settings, research on quality of 
care in outpatient surgical settings needs to address the possible endogeneity of key independent 
variables. Third, data used by many prior studies had hierarchical structures and special 
statistical methods need to be used to deal with clustered data and render valid estimates of 
standard errors. Fourth, existing studies only controlled for factors at the patient and facility 
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levels. Some characteristics at the health market level, such as competition, should also be 
accounted for considering that competition between hospital-based outpatient facilities and ASCs 
may have quality implications. Fifth, prior studies examining adverse events after outpatient 
colonoscopy used limited patient populations and complication indicators. Finally, research 
findings from prior studies found that physician ownership of ASCs was associated with patient 
“cherry-picking” and increased use of services in the outpatient surgical settings. Some industry 
experts contend that physician ownership results in “cost-competitive, high-quality services” 
(Rozich, D'Amore, & Sloan, 2000). Yet no empirical studies compared outcomes and quality in 
physician-owned ASCs and other service settings. 
This study aims to address these gaps in the literature. First, by examining the effect of 
physician ownership of ASCs on the quality of outpatient colonoscopy, this study expands the 
literature of physician ownership of ASC to outcomes beyond patient selection and service use. 
Second, the study uses the consequences of a court decision in California in 2007 that changed 
the licensure requirement for ASCs with physician ownership to determine the physician 
ownership status of ASCs in California. Third, the introduction of market characteristics on 
quality extends previous research that only examined the impact of patient, clinical, and 
organizational characteristics. Multilevel analysis will be used to account for the hierarchical 
structures in the data and a propensity score approach will be adopted to address the potential 
endogeneity in the location of a facility. Fourth, this study examines a comprehensive list of 
adverse events related to outpatient colonoscopy, using a large, all-payer, general patient 
population.  
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The following chapter describes the conceptual framework used in the study and 
develops hypotheses on the theoretical relationships between physician ownership and quality of 
care in outpatient surgical settings. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
This study focuses on comparing the quality of care provided by physician-owned ASCs 
relative to the quality of care provided by hospital-based outpatient facilities. Literature from 
agency theory is drawn upon to provide conceptual guidance in this study. This chapter begins 
with a discussion of potential explanations for physician investment in ASCs. The second section 
examines physician ownership from the agency theory perspective. The third section discusses 
under what circumstances a strengthened agency relationship between owners and physicians 
can improve quality. The fourth section explains why physician ownership can also act as a 
deterrent to quality under certain conditions. Formal hypotheses are developed following 
theoretical discussions. The sixth section examines other factors that are potentially associated 
with the ultimate quality of care and thus should be controlled for in the empirical models. The 
chapter concludes with a diagrammatical depiction of the conceptual framework of the study.  
Rationale for Physician Investment in ASCs 
Physician investment constitutes an important contributing factor to the rapid growth of 
ASCs (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). Three reasons have been given in the literature to 
explain physician ownership of ASCs. First of all, physicians investing in ASCs may be 
motivated by the financial gains associated with ownership (Becker & Biala, 2000; Devers, 
Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003; Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, 2011; Mitchell, 2010). Physicians who perform procedures in an ASC they own 
receive both professional fees and a share of facility fees. One study reported that when 
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performing a cystoscopy in an ASC, a physician owner could collect $100 from the professional 
fee and part of the $340 facility fee (Strope et al., 2009). In an environment with stagnating or 
declining reimbursement for professional services, becoming an owner of a freestanding 
specialty hospital or ASC may provide an important means for a physician to generate income 
(Pham, Devers, May, & Berenson, 2004).  
Second, physicians may seek ownership of a facility to assert greater control over their 
work environment (Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003; Mitchell, 2010). As owners, physicians 
can get have greater authority in hiring, staffing levels, scheduling, and purchasing equipment. 
They are unlikely to have the same level of influence in these decisions in general hospitals.  
Finally, greater efficiency may be another important reason for physicians to invest in 
ASCs. The patient turnover times are shorter in ASCs than in hospital-based outpatient facilities. 
An analysis of the data from the 2006 National Survey of Ambulatory Surgery found that the 
average surgery time in ASCs is nearly 40% shorter than in hospital-based outpatient facilities 
(Wynn, Hussey, & Ruder, 2011). Thus, physicians may be able to perform more procedures in a 
day in ASCs, thereby generating more professional fees. Moreover, because ASCs usually do not 
provide emergency care, disruption of scheduling for emergency cases are rare in ASCs 
(Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003).  
Agency Theory and Physician Ownership of ASCs 
Agency theory is used to study the problems of motivating and aligning behaviors (Scott 
& Davis, 2007). This theory examines the agency relationship in which one party (the principal) 
contracts with another party (the agent) to perform some tasks on the principal’s behalf (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Two problems are focal to agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). First, there is 
the problem that arises when the principal and agent have different goals and it is not feasible for 
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the principal to monitor the behavior of the agent. Second, there is the problem of risk sharing, 
which occurs when the principal and agent have different risk preferences. Agency theory is 
based a series of assumptions about individuals, organizations, and information (Eisenhardt, 
1989). For example, the theory assumes that the agent has better information about the tasks than 
the principal. The primary goal of agency theory is to develop certain mechanisms so that the 
objectives of the principal and agent are better aligned (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency theory recognizes three mechanisms that can be used by principals for motivating 
the agent to act in their interests: monitoring, bonding, and ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Monitoring refers to efforts on the part of the principal to measure and control the 
behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, or 
other mechanisms. In bonding, the agent guarantees the principal against loss due to the agent’s 
fault. For example, a physician (agent) may promise to forgo a bonus at the end of a contract 
period if certain targets agreed to with the facility (principal) are not met. Ownership allows the 
agent to own a share of the asset, and thus financial returns generated by that asset.  
Thus, physician ownership of ASCs can be conceptualized as an incentive by owners of a 
facility (i.e., principals) to induce and reward certain behaviors by physicians providing services 
at their facility (i.e., agents). Ownership is a “high-powered” incentive that tightly links 
individual physicians’ financial interests to that of other facility owners. Physician owners enjoy 
the profits when revenues exceed costs and share the losses when costs exceed revenues. In 
addition, physician owners’ financial stake grows with the value of the organization.  
The next two sections discuss how agency theory may explain the effect of physician 
ownership on two different agency relationships existing within ASCs and the corresponding 
quality implications. Specifically, the two agency relationships that may be affected by physician 
    
 
58 
 
ownership are the agency relationship between other owners of an ASC (principals) and 
physicians (agents) who perform surgical procedures in the facility and that between patients 
(principals) and physicians (agents).  
Physician Ownership as a Mechanism to Improve Quality 
Physicians constitute a key input in the production of outpatient surgical care. Agency 
theory predicts that ownership will strengthen the relationship between principals and agents, in 
the case of this study, between other owners of ASCs and physicians (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Physician owners are more likely than physician non-owners to get involved in the daily 
operation of the facility. For example, physician owners are listed as managing members in some 
physician-owned ASCs. Under the safe harbor law, physician owners of multi-specialty ASCs 
are required to perform as least one third of their surgical procedures at the ASC in which they 
are investing (Office of Inspector General, 1999). Thus, they have to be actively involved with 
the ASC in which they invest to remain to be owners. 
In the post-managed care era, nonprice competition becomes increasingly important and 
health care providers must focus on quality or related dimensions to attract business (Devers, 
Brewster, & Casalino, 2003). Currently, publicly available quality information is not available 
for outpatient surgeries2. But patients may gain a sense about the quality of care at a facility 
based on the personal experience of family and friends who used the facility and their health 
outcomes. Assuming that consumers in the marketplace are reasonably able to assess differences 
in quality across location of care and that patients value high quality care, physician owners will 
be motivated to ensure that their own facility provides high quality care. This is because when 
                                                 
2 The Medicare Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC) Quality Reporting Program will begin on October 1, 2012. For 
the 2012 reporting period, ASCs will need to report on five measures and more measures are required for later 
reporting periods. When these data will be made available to the public has not yet determined. 
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the facility provides poor quality care, it will lead to loss of business and reputation. All 
stakeholders of the facility, including physician owners will suffer financially.  
There are a number of mechanisms through which physician owners may contribute to 
the quality of care provided by the facility they own. Physician owners may participate in the 
decision making process related to investment in organizational infrastructure. They may also 
help the facility choose the optimal mix and quality of medical inputs, such as the appropriate 
number and mix of qualified staff. These decisions are critical to producing quality care (Conrad 
& Christianson, 2004a; Kuhn, 2003). Such a level of physician involvement in decision-making 
is more difficult to achieve in non-physician-owned facilities (Schneider et al., 2008).  
Physician owners may also boost the level of effort of medical and other facility staff. 
The production of outpatient surgical care involves the collaboration of physicians, 
anesthesiologists, nurses, medical assistants, and other support staff. Without a mechanism to 
monitor or measure each team member’s efforts, the potential for shirking among team members 
increases since none of them bears the full cost of shirking (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). When an 
adverse event occurs, it may be difficult for the patient to determine which team member to 
blame. Offering physicians equity interest (the right to claim residual profits) can prevent 
shirking by either physicians or other medical team members. Physician owners have the 
motivation to monitor the performance of other team members. They could be financially 
penalized if poor quality of care results in lost business or malpractice suits, and conversely, they 
can financially benefit if higher quality results in more business and higher profits (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972). Therefore, physician ownership may represent a direct mechanism that ensures 
the facility provides high quality care (McDowell, 1989). 
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The positive effect of physician ownership on quality of care may be stronger in 
competitive health care markets. As discussed above, physician owners have the expertise to 
identify a series of strategies to improve the quality of care. But some strategies such as adopting 
the latest medical equipment may involve sizable resources. In a less competitive health care 
market, physician owners may only implement some quality improvement efforts that are less 
resource-intensive (Pham, Devers, May, & Berenson, 2004). The competitive advantage 
associated with physician ownership may not manifest itself. In competitive health care markets, 
physician-owned ASCs may have the incentive to commit resources to more quality 
improvement initiatives that are identified by physician owners. By contrast, in face of the 
competition from ASCs, many hospitals strive to outperform ASCs by upgrading existing 
facilities and adding new outpatient centers, which are more likely to affect amenities than 
clinical quality (Devers, Brewster, & Casalino, 2003).      
Physician Ownership as a Deterrent to Quality 
Although patients may be able to assess the quality of care to a certain degree, as 
suggested in the prior section, it may instead be the case that patients are unable to do so based 
on their available knowledge and information. Without reliable comprehensive information 
about the clinical quality, comparison across facilities is difficult to achieve. In practice, patients 
may end up acquiescing to their physician’s recommendation when deciding whether and where 
to receive medical care (Katz, 1996). Physician owners have broader concerns than physician 
non-owners; they are not only concerned about the quality of services they provide, but also 
about the operating expenses and profitability of the facility. The financial interest linked to 
ownership may conflict with the best interest of patients. A growing body of literature indicates 
that physicians’ clinical decision making process can be influenced by the financial incentives 
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created by various financial arrangements and organizational structures (Casalino, 1992; Conrad 
et al., 1996; Conrad & Christianson, 2004b; Matthews, 1993; McDowell, 1989; Murray, 
Greenfield, Kaplan, & Yano, 1992).  
First of all, physician owners may not actively implement quality improvement initiatives 
even if they have the knowledge to improve the process of care. Potential physician owners of 
specialty hospitals and ASCs reported that they were not motivated to invest in organized quality 
improvement processes because payers did not provide corresponding financial incentives 
(Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003; Pham, Devers, May, & Berenson, 2004).  
Second, since third party payers set reimbursement rates for surgical procedures, 
physician owners may reduce quality to bring down costs and to increase their profits. This is 
likely to happen because ASCs are subject to less stringent regulation than hospital-based 
outpatient facilities (American Hospital Association, 2006). In an extreme case, nurse 
anesthetists were instructed by clinical staff (anecdotally physician owners) to reuse syringes to 
access vials and reuse bottles of anesthesia on multiple patients (Southern Nevada Health District 
Outbreak Investigation Team, 2009). When owners of an ASC underinvest in some quality 
infrastructure, physician non-owners may decide to direct their patients to facilities providing 
better quality of care. But physician owners may continue to refer patients to the facility even if 
it has suffered a decline in the quality of care because of their equity interest (Zientek, 2003). Of 
course, the extent to which physician owners can shirk on quality is limited by certification and 
accreditation regulations and potential malpractice law suits. For example, the outbreak of 
Hepatitis C in an physician-owned ASC in Nevada led to a half-million dollar fine and the 
prosecution of the chief administrator, a physician, and employees who provided or supervised 
unsafe medical procedures (Duran, 2008; Online Legal Media, 2008). 
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Hypotheses 
Physician ownership of ASCs could potentially lead to improved quality of outpatient 
surgical care or to lower quality of care, depending on the degree to which consumers are able to 
assess quality of care differences across location of care, the extent to which they value high 
quality care, and physicians’ desire to pursue their financial interest.  
On one hand, physician ownership can work as a mechanism to improve quality of care 
by motivating physicians to actively participate in quality improvement efforts if consumers (or 
referring physicians) can observe quality differences and are responsive to quality of care. The 
positive effect of physician ownership on quality also relies on the degree to which physician 
owners can influence facility investment, process redesign, and staff performance evaluation. 
According to agency theory, physician ownership helps align the interests of physicians with 
those of other owners of ASCs. If consumers can detect differences in quality of care across 
different locations of care, facilities providing high quality care will gain better reputations and 
will attract more business. In order to protect their own financial interests, physician owners will 
be motivated to improve the quality of care provided by their own facility. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 1: Assuming that patients can assess differences in quality of care across 
locations of care, physician-owned ASCs will be associated with improved quality of care, all 
other things being equal.  
Physician ownership as a mechanism to improve quality of care may be more fully 
realized in competitive health care markets. Again, assuming patients have the ability to 
determine quality of care, physician-owned ASCs will have the incentive to implement quality 
improvement initiatives identified by physician owners in competitive markets in order to attract 
    
 
63 
 
business from individual patients and referring physicians. By contrast, hospitals in competitive 
markets may strive to outperform by upgrading existing facilities or adding new outpatient 
facilities. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2: Assuming that patients have the ability to assess quality of care, the 
positive effect of physician ownership on quality will be more obvious in more competitive 
markets. In other words, physician-owned ASCs are expected to manifest larger quality 
advantages in competitive health care markets compared to non-physician-owned facilities 
(namely, hospital-based outpatient facilities).  
On the other hand, physician ownership may be a deterrent to quality of care if patients 
do not have the ability to assess quality of care differences and if physician owners exploit this 
information void. Physician owners may reduce the quality of care to bring down operating 
expenditures. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3: Assuming that patients are not able to detect quality differences across 
different locations of care, physician-owned ASCs are expected to have lower quality of care in 
comparison to non-physician-owned facilities (namely, hospital-based outpatient facilities). 
Overall, the effect of physician ownership of ASCs is theoretically unclear, as is evident 
from the hypotheses above.  Empirical analysis is thus important to understand how physician-
owned ASCs differ in quality of care from hospital-based outpatient facilities. 
Control Variables 
In addition to physician ownership, patient demographic and clinical characteristics, 
facility-level factors, and characteristics of the local healthcare market may also affect patient 
outcomes in the outpatient surgical settings. The following subsections motivate the relevance of 
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these factors by drawing on related literature. These variables will be included in the empirical 
models as control variables.  
Patient characteristics. 
Patient type and behavior can significantly affect health outcomes (Conrad & 
Christianson, 2004b). A large body of literature indicates that many factors affect patient care-
seeking behavior, which in turn affects the health outcomes. Without controlling for patient 
characteristics, the quality of care differences between physician-owned ASCs and hospital-
based outpatient facilities may result from the differences in patient populations across these 
settings rather than being the effect of physician ownership status. According to the Behavioral 
Model developed by Anderson, patient characteristics can be divided into three categories: 
predisposing, enabling and need factors (Andersen, 1995). Predisposing factors relates to the 
propensity that an individual uses health services. These factors include demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender, social structures (e.g. education and race/ethnicity) and health 
beliefs (e.g. attitudes and knowledge of health and health services). In addition, previous medical 
care use may increase patients’ propensity to use medical services in the future (Anderson & 
Steinberg, 1984). Therefore, this study will control for patient age group, gender, race/ethnicity, 
and medical care utilization history in the multivariate analysis. Due to limitation in the data, this 
study will not be able to measure and control for patients’ education level and health beliefs. 
Enabling factors are related to access to health care services, including insurance and 
financial resources that cover patient costs of care. Whether a patient resided in an urban or rural 
location also affect his or her access to medical care. For example, rural patients often travel a 
longer distance than urban patients to access the same medical care and therefore may use less 
care. Need factors relate to the reasons patients seek health care services, and can comprise 
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perceived need (e.g. perceived symptoms) or evaluated need (e.g. diagnosed health status). 
Medical severity also can affect patients’ need for health care and provider’s ability to change 
their health status. It is critical to control for patients’ severity of illness in a comparative study 
of the patient outcomes in physician-owned facilities and hospital-based outpatient facilities. 
Qualitative data suggested that physician owners may selectively refer relatively healthy patients 
to their own facilities for treatments (Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003). If this is the case, 
physician-owned ASCs may appear to have better quality of care if patient severity of illness is 
not controlled for in the empirical analysis (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & 
Brooks, 2008). Therefore, this study will control for patients’ insurance status, income level, 
urban/rural location, and medical severity.  
Moreover, the type of the procedure that patients receive during an encounter may make 
a difference in patient outcomes. For example, colonoscopy involving biopsy or polypectomy 
procedures are more invasive than colonoscopy without such procedures and consequently 
patients are more likely to develop complications afterwards (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; 
Rabeneck et al., 2008; Warren et al., 2009). This study therefore will control for the type of 
colonoscopy involved in the encounter (Diagnostic colonoscopy, Colonoscopy and biopsy, or 
Lesion removal colonoscopy).  
Organizational characteristics. 
The Institute of Medicine’s report Crossing the Quality Chasm posited that quality of 
care is a systems problem, which can be affected by health care organizations and the larger 
health care environment (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Physician-owned ASCs differ from non-
physician-owned facilities in many aspects other than the physician ownership status. For 
example, physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities may have different 
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volume and degree of specialization, which may also affect quality of care (Chukmaitov, Devers, 
Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). Omitting these organizational characteristics from the 
analysis could artificially amplify the impact of physician ownership on quality. Empirical 
studies that link quality measures with organizational variables typically draw on the classic 
structure-process-outcome model and specific organization theory and organizational behavior 
frameworks (Mitchell & Shortell, 1997). Donabedian’s structure-process-outcome model 
presumes that good organizational structure leads to good process of care, and ultimately better 
health outcomes (Donabedian, 1966; Donabedian, 1978; Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian 
defined structure as the attributes of the materials, human resources, and organizational 
arrangements that are involved in the production of care. Process refers to the approaches used to 
produce care and interactions between providers and patients as they receive care. Outcome is 
the health status of patients. This study controls for structural factors such as volume and 
specialization level of the facility. Due to limitations in the data, the study will not be able to 
control for process of care variables. In the literature, studies in the inpatient setting also 
predominantly examined the relationship between organizational structure and quality of care 
(Hearld, Alexander, Fraser, & Jiang, 2008).  
It is well documented in the inpatient literature that a positive relationship exists between 
the volume of certain surgical procedures at a hospital and patient quality of care (Chukmaitov et 
al., 2008). This relationship was also found in the outpatient surgical settings (Chukmaitov et al., 
2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). It is thus necessary for this 
study to control for the facility volume of the procedure of interest, namely, colonoscopy. 
Additionally, ASCs tend to provide a narrow range of procedures (Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, 2004) and thus, it may be that quality of care in highly specialized ASCs is higher 
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because physicians and other staff can achieve proficiency by providing a smaller set of services 
often (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). Moreover, ASCs specialized in providing certain 
types of procedures may do a better job in implementing evidence-based practices in a focused 
area (Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). Therefore, it is also necessary 
to control for the extent of organizational specialization for this study. A specialization rate, the 
percentage of a certain type of procedure in a facility’s total procedures, will be used to measure 
the degree of specialization. The specialization rate squared will also be included to account for 
the potential diminishing returns to specialization (Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & 
Brooks, 2010).  
Market characteristics. 
The larger health care environment may influence quality of care by affecting patients’ 
access to necessary medical care and thus their health outcomes (Andersen & Davidson, 2001). 
Additionally, environmental forces may encourage or impede health care providers’ efforts to 
improve quality. As stated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 1), “to understand the behavior of an 
organization you must understand the context of that behavior-that is, the ecology of the 
organization.” Market-level factors, such as competition, managed care penetration, physician 
supply, and patient demand factors, will be controlled for in this study. It is necessary to control 
for market characteristics when comparing patient outcomes in different health care facilities. 
This is because if physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities may locate in 
different kinds of markets, and thus, not controlling for market factors will lead to biased 
estimation of the effect of physician ownership.   
ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities have great overlap in the types of outpatient 
surgical services they provide. Evidence indicates that ASCs are meaningful competitors of 
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general hospitals (Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2011). However, the theoretical relationship 
between competition and quality is complex. On one hand, competition between ASCs and 
hospital-owned outpatient facilities may reduce environmental munificence, namely, the 
availability of critical resources needed by these facilities to operate within an environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 2003) and thus the available resources allocated to quality 
improvement efforts. But on the other hand, some studies that examined quality of inpatient 
services suggest that competition may lead to increased efficiency and thus mitigate the effect of 
financial pressure on quality (Kessler & McClellan, 2000; Pope, 1989). Additionally, evidence 
indicates that among patients for which organizations face regulated prices, competition for 
patient business will focus on the quality and great competition will improve the quality of health 
care. Whereas for markets where prices are set by providers rather than the government, both 
price and quality may be influenced by competition and the relationship between quality and 
competition is theoretically ambiguous (Gaynor, 2006). Therefore, the impact of competition on 
quality of care is theoretically unclear. This study will control for the competition level of the 
local health care market using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). As mentioned above, the 
interaction term of physician ownership and HHI will also be included.  
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) 
penetration may also affect the quality of care. Because premiums are a key factor when 
employers purchase group coverage for their employees (Legnini, Rosenberg, Perry, & 
Robertson, 2000), HMOs and PPOs attach much importance to prices when they contract with 
providers. Given this, health care providers may reduce the quality of care, under the pressure to 
control costs. High percentage of patients enrolled in HMOs or PPOs may induce changes in the 
treatment patterns and resource utilization across all patients in the area, affecting health 
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outcomes of those not covered by managed care organizations (Baker, 2003). Therefore, 
facilities located within the high HMO or PPO penetration markets may be expected to have 
different patient outcomes than those located in the low HMO/PPO penetration markets.  
In addition, the medical care resources in the community may influence health care 
organizations’ investment in structural quality and ultimately affect patient outcomes (Conrad & 
Christianson, 2004b). For example, physician supply in the local market may affect the cost of 
human capital and thus the qualification and skills of physicians that staff health care 
organizations. This study therefore will control for the number of physicians in gastroenterology, 
primary care, and general surgery per 100,000 population in the county. These physicians are 
included because they either are directly involved in the delivery of colonoscopy or are a source 
of referrals. Furthermore, the population size, percentage of the population over age 65, and 
percentage of the population below age 65 without health insurance may determine the demand 
for medical care (Roggenkamp, White, & Bazzoli, 2005). These market factors will also be 
controlled for in the analysis.  
Conceptual Framework 
As shown in Figure 3, agency theory and evidence from the literature suggests that 
patient outcomes in the outpatient surgical settings can be influenced by multiple factors. This 
study examines the potential effects of physician ownership on quality of care by comparing the 
outcomes of patients treated at a physician-owned ASC with those achieved by patients treated 
by non-physician-owned facilities (i.e., hospital-based outpatient facilities). Specifically, this 
study is interested in investigating whether colonoscopy patients treated at a physician-owned 
ASC were less or more likely to experience adverse events that can develop after the procedure 
when compared to those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility.  
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Figure 3. Conceptual Framework of the Effect of Physician Ownership on the Quality of 
Outpatient Colonoscopy 
Note: HHI: Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; HMO: health maintenance organization; PPO: preferred provider 
organizations; ED: emergency department. The key independent variables appear in bold. 
In order to control for other confounding factors that may affect patient outcomes, this 
study accounts for patient characteristics, organizational characteristics, and health care market 
characteristics in the analytical models.  
Summary 
This chapter drew on agency theory and the literature to develop a conceptual framework 
that examines the potential effects of physician ownership on the quality of outpatient surgical 
care. In theory, the relationship between physician ownership and quality of care was shown to 
be unclear. Assuming that patients can distinguish the quality differences across locations of care, 
physician ownership may work to improve quality. This is because physicians, as facility owners, 
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can play an important role in quality improvement as it is important to their reputation and 
maintaining patient business. However, if patients cannot detect differences in quality of care, 
physician-owned facilities may make production decisions that lead to lower quality of care 
because this may provide greater financial returns through the reduction of costs of operation. 
The chapter also reviewed other factors that may affect patient outcomes in the outpatient 
surgical settings and thus should be controlled for in the analysis. Figure 3 diagrammatically 
presented the conceptual framework for this study. Chapter 4 covers the research methods used 
in this study, including research design, data sources, sampling process, variable measurements, 
and the overall analytical approach.  
    
 
72 
 
 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter describes the research methods used to investigate the relationship between 
physician ownership and the quality of outpatient colonoscopy. The first section describes the 
research design, followed by a description of the study sample, data sources, and variable 
measurements. The fifth section discusses the model specification and technical issues that need 
to be addressed in the study. The chapter ends with a summary.  
Research Design 
This study aims to examine the effect of physician ownership of ASCs on the quality of 
outpatient colonoscopy.  The California appellate court decision in Capen v. Shewry (2007) 
which led to the delicensing of ASCs with any physician ownership provides a unique 
opportunity for this study to identify physician owned ASCs in California. This study utilizes a 
pooled, cross-sectional design. This design enables the accumulation of a large number of 
colonoscopy cases to identify the relatively rare complications following outpatient colonoscopy. 
This study is retrospective and observational in nature. Because technological, market, and 
public policy factors jointly affect physicians’ decision to invest in ASCs (Casalino, Devers, & 
Brewster, 2003), a propensity score approach is used to adjust potential physician selective 
investment in outpatient surgical facilities. Additionally, in sensitivity analysis, the propensity 
score method will be used instead to adjust for potential selective patient referrals.  
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Data Sources 
The main sources of data for this study are three discharge-level databases: the State 
Ambulatory Surgery Databases (SASD), State Emergency Department Databases (SEDD), and 
State Inpatient Databases (SID) for the state of California from 2005 to 2007. The SASD, SEDD, 
and SID are compiled by the Healthcare Cost & Utilization Project (HCUP), which is 
administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The primary reason for 
choosing California as the study site is that the Capen v. Sherwy (2007) decision makes it 
possible to identify physician ownership status of ASCs. Additionally, with the absence of 
national data, the state of California is a good choice for a study of ASCs. It has the largest 
number of ASCs around the country and accounts for the second largest number of visits out of 
all 17 participating states in HCUP SASD project. The number of records for 2005, 2006, and 
2007 SASD files were 2.79 million, 2.87 million, and 3.00 million, respectively (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2012a). In addition, California SASD tracks discharges from 
freestanding ASCs and hospital-owned outpatient facilities (Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, 2012b). Finally, California does not subject medical facilities to certificate of need 
requirements (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011), which allows physicians and 
investors to freely respond to the changing demands for outpatient surgical care. 
The SASD contain a core set of clinical and nonclinical information on all patients, 
regardless of payers. Variables from the SASD include patient demographic characteristics, 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) diagnosis codes, Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT) codes, discharge status, expected payment sources, and the identifier of the 
facility in which the patient received treatments. Using supplemental AHRQ files that identify 
patients with multiple types of health service use (i.e., their revisit files), the outpatient surgery 
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records are merged with hospital emergency department and inpatient discharge data. The SEDD 
and SID contain information on all ED visits and hospital admissions in California.  
The study also uses data from the annual utilization files of specialty clinics and hospitals, 
which are collected by the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 
(OSHPD). All specialty clinics and hospitals are mandated by state law to file an Annual 
Utilization Report with OSHPD that contains utilization data for their licensed services. These 
files include information on facility location, original license date, control type, patient 
encounters, number of operating rooms, surgical volume, revenue, expenditure and other 
financial data. ASCs in California are specialty clinics licensed as surgical clinics3.  
Other databases such as the Area Resource File (ARF) 2009-2010 Release (Version 2) 
compiled by the Bureau of Health Professions, and the HMO and PPO enrollment data provided 
by HealthLeader are also included in the study to provide information on health market 
characteristics.  
Study Sample 
The outpatient surgery discharge records in California are used to identify a cohort of 
patients who underwent outpatient colonoscopy between January 1, 2005 and November 30, 
2007. Hospital emergency department and inpatient discharge records in the period from 2005 to 
2007 are merged to the outpatient surgery data. There are three uses of the emergency 
department and hospital data: 1) to provide additional information about patients’ medical care 
use history and comorbidity conditions; 2) to identify patients transferred to emergency 
department or admitted to short-term acute care hospital in the same day of the colonoscopy; and 
3) to identify colonoscopy related complications resulting in emergency department or hospital 
                                                 
3 Personal communication with Michael B. Derrick, manager of the Licensed Services Data Unit under the OSHPD 
(email received on 4/27/2009).  
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use within 30 days. The study sample includes patients aged 18 and older and those covered by 
all types of payers (Medicare, Medicaid, commercial insurance, or self-pay).  
This study focuses on colonoscopy procedures because they are among the most common 
and profitable procedures for ASCs (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2004). 
Specifically, this study examines colonoscopy procedures represented by five CPT codes (Table 
7). The code 45378 is used to report a diagnostic colonoscopy, in which no biopsies or excisions 
are involved. CPT codes 45380, 45383, 45384, and 45385 are used to report therapeutic 
colonoscopy procedures that involve biopsy, polypectomy, or excision of a lesion.   
Table 7  
Description of the CPT Codes Examined in the Study 
CPT 
code 
Short 
Descriptor Description 
Final CY 
2012 
Payment 
Weight 
Final CY 
2012 
Payment 
45378 Diagnostic colonoscopy 
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure; 
diagnostic, with or without collection of specimen(s) 
by brushing or washing, with or without colon 
decompression (separate procedure) 
8.8699 $378.10 
45380 Colonoscopy and biopsy 
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure; 
with biopsy, single or multiple 
8.8699 $378.10 
45383 
Lesion 
removal 
colonoscopy 
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure; 
with ablation of tumor(s), polyp(s), or other lesion(s) 
not amenable to removal by hot biopsy forceps, 
bipolar cautery or snare technique 
8.8699 $378.10 
45384 
Lesion 
remove 
colonoscopy 
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure; 
with removal of tumor(s), polyp(s), or other lesion(s) 
by hot biopsy forceps or bipolar cautery 
8.8699 $378.10 
45385 
Lesion 
removal 
colonoscopy 
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure; 
with removal of tumor(s), polyp(s), or other lesion(s) 
by snare technique 
8.8699 $378.10 
Note: CPT:  is a registered trademark of American Medical Association.  Short descriptor, payment weight and rate 
information was published on the CMS website.   
During the period from 2005 to 2007, 1,832,535 colonoscopy cases were performed in 
California, of which 131,440 cases are not linkable to emergency department and inpatient data 
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and thus excluded from the sample. The colonoscopy cases performed on patients younger than 
18 are excluded (N=22,370). Following previous studies (Warren et al., 2009), colonoscopies 
performed on patient with a diagnosis of diverticulitis, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, and 
colorectal cancer are excluded from the study because they are prone to experience colonic 
perforation and gastrointestinal bleeding (N=116,144). If a patient had two colonoscopies less 
than three months apart, only the second colonoscopy is included in the sample, considering that 
the first one may be incomplete due to poor preparation (Levin et al., 2006). For those with more 
than two colonoscopies that were three or more months apart during the study period, only the 
first one is included. For these two reasons, 74,843 cases are removed. Cases without a facility 
identifier or performed in a facility that was not licensed by California Department of Public 
Health are excluded (N=68). To ensure that facilities of interest performed colonoscopy on a 
regular basis, cases associated with facilities which did not perform a minimum of 30 cases in a 
year are removed from the study as well (N=77,397). To ensure the completeness of a one month 
follow-up after the procedure, colonoscopy cases performed in December of 2007 are excluded 
(N=38,087). Missing values are found for patients’ gender (about 13%) and race/ethnicity (about 
32%). The missing values for these two variables are replaced by values found on emergency 
department or inpatient records during the study period. Missing values are also found in 
variables including the state quartile of the median household income for the patient’s ZIP Code, 
payer type, and urban/rural location. Overall, due to missing values, 68,962 cases are excluded. 
Finally, cases provided by non-physician-owned ASCs (N=24,338) are also excluded due to 
small numbers. The final sample contains 1,278,886 colonoscopy cases.  
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Variable Measurement 
Dependent variables. 
This study examines all-cause ED visit and/or hospitalization in the same day of the 
colonoscopy procedure and also related complications occurring within 30 days after outpatient 
colonoscopy that were severe enough to require an emergency department visit or hospitalization. 
A follow up period of 30 days was chosen because some serious complications such as 
gastrointestinal bleeding can occur 3-4 weeks after a colonoscopy (Ko & Dominitz, 2010; Mezei 
& Chung, 1999). Thirty-day hospital admissions have commonly been used as quality measures 
in outpatient surgical settings (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; 
Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Mezei & Chung, 1999; Shnaider & 
Chung, 2006; Warner, Shields, & Chute, 1993; Warren et al., 2009). Following Warren et al. 
(2009), mortality is not included in the analysis because of the small number of patient deaths 
after colonoscopy and the complex causes of mortality. 
The first dependent variable is all-cause ED visit and/or hospitalization in the same day 
of colonoscopy. Outpatient surgical patients are not expected to use emergency department or 
inpatient care immediately after their procedure. Thus, this variable is an indicator of a potential 
adverse event that required more intensive and immediate care (Fleisher, Pasternak, & Lyles, 
2007).  
The second to fourth dependent variables are related adverse events occurring within 30 
days after outpatient colonoscopy that were severe enough to require an ED visit and/or 
hospitalization. Specifically, the second dependent variable is the occurrence of serious 
gastrointestinal events requiring ED visit and/or hospitalization within 30 days. The serious 
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gastrointestinal complications included in the analysis are colonic perforation, lower 
gastrointestinal bleeding, and anemia (Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009).  
The third dependent variable is the occurrence of other gastrointestinal events occurring 
within 30 days. Relevant complications for this variable include intestinal obstruction, abdominal 
pain, diverticulitis, ulcerative colitis, nausea and vomiting, and disorders of fluid (Levin et al., 
2006; Warren et al., 2009). Note that the diverticulitis and ulcerative colitis are medical 
conditions developed after the patient received colonoscopy. Those with such conditions at the 
time of colonoscopy have been excluded. 
The fourth dependent variable is the occurrence of other non-gastrointestinal events 
occurring within 30 days after outpatient colonoscopy. Relevant complications for this variable 
include sedation-related cardiopulmonary complications (aspiration pneumonia, pneumonia, 
organism unspecified, myocardial infarction/angina, arrhythmias, heart failure, stroke, 
syncope/dizziness, hypotension, shock after procedure, respiratory and/or cardiac arrest), 
infection (fever, bacteremia, and endocarditis following the procedure), and complications of 
procedure (failure of sterile precautions during procedure, foreign body accidentally left during a 
procedure, and postoperative infection ) (Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009).   
In some cases, a patient may experience more than one type of adverse events and the 
ensuing ED visit and/or hospitalization may not be attributed to one type of adverse events or 
another. To avoid underestimating the incidence rate, each type of adverse event is considered to 
have resulted in an ED visit and/or hospitalization in these cases. For example, if a patient had 
gastrointestinal bleeding and a stroke within 30 days of the procedure and got hospitalized, two 
binary variables, the occurrence of serious gastrointestinal events and the occurrence of other 
non-gastrointestinal events will be coded as 1. If a patient had multiple complications that belong 
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to one type of adverse events, only the corresponding dependent variable will be coded as 1. For 
example, if a patient had an inpatient record with the diagnoses of abdominal pain and nausea 
and vomiting, only the occurrence of other gastrointestinal events for this patient will be coded 
as 1.  
Key independent variable. 
The primary interest of this study is examining how physician ownership status affects 
patient outcomes of colonoscopy procedures. Prior to the Capen v. Shewry lawsuit and 
corresponding court ruling, Section 1200, et seq. of the California Health and Safety Code 
required that certain types of clinics and surgical clinics be licensed by the California 
Department of Public Health (CDPH). CDPH had interpreted the Statute as excluding from 
mandatory licensure clinics that were solely owned physicians. But CDPH had licensed wholly 
physician-owned clinics if physicians voluntarily requested it. Most physician-owned ASCs 
elected to be licensed because most third party payers, such as Medi-Cal, have included being 
licensed as a condition for coverage (Fielding & Freedman, 2008).  
The decision made by the Third District Court of Appeal on September 19, 2007 in the 
Capen v. Shewry lawsuit altered CDPH’s licensing practices. The decision ruled that “physician 
owned and operated surgical clinics are to be regulated by a division of the Medical Board, when 
general anesthesia is used, and surgical clinics operated by non-physicians are to be regulated by 
the Department (CDPH).”(Court of Appeal, Third District, California, 2007) CDPH interpreted 
the decision as it no longer having authority to license or regulate any physician-owned ASCs, 
nor to issue licenses even if physicians applied for them voluntarily. Consequently, about 450 
ASCs with physician ownership stopped filing annual reports to the CDPH. These facilities also 
    
 
80 
 
stopped submitting discharge data. Post the court ruling, the Medical Board of California is 
solely responsible for oversight of any centers with any fraction of physician ownership.  
The Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) maintains 
information on all licensed health facilities in California. After the Capen v. Shewry decision, 
OSHPD began to identify and delicense ASCs with any physician ownership. The delicensing 
process did not happen immediately after the court ruling because many physician-owned ASCs 
continued to submit utilization reports to OSHPD. By 2012, all ASCs with physician-ownership 
have been delicensed. Based on the records maintained by OSHPD, this study is able to identify 
ASCs with at least partial physician ownership. This study assumed that physician ownership 
status remained unchanged during the study period, namely, from 2005 to 2007. Physician 
information was not available in the California data. Therefore, it is not possible to identify 
physicians who were practicing in physician-owned facilities or to identify which physicians 
were indeed owners of these facilities.  
A dummy variable physician ownership is constructed to identify outpatient surgical 
facilities with physician ownership, namely, physician-owned ASCs and those without, namely, 
hospital-based outpatient facilities. The first type of facility includes freestanding ASCs that 
were solely or partially owned by physicians. This category also includes freestanding ASCs 
organized through joint ventures between hospitals and individual physicians or between 
hospitals and physician groups. The second type of facility includes hospital outpatient 
departments as well as hospital-owned ASCs that are not physically attached to the main hospital 
campus. Because all these hospital-owned facilities reported information at the hospital level, it 
is impossible to distinguish hospital outpatient departments from hospital-owned ASCs. In this 
study, hospital-based outpatient facility serves as the reference group.  
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Control variables. 
All regressions included the same set of control variables. These control variables can be 
grouped into factors at the patient, organizational, and health care market-level as shown in 
Figure 3 of Chapter 3.  
Patient characteristics. 
Several demographic and clinical factors that may affect patients’ likelihood of ED and 
hospital inpatient care use after outpatient surgery are included in the analysis. Specifically, 
patient demographic variables include: patient age group, gender, race/ethnicity, payer type, 
income proxy, and urban/rural location. This study selected colonoscopy patients who were 18 
years or older on the date of admission. Following Chukmaitov et al (2008a), the age group 
variable is divided into five groups (18-49 [the reference group], 50-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85 and 
above). Patient gender is included as a binary variable (male is the reference group). 
Race/ethnicity is coded as non-Hispanic white (the reference group), non-Hispanic African 
American, Hispanic, or other (non-Hispanic, including unknowns). Patient payer types are 
categorized into five groups: Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance (the reference group), self-
pay, or other payer.  
Ideally, a patient’s income should be measured directly by the income at the patient level 
or household level. However, such data are not publicly available. Instead, a quartile variable 
based on the median household income for the patient’s ZIP code is used (first quartile, second 
quartile, third quartile, fourth quartile [the reference group]). The quartiles are identified by 
values of 1 to 4, with 1 indicating the poorest population and 4 the wealthiest population, 
respectively. The cut-offs for the quartile designation is determined by ranking the ranking the 
median household income for all the ZIP Codes within the state. This variable is used as a proxy 
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for an individual patient’s socioeconomic status. It is worth noting that it may also be an 
indicator of the community from which the outpatient surgery facility is drawing business.  
Patient urban/rural location is classified as one of these categories: large metropolitan 
area with at least 1 million residents (the reference group), small metropolitan area with less than 
1 million residents, micropolitan area, and not metropolitan or micropolitan area (rural area). 
Several clinical factors may affect patient outcomes and thus should be controlled for. 
This study uses the Charlson et al. (1987) Index as a measure of medical severity of illness. 
Charlson et al. (1987) defined 17 comorbidities, including myocardial infarction, congestive 
heart failure, peripheral vascular disease, cerebrovascular disease, dementia, chronic pulmonary 
disease, rheumatic disease, peptic ulcer disease, mild liver disease, diabetes without chronic 
complication, diabetes with chronic complication, hemiplegia or paraplegia, renal disease, any 
malignancy, moderate or severe liver disease, metastatic solid tumor, and HIV/AIDS. Different 
comorbidities receive different weights in the construction of the Index. The first 10 conditions 
(from myocardial infarction to diabetes without chronic complication) are given a weight of 1. 
The eleventh to fourteenth conditions (from diabetes with chronic complication to any 
malignancy) are given a weight of 2. Moderate or severe liver disease is given a weight of 3 and 
metastatic solid tumor and HIV/AIDS are given a weight of 6. In this study, the Index is 
constructed using diagnosis information from the outpatient surgery records as well as 
emergency and inpatient records for the 6 months prior to and 6 months after the procedure, 
assuming comorbid conditions remain unchanged over this period of time. The calculation is 
based on the algorithms used in Quan et al (2005). Some conditions, such as acute myocardial 
infarction, are excluded from the calculation of the Index if they happened within 30 days after 
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the procedure because these are regarded as colonoscopy related complications. The Charlson 
Index is treated as a continuous variable in the analysis.  
This study also measures some other clinical factors. Following Fleisher et al (2004), the 
propensity to use medical services, which is measured by the number of previous ED visits and 
hospital admissions (within 6 months prior to the colonoscopy), is controlled for in this study. 
The study also controls for the procedures that patients received during the colonoscopy. 
Following prior studies (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009), this study 
controls for the type of colonoscopy performed on the patient (Diagnostic colonoscopy [the 
reference group], Colonoscopy and biopsy, or Lesion removal colonoscopy).  
Organizational characteristics. 
Other organizational characteristics are also measured and controlled for in this study. 
Facility volume is measured through a tertile variable that represents the ranking of the volume 
of colonoscopies provided by a facility relative to the volume of all other facilities in a given 
year (Chukmaitov et al., 2008). The total number of colonoscopies performed by each facility is 
obtained by using unique facility identifiers and procedure identifiers. Following Chukmaitov et 
al. (2010), this study measures procedure specialization within an outpatient surgical facility. 
The variable specialization rate equals the number of colonoscopy procedures provided by the 
facility divided by the total number of outpatient surgeries in that facility in a given year. The 
specialization rate squared is also included to allow for the estimate of a quadratic relationship 
between organizational specialization and quality of care.  
Market characteristics.  
The proposed study also controls for several market characteristics that may affect the 
quality of outpatient surgical care, including degree of competition, HMO and PPO penetration, 
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physician density, and demand-related factors. In this study, the health care market is defined as 
the county due to the availability of data. Alternative methods to define health care market 
include the use of the Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) (Wennberg & Cooper, 1998) and fixed 
radius. Past work suggests that different definitions of markets do not substantially change the 
results (Krauchunas, 2011; McLaughlin, Normolle, Wolfe, McMahon, & Griffith, 1989). 
Competition in this study is measured using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that is 
based on the market share of colonoscopy for a facility, calculated with the county as the 
relevant market area. Outpatient surgical facilities operated by the same health care system in a 
county are treated as one organization with their market share combined to the system level. This 
is the standard practice in hospital related research. Health system identifiers are obtained from 
AHA annual survey. An interaction term of competition and facility type is included in the 
analysis as physician-owned ASCs may behave differently in highly competitive markets. HMO 
and PPO penetration rates are used to capture the financial pressure from managed care 
organizations. The HMO penetration rate is defined as the proportion of  the total population 
enrolled in HMOs (including commercial, Medicare, and Medicaid enrollment) in a county 
following the literature (Scanlon, Chernew, Swaminathan, & Lee, 2006). The PPO penetration 
rate includes commercial, Medicare, and self insured enrollment and uses the total population in 
the county as the denominator.  
This study also includes a set of physician supply variable to reflect the medical 
infrastructure in the local health care market. Specifically, the numbers of physicians practicing 
gastroenterology, primary care (including family medicine, general practice, and general internal 
medicine), and general surgery per 100,000 population in the county are included. Because ARF 
does not provide the physician supply variables for the year 2006, averages of the values in years 
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2005 and 2007 are used instead. Additionally, the study controls for several demand-related 
factors, including log-transformed population size at the county level, percentage of the 
population over age 65, and percentage of the population under age 65 without health insurance. 
Finally, time effects are accounted for in the model. Specifically, dummy variables for each year 
between 2005 and 2007 are constructed, with the reference group being 2005. Table 8 
summarizes the variables included in the analysis, their definitions, and data sources.  
Empirical Specification and Methodology 
A descriptive analysis of colonoscopy patients’ characteristics and the prevalence of 
adverse events related to outpatient colonoscopy by the ownership structure of the facility will 
first be conducted. To demonstrate the prevalence of colonoscopy related adverse events, the 
unadjusted rate per 1,000 persons for specific adverse events will be calculated by counting the 
number of specific adverse events within 30 days of the procedure, not controlling for covariates. 
Chi-square test will be used to determine whether the rate for adverse events differed 
significantly across two types of facilities, namely, physician-owned ASC and hospital-based 
outpatient facility.  
Recognizing that a colonoscopy case is nested within an outpatient surgical facility, and 
the latter is nested within a certain health care market, three-level generalized hierarchical linear 
models (GHLM) will be constructed to investigate the factors associated with adverse events 
after colonoscopy. Patient characteristics will be modeled at level-1, organizational factors at 
level-2 and health care market characteristics at level-3. Separate models will be estimated for 
each dependent variable.  
In the hierarchical modeling, a patient’s log odds of experiencing an adverse event after 
the index colonoscopy may vary across both facilities and health care markets. First, a patient’s  
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Table 8  
Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Data Sources 
Dependent Variables   
The incidence of same day ED 
visit and/or hospitalization  
All-cause ED visit and/or hospitalization in the same day of colonoscopy. This 
variable is binary and equals to 1 if the patient experiences this type of adverse 
events and 0 otherwise. 
HCUP-
SEDD 
and SID 
The incidence of serious 
gastrointestinal event 
Serious gastrointestinal complications (colonic perforation, lower 
gastrointestinal bleeding, and anemia) requiring ED visit and/or hospitalization 
within 30 days following outpatient colonoscopy. This variable is binary and 
equals 1 if the patient experiences any of the complications under this category 
and 0 otherwise. 
HCUP-
SEDD 
and SID 
The incidence of other 
gastrointestinal event 
Other gastrointestinal complications including intestinal obstruction, abdominal 
pain, diverticulitis, ulcerative colitis, nausea and vomiting, and disorders of fluid 
occurring within 30 days after outpatient colonoscopy that were severe enough 
to require an emergency department visit or hospitalization. This variable is 
binary and equals 1 if the patient experiences any of the complications under this 
category and 0 otherwise. 
HCUP-
SEDD 
and SID 
The incidence of other non-
gastrointestinal event 
Other non-gastrointestinal complications including sedation-related 
cardiopulmonary complications (aspiration pneumonia, pneumonia, organism 
unspecified, myocardial infarction/angina, arrhythmias, heart failure, stroke, 
syncope/dizziness, hypotension, shock after procedure, respiratory and/or 
cardiac arrest), infection (fever, bacteremia, and endocarditis following the 
procedure), and complications of procedure (failure of sterile precautions during 
procedure, foreign body accidentally left during a procedure, and postoperative 
infection) occurring within 30 days after outpatient colonoscopy that were 
severe enough to require an emergency department visit or hospitalization. This 
variable is binary and equals 1 if the patient experiences any of the 
complications under this category and 0 otherwise. 
HCUP-
SEDD 
and SID 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Variable Definition Data Sources 
Key Independent Variable   
Physician ownership A dummy variable identifying physician-owned ASC and hospital-based outpatient facility (the reference group) 
CA-
OSHPD 
Physician ownership interacted 
with HHI 
The interaction term of the dummy variable identifying physician-owned ASC 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
HCUP-
SASD 
CA-
OSHPD 
Control Variables   
Patient characteristics   
Age group Dummy variables identifying these age groups: 18–49 [the reference group], 50–64, 65–74, 75–84, 85 and above. 
HCUP-
SASD 
Gender A dummy variable equal to 1 for male and 0 for female  HCUP-SASD 
Race/ethnicity Dummy variables identifying white (non-Hispanic, the reference group), African American (non-Hispanic), Hispanic, or other (including unknowns) 
HCUP-
SASD 
Payer type 
Dummy variables identifying Medicare (fee-for-service and managed care 
Medicare), Medicaid (fee-for-service and managed care Medicaid), private 
insurance (including Blue Cross, commercial carriers, and private HMOs and 
PPOs, the reference group), self-pay, or other payer (Worker's Compensation, 
CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA, Title V, and other government programs) 
HCUP-
SASD 
Income level  
Dummy variables indicating the quartile in which the median household income 
for the patient’s ZIP code falls (first quartile, second quartile, third quartile, 
fourth quartile [the reference group]). The quartiles are identified by 1 to 4, with 
1 indicating the poorest population and 4 the wealthiest population, respectively. 
The cut-offs for the quartile designation is determined by ranking the median 
household income for all ZIP Codes within the state. 
HCUP-
SASD 
Urban/rural location  
A series of dummy variables identifying patient urban/rural location as one of 
these: large metropolitan area with at least 1 million residents (the reference 
group), small metropolitan area with less than 1 million residents, micropolitan 
area,  and not metropolitan or micropolitan area (nonmetro noncore area) 
HCUP-
SASD 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Variable Definition Data Sources 
Charlson Comorbidity Index 
A continuous variable which represents the weighted number of comorbid 
conditions. It is calculated using diagnoses on the ambulatory surgery records as 
well as emergency department and inpatient records for the 6 months prior to 
and 6 months after the outpatient colonoscopy 
HCUP-
SASD, 
SEDD, 
and SID 
# of previous ED visits and 
hospitalizations 
The number of ED visits and hospital admissions within 6 months prior to the 
colonoscopy procedure  
HCUP-
SEDD 
and SID 
Colonoscopy type Dummy variables indicating diagnostic colonoscopy  (the reference group), colonoscopy and biopsy, or lesion removal colonoscopy 
HCUP-
SASD 
Organizational Characteristics   
Facility volume 
Three dummy variables representing the low-, medium-, or high-volume tertile 
based on the facility volume of colonoscopy. The low tertile serves as the 
reference group. These tertile variables vary from year to year with cut-offs 
determined by ranking all facilities’ volumes in a given year 
HCUP-
SASD 
Specialization rate The percentage which equals the number of colonoscopies provided by the facility divided by the number of outpatient surgeries for a facility in a year 
HCUP-
SASD 
Specialization rate squared A continuous variable which equals to the square of specialization rate HCUP-SASD 
Market Characteristics   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI)  
Sum of squares of market share of a facility’s outpatient colonoscopy cases. The 
market shares for facilities that belonged to the same health systems within a 
county were combined 
HCUP-
SASD 
HMO and PPO penetration 
The percentage of the population enrolled in HMOs (including commercial, 
Medicare, and Medicaid) in a county  and the percentage of the population in the 
county enrolled in commercial PPO, Medicare PPO, or self insured PPO.  
Health-
Leader 
Number of gastroenterologists 
per 100,000 population 
The ratio of the number of physicians in gastroenterology to 100,000 population 
in the county 
ARF 
Number of primary care 
physicians per 100,000 
population 
The ratio of the number of physicians practicing family medicine, general 
medicine, and internal medicine to 100,000 population in the county 
ARF 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Variable Definition Data Sources 
Number of general surgeons per 
100,000 population 
The ratio of the number of physicians in general surgery to the total population 
in the county 
ARF 
Log-transformed population 
size The log-transformation of the estimated total number of population in the county ARF 
% of the population above age 
65 The percentage of the population above age 65 ARF 
% of the population below age 
65 without health insurance The percentage of the population under age 65 that have no health insurance ARF 
Year dummy variables A set of dummy variables for years 2005 (the reference group), 2006, and 2007  
Note: CA-OSHPD: State specialty clinic and hospital annual utilization reports from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD); 
HCUP-SASD: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State Ambulatory Surgery Databases; HCUP-SEDD: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State 
Emergency Department Databases; HCUP-SID: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Databases; ARF: Area Resource File.
    
 
90 
  
odds of having an adverse event will be modeled as a function of a facility mean and a random 
error (which was assumed to have a Bernoulli distribution with a mean of zero and a constant 
variance). Then, the organizational mean will be modeled as an outcome varying randomly 
around a health market mean with a random error (which was assumed to have a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a certain variance). Finally, each health market mean will be 
modeled as an outcome varying randomly around a grand mean with a random error (which was 
also assumed to have a normal distribution).  
Suppose that  is a binary variable (e.g. same day ED visit and/or hospitalization) that 
equals 1 if a specific type of adverse events occurred in patient  who received care from facility 
 which was located in health markets , the three-level logistic random-intercept model can be 
expressed by the following equation: 
 
where   follows 
the Bernouli distribution, ,  is a random intercept 
varying over facilities (level2),  is a random intercept varying over health 
care markets (level 3).  represents the cross-level interaction 
term between physician-ownership and market competition.  
A common threat to the internal validity of this observational study is that physicians 
may selectively invest in outpatient surgical facilities in certain type of health care market. 
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Researchers have noted that technological, market, and public policy factors jointly influence 
physician decisions to invest in ASCs (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). This study will use 
the propensity score approach (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984) to 
identify facilities that are more likely to attract physician investment using market-level factors. 
Including the propensity score in the models ensures that facilities in different categories have 
similar joint distributions in observed variables related to decisions among physicians about 
where to locate facilities (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984; Rubin, 1997). 
In theory, if physicians’ selection of location wholly depends on the variables used in propensity 
score estimation, including propensity scores in the models can make the selection process 
“ignorable” (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). But in practice, important factors that may influence 
such decisions may be unobservable and thus not incorporated into the propensity score.  
Little evidence exists in the current literature on physician investment decisions. One 
qualitative study suggests that technological, market, and public policy factors jointly affect 
physicians’ decision to invest in ASCs (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003; Pham, Devers, May, 
& Berenson, 2004). For example, the presence of large single-specialty physician groups is 
found to be an important contributing factor in the creation of a physician-owned ASC (Casalino, 
Devers, & Brewster, 2003). In addition, physician income pressure and physician’s negotiation 
power relative to that of health insurance plans and hospitals also may play a role in physicians’ 
decision to invest in specialty facilities (i.e., specialty hospitals or ASCs) (Pham, Devers, May, & 
Berenson, 2004). In this study, all market-level factors, including competition, HMO/PPO 
penetration, physician supply variables, and patient demand factors, are used in the propensity 
score analysis. The propensity score is calculated using logistic regression and is included in 
multilevel models as a covariate.  
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In this study, data management is conducted using SAS 9.2 and STATA 12.0. Multilevel 
logistic regressions are estimated using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS. This study was 
reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Virginia Commonwealth 
University.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine whether multivariate regression results are 
robust to the change in propensity score adjustment approach. It is possible that physician 
owners may selectively refer relatively healthier patients to their own facilities for treatments 
(Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012). At the same time, they may direct 
sicker patients and those with multiple comorbid conditions to other facilities for treatment 
because these patients may require a higher level of service and cost more to be taken care of. 
Thus, a separate propensity score will be constructed to account for favorable patient selection. 
Because little evidence exists about what patient characteristics are used in patient selection by 
physician owners, all patient-level factors will be used to construct the propensity score. Note 
that patients from remote rural areas may only have access to hospital outpatient facilities 
because there were no physician-owned ASCs nearby. In this case, patients’ urban/rural location 
variable can be used to control for physical accessibility to physician-owned ASCs. The results 
will be compared with those of primary models that include propensity score adjusting for 
potential physician selective investment in outpatient surgical facilities.  
An additional sensitivity analysis parallels the two series of models in the main analysis, 
with an added lagged quality indicator-unadjusted adverse event rate for a facility in the previous 
year. The inclusion of the lagged quality variable may be necessary for two reasons. First, lagged 
quality may affect patient outcomes in the current period due to the dynamic nature of quality 
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(Castle & Anderson, 2011). Second, this variable may in part pick up the influence of quality on 
patients’ decisions if they are indeed able to ascertain differences in quality across different 
providers. These models are run as sensitivity tests rather than the main analysis considering that 
observations of year 2005 do not have lagged quality information and need to be dropped from 
the analysis. This loss of sample size is significant since the outcomes are rare adverse events.  
Summary 
This chapter covered the research design, data sources, variable measurements, and 
empirical specification and methods used in this study. This study will utilize a pooled, cross-
sectional design. The ambulatory surgery, emergency department, and inpatient care discharge 
records from California will be linked together to identify a cohort of outpatient colonoscopy 
patients and their use of emergency department and/or hospital inpatient care within 30 days 
after the procedure. The Capen v Shewry decision in California in 2007 will be used to identify 
the physician ownership status of outpatient surgical facilities. Using hierarchical generalized 
linear modeling technique and propensity score adjustments, this study will attempt to examine 
the effect of physician ownership by comparing patient outcomes in facilities with physician 
ownership and in those with no physician ownership. The findings of this study are presented in 
Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analyses. It is divided into four sections. 
The first section provides descriptive data on patients, outpatient surgical facilities, and health 
care markets for California during the 2005 to 2007 study period. The second section shows the 
unadjusted rate per 1,000 procedures for adverse events of interest. The third section presents 
results of multilevel models, with and without a propensity score adjusting for physician 
selective investment in outpatient surgical facilities. The fourth section reports the results of 
sensitivity analyses, in which a different propensity score is constructed to adjust for patient 
selection and lagged quality indicators are included in the empirical model. These results are 
compared with those obtained in the main analysis. The fifth and final section concludes the 
chapter with a brief summary.  
Results of Descriptive Analysis 
Numbers of colonoscopy patients, facilities, and markets. 
During the study period (2005-2007), 1,832,535 colonoscopies were performed in 
California, of which 1,278,886 colonoscopies were performed on patients aged 18 or above and 
were included in the study. Physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities 
provided 645,481 (50.5%) and 633,405 (49.5%) colonoscopies, respectively. There were 1,324 
facility-years included in this study, with 494 physician-owned ASC-years and 830 hospital-
based outpatient facility-years. On average, in each study year, there were 165 physician-owned 
ASCs and 277 hospital-based outpatient facilities with an annual facility volume of no less than 
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30 colonoscopies. Those outpatient surgical facilities were located in 58 counties. The counties 
of Alpine and Sierra did not have any health care facility that provided outpatient surgeries 
during the study period. In Modoc County, the only licensed health care facility, Modoc Medical 
Center, reported 7 outpatient surgeries (no colonoscopy) in 2005 and none in 2006 and 2007. 
Thus, Alpine, Sierra, and Modoc counties were excluded from the study. These three counties 
are the three least populated in California. Thus, the health care markets in 55 counties were 
examined in the study.  
Characteristics of patients examined. 
As reported in Table 9, a majority of colonoscopy patients (71.7%) were between age 50 
and 74, which is consistent with the recommendation that colonoscopy be conducted for polyps 
and cancer screening in an average risk person, aged between 50 and 75 (U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force, 2008). The distribution of patient age was similar at physician-owned 
ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities.  
Outpatient colonoscopy patients were more likely to be female. Although a higher 
percentage of patients treated at a physician-owned ASC were male than patients treated at a 
hospital-based outpatient facility (45.7% versus 45.1%, p<0.0001), the magnitude of the 
difference may not have practical implications.  
Extra caution needs to be exercised when interpreting the racial/ethnic composition of patients in 
different types of facilities. More patients at a physician-owned ASC had unknown race/ethnicity. 
In this situation, the racial-ethnic composition is calculated on the basis of patients with known 
race/ethnicity. Overall, non-Hispanic white, African American, and Hispanic patients accounted 
for 81.4%, 4.0%, and 14.6% of all patients with known race/ethnicity, respectively. In physician-
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Table 9  
Descriptive Statistics for Patient-level Characteristics by Facility Type from 2005 to 2007 
  Physician-owned ASC 
Hospital-owned 
Outpatient Facility Total 
  # of cases (%) # of cases (%) # of cases (%) 
Patient age       
18-49 (reference) 86,918 (13.5) 95,244 (15.0) 182,162 (14.2) 
50-64 323,124 (50.1) 317,479 (50.1) 640,603 (50.1) 
65-74 144,779 (22.4) 131,783 (20.8) 276,562 (21.6) 
75-84 79,831 (12.4) 76,348 (12.1) 156,179 (12.2) 
85 or greater 10,829 (1.7) 12,551 (2.0) 23,380 (1.8) 
Patient gender       
Male (reference) 294,799 (45.7) 285,914 (45.1) 580,713 (45.4) 
Female 350,682 (54.3) 347,491 (54.9) 698,173 (54.6) 
Patient race/ethnicity       
White (reference) 381,806 (59.2) 416,925 (65.8) 798,731 (62.5) 
Black 19,832 (3.1) 19,963 (3.2) 39,795 (3.1) 
Hispanic 61,020 (9.5) 82,110 (13.0) 143,130 (11.2) 
Other 182,823 (28.3) 114,407 (18.1) 297,230 (23.2) 
Payer       
Medicare 222,200 (34.4) 205,126 (32.4) 427,326 (33.4) 
Medicaid 10,808 (1.7) 37,121 (5.9) 47,929 (3.7) 
Private insurance (reference) 374,037 (57.9) 355,123 (56.1) 729,160 (57.0) 
Self-pay 7,890 (1.2) 9,674 (1.5) 17,564 (1.4) 
Other payer 30,546 (4.7) 26,361 (4.2) 56,907 (4.4) 
Median household income quartile (ZIP code level)       
Lowest quartile of income 105,618 (16.4) 117,653 (18.6) 223,271 (17.5) 
Second lowest quartile of income 125,518 (19.4) 151,213 (23.9) 276,731 (21.6) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
  Physician-owned ASC 
Hospital-owned 
Outpatient Facility Total 
  # of cases (%) # of cases (%) # of cases (%) 
Second highest quartile of income 176,949 (27.4) 172,924 (27.3) 349,873 (27.4) 
Highest quartile of income (reference) 237,396 (36.8) 191,615 (30.3) 429,011 (33.5) 
Urban/rural location       
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million residents, 
reference) 466,053 (72.2) 448,594 (70.8) 914,647 (71.5) 
Metropolitan areas (<1 million residents) 170,060 (26.3) 148,319 (23.4) 318,379 (24.9) 
Micropolitan areas 4,870 (0.8) 26,074 (4.1) 30,944 (2.4) 
Non-urban areas 4,498 (0.7) 10,418 (1.6) 14,916 (1.2) 
Charlson Comorbidity Indexa 0.17 (0.80) 0.35 (1.02) 0.26 (0.92) 
Propensity to use medical servicesa 0.15 (0.55) 0.23 (0.74) 0.19 (0.65) 
Colonoscopy type       
Diagnostic colonoscopy (reference) 337,922 (52.4) 334,998 (52.9) 672,920 (52.6) 
Colonoscopy and biopsy 141,383 (21.9) 138,331 (21.8) 279,714 (21.9) 
Lesion removal colonoscopy 166,176 (25.7) 160,076 (25.3) 326,252 (25.5) 
Total 645,481 (100.0) 633,405 (100.0) 1,278,886 (100.0) 
Note: Chi-square test was used to test the association between the row variables and facility type variables. a For Charlson Comorbidity Index and 
propensity to use medical services, mean and standard deviation are reported and t test was used to test the differences across facility types. All differences 
across the two types of facilities are significant at the p<0.01 level. 
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owned ASCs, the three percentages were 82.5%, 4.3%, and 13.2%, respectively while in 
hospital-based outpatient facilities, the three percentages were 80.3%, 3.8%, and 15.8%. Taking 
African American and Hispanic patients together, physician-owned ASCs served a relatively 
smaller percentage of patients from racial-ethnic minority groups (17.5%) than hospital-based 
outpatient facilities (19.7%).  
The patients tended to be covered by private insurance or Medicare. Medicare patients 
and private insured patients accounted for a significantly larger percentage in physician-owned 
ASCs (92.3%) than in hospital-based outpatient facilities (88.5%). By contrast, Medicaid 
patients accounted for a significantly smaller percentage in physician-owned ASCs (1.7%) than 
in hospital-based outpatient facilities (5.9%).  
Using the median household income quartile for the patient’s ZIP code as a proxy for a 
patients’ income, physician-owned ASCs had a significantly higher percentage of patients from 
the wealthiest quartile (36.8%) and a significantly lower percentage of patients from the poorest 
quartile (16.4%) than hospital-based outpatient facilities (30.3% and 18.6%, respectively).  
A majority of colonoscopy patients came from metropolitan areas (96.4%). Physician-
owned ASCs had significantly smaller percentages of patients from micropolitan and non-urban 
areas (0.8% and 0.7%, respectively) than hospital-based outpatient facilities (4.1% and 1.6%, 
respectively).  
Outpatient colonoscopy patients were largely healthy. The average Charlson Comorbidity 
Index was 0.26 and the average number of the ED visits and hospitalizations in the six months 
prior to the colonoscopy was 0.19 per person. Physician-owned ASCs served significantly 
healthier patients. The mean Charlson Comorbidity Index for patients treated at a physician-
owned ASC was 0.17 while the number was 0.35 for patients treated at a hospital-based 
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outpatient facility. Patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had a significantly lower 
propensity to use medical services. The average number of previous ED visits and 
hospitalizations was 0.15 for patients treated at a physician-owned ASC while that number for 
patients treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility was 0.23.  
More than half of outpatient colonoscopies were diagnostic colonoscopies. About one 
fifth were colonoscopy with biopsy and about one fourth were lesion removal colonoscopies. 
The composition of different colonoscopy procedures was similar across the two types of 
facilities. Overall, 52.6% of colonoscopy patients received diagnostic colonoscopy without 
biopsy or polypectomy, while 21.9% received colonoscopy and biopsy and 25.5% received 
lesion removal colonoscopy.  
In sum, a majority of outpatient colonoscopy patients were above age 50. They were 
more likely to be female and non-Hispanic white. Private insurance and Medicare were two 
largest payers for this type of medical care. Patients from the wealthier two quartiles accounted 
for more than 60% of all the patients. Most patients lived in metropolitan areas. Outpatient 
colonoscopy patients were largely healthy. A little more than half of patients received diagnostic 
colonoscopy. There were significant differences among patients receiving the procedure at a 
physician-owned ASC and those treated by a hospital outpatient facility. Patients receiving the 
procedure at a physician-owned ASC were more likely to be non-Hispanic white, have private 
insurance or Medicare, live in wealthier zip codes and metropolitan areas, and have better health 
status.  
Characteristics of outpatient surgical facilities. 
As reported in Table 10, on average an outpatient surgical facility provided 1284 
colonoscopies in a given year. On average 30% of all the surgeries in an outpatient facility were  
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Table 10  
Descriptive Statistics for Facility-level Characteristics by Facility Type from 2005 to 2007 
  Physician-owned ASC 
Hospital-owned 
Outpatient Facility Total 
  Mean (Standard deviation) 
Mean (Standard 
deviation) 
Mean (Standard 
deviation) 
Facility colonoscopy 
volume 1811.67 (1711.98) 970.69 (1088.72) 1284.47 (1414.36) 
Facility colonoscopy 
volume groupa       
30-430 cases per year 
(reference) 113 (22.9) 314 (37.8) 427 (32.3) 
431-1333 cases per year 124 (25.1) 323 (38.9) 447 (33.8) 
>= 1334 cases per year  257 (52.0) 193 (23.3) 450 (34.0) 
Specialization rate 0.48 (0.27) 0.20 (0.12) 0.31 (0.23) 
Facility-years 494 (100.0) 830 (100.0) 1,324 (100.0) 
Note: Means are reported and standard deviations are in brackets. t test was used to check on the equality of means 
of row variables of different facility types. a For the Facility colonoscopy volume group variables, frequencies and 
column percentages are reported and chi-square test is used to test the association between row variables and facility 
type variables. All differences across the two types of facilities are significant at the p<0.01 level. 
 
colonoscopy procedures. Physician-owned ASCs on average had a significantly higher 
colonoscopy volume (1,812 cases per year) than hospital-based outpatient facilities (971 cases 
per year). Correspondingly, 52.0% of physician-owned ASC-years fell into the highest volume 
group while 23.3% of hospital-based outpatient facilities belonged to that group. Physician-
owned ASCs had a significantly higher level of specialization than hospital-based outpatient 
facilities. Among physician-owned ASCs, on average 48% of all outpatient surgeries were 
colonoscopy cases. In hospital-based outpatient facilities, only 20% of all outpatient surgeries 
were colonoscopies on average. 
Characteristics of health care markets. 
As mentioned before, counties are used to define health care markets in this study. The 
distribution of outpatient surgical facilities that performed outpatient colonoscopy varied greatly 
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across counties. Among the 55 counties with at least one outpatient surgical facility that provided 
30 or more outpatient colonoscopies in a given year, only 38 counties had both physician-owned 
ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities. The other 17 counties only had hospital-based 
outpatient facilities.  
Table 11 depicts the characteristics of the health care markets based on the percentage of 
outpatient surgical center observations for the three year study period in a county that were 
physician-owned ASC observations rather than hospital-based outpatient facility observations. 
Twenty-five counties had low percentages of physician-owned ASC observations (0-29.9%), 17 
counties belonged to the group of markets with moderate percentages (30.0-49.9%), and 10 
belonged to the group of markets with high percentages of physician-owned ASC observations 
(above 50.0%). Markets with low percentages of physician-owned ASC observations had a much 
lower level of competition (HHI 0.6814) compared with markets with moderate or high 
percentages of physician-owned ASC observations (HHI 0.2820 and 0.3549, respectively). 
Markets with low percentages of physician-owned ASC observations also had a relatively lower 
HMO penetration rate, lower gastroenterologists per 100,000 population, higher primary care 
physicians per 100,000 population, higher general surgeon per 100,000 population, a smaller 
population size, and a higher percent of the population aged 65 or above. Little difference in the 
rate of individuals who are uninsured was found across the three market types.  
Unadjusted rates for adverse events by facility type. 
Table 12 presents the unadjusted rates for specific adverse events that developed within 
30 days of outpatient colonoscopy and resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization by facility type. 
Here the rate is calculated by summing up all the complications across facilities of a particular 
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Table 11  
Descriptive Statistics for Market-level Characteristics by Percentages of Outpatient Surgical Center Observations that were for 
Physician-owned ACSsa  
% of Observations that 
were for Physician-
owned ASC 
HHI HMO penetration 
PPO 
penetr
ation 
# of  GI 
per 
100,000 
# of 
PCP 
per 
100,000 
# of GS 
per 
100,000 
Log 
population 
% of 
populatio
n age 65+ 
% of 
the 
uninsu
red 
Low (0-29.9%)  0.6814 27.0% 32.1% 1.61 64.05 9.29 11.28 13.8% 19.7% 
Medium (30.0-49.9%)  0.2820 39.0% 29.5% 2.99 59.64 9.22 13.34 11.1% 19.7% 
High (>=50.0%) 0.3549 29.7% 37.2% 2.62 62.31 8.27 12.30 12.3% 19.8% 
Overall 0.4768 31.9% 32.1% 2.30 62.13 9.08 12.22 12.6% 19.7% 
Note: HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; GI: gastroenterologists; PCP: primary care physicians; GS: general surgeons. aThe percentage was calculated 
by dividing the number of study observations for physician-owned ASCs during the three-year study period within a county by the total number of 
outpatient surgical center observations (i.e., physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities) in that county.   
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Table 12  
Unadjusted Rates per 1,000 procedures for Specific Adverse Events within 30 Days of Colonoscopy by Facility Type from 
2005 to 2007 
Adverse event 
Physician-owned 
ASCs (n=645,481) 
Hospital-based 
outpatient facilities 
(n=633,405) 
Total  
(n=1,278,886) P value 
Events, n Rate Events, n Rate Events, n Rate 
Same day transfer to ED or Hospital 1,131 1.8 2,283 3.6 3,414 2.7 <0.001 
Serious GI events resulting in an ED 
visit or hospitalization within 30 days 638 1.0 636 1.0 1,274 1.0 0.779 
Other GI events resulting in an ED visit 
or hospitalization within 30 days 3,028 4.7 3,451 5.4 6,479 5.1 <0.001 
Other non-GI events resulting in an ED 
visit or hospitalization within 30 days 7,683 11.9 9,951 15.7 17,634 13.8 <0.001 
Note: ED: emergency department; GI=gastrointestinal. 
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ownership type and then dividing this by the total number of procedures (measured in 1000s) for 
that facility ownership type. The rate for same day transfer to ED or short-term acute care 
hospital was 2.7 per 1,000 procedures. Rate for same day transfer to ED or short-term acute care 
hospital was significantly lower for patients treated at a physician-owned ASC (1.8 per 1,000 
procedures) than those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility (3.6 per 1,000procedures) . 
The incidence of serious gastrointestinal events (colonic perforation or lower gastrointestinal 
bleeding) that resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization was 1.0 per 1,000 procedures. The rate 
for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events was not significantly different among patients treated at 
the two types of facilities.  
The rate for other gastrointestinal adverse events (e.g. intestinal obstruction) that resulted 
in ED visit or hospitalization was 5.1 per 1,000 procedures. Rate for other gastrointestinal events 
was significantly lower among patients receiving colonoscopy at a physician-owned ASC (4.7 
per 1,000 procedures) than those treated in a hospital-based outpatient facility (5.4 per 1,000 
procedures). In addition, the incidence of non-gastrointestinal adverse events (cardiopulmonary 
events and complications associated with the procedure) was 13.8 per 1,000 procedures. Rate for 
non-gastrointestinal events was significantly lower among patients treated at a physician-owned 
ASC (11.9 per 1,000 procedures) than among those receiving procedures at a hospital-based 
outpatient facility (15.7 per 1,000 procedures).  
In sum, a comparison of the unadjusted rates for adverse events after outpatient 
colonoscopy across the two types of facilities indicates that before controlling for other 
confounding factors, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had relatively lower rates for 
developing complications that resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization than those receiving 
treatments in a hospital-based outpatient facility. Except for serious gastrointestinal events, 
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which shows no difference across two types of facilities, patients treated at a physician-owned 
ASC had significantly lower rates for same day transfer, other gastrointestinal events and other 
non-gastro-intestinal events. However, these rates are unadjusted measures. The results are likely 
to change after controlling for variables that may affect patient outcomes. 
Results of Multivariate Analysis 
This section presents the estimation results of three-level hierarchical generalized linear 
models. Separate models are estimated for the incidence of four types of adverse events: same 
day ED visit and/or hospitalization, serious gastrointestinal events that resulted in an ED visit or 
hospitalization within 30 days, other gastrointestinal events that resulted in an ED visit or 
hospitalization within 30 days, and other non-gastrointestinal events that resulted in an ED visit 
or hospitalization within 30 days. For each dependent variable, basic models are first fitted. Then, 
models that also include a propensity score constructed to adjust for physician selective 
investment in outpatient surgical facilities are estimated.  
To recap the theoretical hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3, this study expects that 
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had better outcomes (lower odds for adverse events 
after colonoscopy) than those receiving treatment at a hospital-based outpatient facility, with the 
assumption that patients are able to assess quality of care difference across locations of care. 
Additionally, the quality advantage associated with physician ownership would be stronger in 
competitive health care markets. In other words, the odds ratio for the interaction term of 
physician ownership and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index should be greater than one. On the other 
hand, if patients do not have the ability to assess the quality differences and if physician owners 
exploit this information void, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC would have higher odds 
for adverse events examined in this study.  
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Results for the same day ED visit and/or hospitalization measure. 
Table 13 presents the results generated from the three-level hierarchical models with the 
incidence of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization as the dependent variable, with and 
without the propensity score adjustment for physician selective investment in outpatient surgical 
facilities. The results of the model with propensity score adjustment are similar to those of the 
basic model when it comes to patient factors and facility-level factors. But the results for market-
level factors are greatly different, and a few variables that are insignificant in the basic model 
become significant in the model with propensity score. Therefore, the results for the basic model 
plus propensity score are reported.  
For same day ED visit and/or hospitalization, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC 
and those at a hospital-based outpatient facility had comparable outcomes. In the adjusted model, 
the variable physician ownership yielded an odds ratio of 0.95, which is not statistically 
significant. The competition level in the local health care market did not have significant 
influence over patient outcomes. The estimated odds ratio of the interaction term of physician 
ownership and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was 2.20 and statistically insignificant (p=0.26).  
The results of the multilevel analysis show that several patient characteristics affect 
patients’ odds for same day ED visit and/or hospitalization. Compared with patients aged 18 
through 49, patients in age group 50-64 had a significantly lower odds for same day ED visit 
and/or hospitalization (odds ratio, 0.64). But for patients aged between 75 and 84, the odds of 
experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization was significantly higher than patients aged 
between 18 and 49 (odds ratio, 1.35). The odds for patients in the age group of age 85 and above 
was even higher (odd ratio, 2.36). The odds for a female patient to experience same day ED visit 
and/or hospitalization was significantly higher than that for a male patient (odds ratio, 1.11). 
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Table 13  
Results of Multilevel Models for Same day ED Visit and/or Hospitalization (2005-2007) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Key Independent Variables   
Physician ownership 1.03 (0.72, 1.46) 0.95 (0.66, 1.35) 
Physician ownership*HHI 1.21 (0.33, 4.49) 2.20 (0.56, 8.61) 
Patient characteristics   
Patient age   
18-49 (reference)   
50-64 0.64 (0.57, 0.71) 0.64 (0.57, 0.71) 
65-74 0.91 (0.78, 1.05) 0.91 (0.78, 1.05) 
75-84 1.35 (1.16, 1.58) 1.35 (1.16, 1.58) 
85 or greater 2.36 (1.92, 2.90) 2.36 (1.92, 2.90) 
Patient gender   
Male (reference)   
Female 1.11 (1.03, 1.20) 1.11 (1.03, 1.20) 
Patient race/ethnicity   
White (reference)   
Black 1.13 (0.92, 1.39) 1.13 (0.92, 1.39) 
Hispanic 1.00 (0.88, 1.13) 1.00 (0.88, 1.13) 
Other 0.55 (0.49, 0.62) 0.55 (0.49, 0.62) 
Payer   
Medicare 1.05 (0.93, 1.19) 1.05 (0.93, 1.19) 
Medicaid 1.49 (1.25, 1.78) 1.50 (1.26, 1.78) 
Private insurance (reference)   
Self-pay 1.57 (1.18, 2.08) 1.58 (1.19, 2.09) 
Other payer 0.87 (0.67, 1.12) 0.86 (0.67, 1.12) 
Median household income quartile 
(ZIP code level)   
Lowest quartile of income 1.13 (0.98, 1.30) 1.14 (0.99, 1.31) 
Second lowest quartile of income 0.99 (0.87, 1.12) 0.99 (0.87, 1.13) 
Second highest quartile of income 1.12 (1.00, 1.26) 1.13 (1.01, 1.26) 
Highest quartile of income 
(reference)   
Urban/rural location   
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Table 13 (continued) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million, 
reference)   
Metropolitan areas (<1 million) 0.78 (0.62, 0.99) 0.81 (0.64, 1.02) 
Micropolitan areas 2.04 (1.31, 3.16) 2.00 (1.29, 3.12) 
Non-urban areas 0.98 (0.55, 1.75) 1.01 (0.57, 1.79) 
Charlson Comorbidity Index 1.27 (1.25, 1.29) 1.27 (1.25, 1.29) 
# of previous ED visits and 
hospitalizations 1.20 (1.17, 1.23) 1.20 (1.17, 1.23) 
Colonoscopy type   
Diagnostic colonoscopy 
(reference)   
Colonoscopy and biopsy 1.04 (0.94, 1.15) 1.04 (0.94, 1.15) 
Lesion removal colonoscopy 1.06 (0.96, 1.17) 1.06 (0.96, 1.17) 
Organizational characteristics   
Facility colonoscopy volume group   
30-430 cases per year (reference)   
431-1333 cases per year 0.63 (0.49, 0.81) 0.63 (0.49, 0.81) 
>= 1334 cases per year  0.66 (0.49, 0.88) 0.66 (0.49, 0.88) 
Specialization rate 0.62 (0.10, 4.07) 0.53 (0.08, 3.50) 
Specialization rate squared 1.05 (0.14, 7.70) 1.24 (0.17, 9.23) 
Market characteristics   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  0.28 (0.10, 0.79) 35.48 (2.01, 625.17) 
HMO penetration rate 1.46 (0.63, 3.34) 1.11 (0.48, 2.59) 
PPO penetration rate 1.80 (0.85, 3.78) 1.01 (0.45, 2.28) 
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000 1.11 (0.95, 1.31) 0.57 (0.39, 0.85) 
# of primary care physicians per 
100,000 1.00 (0.99, 1.01) 1.02 (1.00, 1.03) 
# of general surgeons per 100,000 0.98 (0.93, 1.04) 1.18 (1.05, 1.33) 
Log-transformed population size 0.90 (0.75, 1.08) 1.45 (1.05, 2.00) 
% of the population above age 65 0.05 (<0.001, 144.93) 0.06 (<0.001, 193.13) 
 
 
Table 13 (continued) 
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Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
% of the population below age 65 
without health insurance 0.07 (0.00, 2.47) 0.10 (0.00, 3.61) 
Year dummies   
Year 2005 (reference)   
Year 2006 1.16 (1.03, 1.31) 1.16 (1.03, 1.31) 
Year 2007 1.16 (1.02, 1.31) 1.13 (0.99, 1.28) 
Propensity score  >999.99 (42.62, >999.99) 
# of Observations 1,278,886 1,278,886 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 11,932,011 11,935,483 
 
Compared to patients covered by private health insurance, Medicaid and self-pay patients had a 
significantly higher odds of experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization (odds ratios, 
1.50 and 1.58, respectively). Patients with second highest quartile of income had significantly 
higher odds for same day ED visit and/or hospitalization than patients with highest quartile of 
income (odd ratio, 1.13). Patients from micropolitan areas had significantly higher odds of 
experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization than patients from large metropolitan 
areas with more than 1 million residents (odds ratio, 2.00). Increasing number of comorbid 
conditions and ED visits and hospitalizations within 6 months prior to the colonoscopy 
procedure were both associated with significantly higher odds for same day ED visit and/or 
hospitalization (odds ratios, 1.27 and 1.20, respectively). Colonoscopy procedures with biopsy or 
lesion removal were not linked to elevated odds for same day ED visit and/or hospitalization.  
At the facility level, higher facility volume was associated with lower odds for same day 
ED visit and/or hospitalization. Specifically, the odds of experiencing same day ED visit and/or 
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hospitalization were significantly lower for patients treated at a facility with second and third 
tertile colonoscopy volume (431-1333 cases per year and >=1334 cases per year) compared to 
those treated at a facility with a first tertile volume (30-430 cases per year, odds ratios, 0.63 and 
0.66, respectively). Both specialization rate and its squared form were not significant.  
Some market characteristics were found to be associated with patients’ odds of same day 
ED visit and/or hospitalization. Higher Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), i.e., lower 
competition level in the market was associated with significantly higher odds of same day ED 
visit and/or hospitalization. Greater number of gastroenterologists per 100,000 population was 
associated with lower odds of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization while greater number of 
primary care physicians per 100,000 population and greater number of general surgeons were 
associated with greater odds of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization. Another market factor, 
population size, was associated with an increase in the odds for same day ED visit and/or 
hospitalization. The year dummy 2006 was significant in the model. This means that on average, 
the odds of experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization were higher in 2006 than in 
2005.  
Results for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or 
hospitalization. 
As with the same day ED visit and/or hospitalization measure, the model of 30-day serious 
gastrointestinal events with propensity score adjustment results in different estimation for some 
market-level factors while that for other factors is very similar to the results from the model 
without propensity score adjustment (Table 14). Therefore, only results based on the model with 
propensity score adjustment are reported below. 
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Table 14  
Results of Multilevel Models for Serious Gastrointestinal Events within 30 Days Resulting in ED 
Visit or Hospitalization (2005-2007) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for 
Market Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Key Independent Variables   
Physician ownership 1.62 (1.33, 1.99) 1.62 (1.32, 1.98) 
Physician ownership*HHI 0.57 (0.27, 1.19) 0.59 (0.27, 1.29) 
Patient characteristics   
Patient age   
18-49 (reference)   
50-64 0.46 (0.39, 0.54) 0.46 (0.39, 0.54) 
65-74 0.75 (0.61, 0.92) 0.75 (0.61, 0.92) 
75-84 0.98 (0.79, 1.21) 0.98 (0.79, 1.21) 
85 or greater 1.30 (0.95, 1.77) 1.30 (0.95, 1.77) 
Patient gender   
Male (reference)   
Female 1.39 (1.24, 1.55) 1.39 (1.24, 1.55) 
Patient race/ethnicity   
White (reference)   
Black 1.01 (0.77, 1.33) 1.01 (0.77, 1.33) 
Hispanic 1.22 (1.04, 1.42) 1.22 (1.04, 1.42) 
Other 0.50 (0.42, 0.60) 0.50 (0.42, 0.60) 
Payer   
Medicare 1.06 (0.90, 1.26) 1.06 (0.90, 1.26) 
Medicaid 1.42 (1.11, 1.81) 1.42 (1.12, 1.82) 
Private insurance (reference)   
Self-pay 0.92 (0.54, 1.58) 0.92 (0.54, 1.58) 
Other payer 1.27 (0.96, 1.67) 1.26 (0.95, 1.67) 
Median household income quartile (ZIP 
code level)   
Lowest quartile of income 1.12 (0.93, 1.35) 1.12 (0.93, 1.35) 
Second lowest quartile of income 1.13 (0.96, 1.33) 1.13 (0.96, 1.34) 
Second highest quartile of income 1.11 (0.95, 1.29) 1.11 (0.95, 1.29) 
Highest quartile of income (reference)   
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Table 14 (continued) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Urban/rural location   
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million, 
reference)   
Metropolitan areas (<1 million) 0.97 (0.80, 1.17) 0.97 (0.80, 1.18) 
Micropolitan areas 1.50 (0.97, 2.31) 1.49 (0.96, 2.31) 
Non-urban areas 1.24 (0.69, 2.20) 1.24 (0.70, 2.20) 
Charlson Comorbidity Index 1.37 (1.34, 1.40) 1.37 (1.34, 1.40) 
# of previous ED visits and 
hospitalizations 1.18 (1.14, 1.21) 1.18 (1.14, 1.21) 
Colonoscopy type   
Diagnostic colonoscopy 
(reference)   
Colonoscopy and biopsy 1.49 (1.31, 1.71) 1.49 (1.31, 1.71) 
Lesion removal colonoscopy 1.44 (1.26, 1.65) 1.44 (1.26, 1.65) 
Organizational characteristics   
Facility colonoscopy volume group   
30-430 cases per year (reference)   
431-1333 cases per year 0.88 (0.69, 1.13) 0.88 (0.69, 1.13) 
>= 1334 cases per year  0.74 (0.58, 0.96) 0.74 (0.58, 0.96) 
Specialization rate 1.70 (0.45, 6.47) 1.68 (0.44, 6.42) 
Specialization rate squared 0.41 (0.11, 1.48) 0.42 (0.12, 1.50) 
Market characteristics   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  1.86 (0.92, 3.77) 2.63 (0.26, 26.72) 
HMO penetration rate 1.49 (0.60, 3.69) 1.47 (0.59, 3.65) 
PPO penetration rate 1.00 (0.40, 2.51) 0.96 (0.37, 2.49) 
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000 1.00 (0.89, 1.12) 0.95 (0.68, 1.33) 
# of primary care physicians per 
100,000 1.00 (0.99, 1.01) 1.00 (0.99, 1.02) 
# of general surgeons per 100,000 0.98 (0.94, 1.02) 0.99 (0.90, 1.10) 
Log-transformed population size 1.09 (0.97, 1.23) 1.13 (0.88, 1.45) 
% of the population above age 65 0.58 (0.00, 125.20) 0.59 (0.00, 128.10) 
% of the population below age 65 
without health insurance 0.31 (0.04, 2.63) 0.32 (0.04, 2.77) 
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Table 14 (continued) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Year dummies   
Year 2005 (reference)   
Year 2006 1.14 (0.98, 1.33) 1.14 (0.98, 1.33) 
Year 2007 1.05 (0.91, 1.22) 1.05 (0.90, 1.22) 
Propensity score  1.83 (0.04, 89.89) 
# of Observations 1,278,886 1,278,886 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 12,764,267 12,764,218 
 
In the adjusted model, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had significantly higher 
odds of experiencing serious gastrointestinal events within 30 days of their procedure that 
resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization than patients treated at a hospital-based outpatient 
facility (odds ratio, 1.61). The estimated odds ratio for the interaction term between physician 
ownership and competition in the market was less than one but not statistically significant at 
p<0.05 level.  
Similar to the model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, female patients had higher 
odds than male patients of experiencing serious gastrointestinal events within 30 days. Medicaid 
patients had significantly higher odds for serious gastrointestinal events than privately insured 
patients. Charlson Comorbidity Index and the number of ED visits and hospitalizations within 6 
months prior to the colonoscopy procedure were associated with significantly higher odds for 
serious gastrointestinal events. Among organizational factors, higher facility volume was linked 
to reduced odds for serious gastrointestinal events.  
Different from the model of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization, patients in age 
groups 50-64 and 65-74 had significantly lower odds for serious adverse events within 30 days 
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of colonoscopy than those in age group 18-49. Hispanic patients had significantly higher odds 
for serious gastrointestinal events than non-Hispanic white patients. In addition, receiving 
colonoscopy with biopsy or lesion removal were associated increased odds for serious 
gastrointestinal events. At the market level, no factors were statistically significant.  
Results for 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or 
hospitalization. 
As with the two prior models, the results reported here are for the model with propensity 
score adjustment. The adjusted odds for other gastrointestinal events was significantly higher for 
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC compared to those treated at a hospital-based 
outpatient facility (Table 15). Again, the effect of physician ownership on quality of care was not 
influenced by the competition level in the market. 
Similar to the prior model with the measure of same day transfer to ED or hospital, older 
patients aged 75 or above, being female, covered by Medicaid, being self-pay, having higher 
Charlson Comorbidity Index and larger number of ED visits and hospitalizations in the 6 months 
prior to the colonoscopy were associated with a higher adjusted odds for other gastrointestinal 
events.  
Different from the model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, Hispanic patients had 
lower odds of having other gastrointestinal events compared with non-Hispanic white patients. 
Being covered by Medicare or other payers was associated with elevated odds of other 
gastrointestinal events compared with privately insured patients. Residing in metropolitan areas 
with less than 1 million population was associated with lowered odds of other gastrointestinal 
events. Certain types of procedure, including colonoscopy with biopsy and colonoscopy with 
lesion removal were associated with higher odds for other gastrointestinal events. This is 
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Table 15  
Results of Multilevel Models for Other Gastrointestinal Events within 30 Days Resulting in ED 
visit or hospitalization (2005-2007) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Key Independent Variables   
Physician ownership 1.26 (1.14, 1.38) 1.27 (1.15, 1.40) 
Physician ownership*HHI 1.08 (0.77, 1.50) 1.00 (0.70, 1.42) 
Patient characteristics   
Patient age   
18-49 (reference)   
50-64 0.62 (0.57, 0.67) 0.61 (0.57, 0.67) 
65-74 0.91 (0.82, 1.00) 0.91 (0.82, 1.00) 
75-84 1.43 (1.29, 1.58) 1.43 (1.29, 1.58) 
85 or greater 2.49 (2.19, 2.83) 2.49 (2.19, 2.83) 
Patient gender   
Male (reference)   
Female 1.10 (1.05, 1.16) 1.10 (1.05, 1.16) 
Patient race/ethnicity   
White (reference)   
Black 0.98 (0.87, 1.11) 0.98 (0.86, 1.11) 
Hispanic 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 
Other 0.50 (0.46, 0.54) 0.50 (0.46, 0.54) 
Payer   
Medicare 1.22 (1.13, 1.32) 1.22 (1.13, 1.32) 
Medicaid 1.14 (1.01, 1.30) 1.14 (1.01, 1.30) 
Private insurance (reference)   
Self-pay 1.37 (1.11, 1.68) 1.36 (1.11, 1.68) 
Other payer 1.23 (1.07, 1.40) 1.23 (1.07, 1.40) 
Median household income quartile 
(ZIP code level)   
Lowest quartile of income 1.06 (0.97, 1.15) 1.06 (0.97, 1.15) 
Second lowest quartile of income 0.98 (0.91, 1.06) 0.98 (0.91, 1.06) 
Second highest quartile of income 1.00 (0.93, 1.07) 0.99 (0.93, 1.06) 
Highest quartile of income 
(reference)   
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Table 15 (continued) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Urban/rural location   
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million, 
reference)   
Metropolitan areas (<1 million) 0.92 (0.84, 1.01) 0.91 (0.84, 1.00) 
Micropolitan areas 1.23 (1.00, 1.51) 1.24 (1.01, 1.52) 
Non-urban areas 0.91 (0.68, 1.20) 0.91 (0.69, 1.20) 
Charlson Comorbidity Index 1.50 (1.49, 1.51) 1.50 (1.49, 1.51) 
# of previous ED visits and 
hospitalizations 1.24 (1.23, 1.26) 1.24 (1.23, 1.26) 
Colonoscopy type   
Diagnostic colonoscopy (reference)   
Colonoscopy and biopsy 1.31 (1.23, 1.39) 1.31 (1.23, 1.39) 
Lesion removal colonoscopy 1.15 (1.08, 1.23) 1.15 (1.08, 1.23) 
Organizational characteristics   
Facility colonoscopy volume group   
30-430 cases per year (reference)   
431-1333 cases per year 0.91 (0.81, 1.03) 0.92 (0.82, 1.03) 
>= 1334 cases per year  0.90 (0.80, 1.02) 0.90 (0.80, 1.02) 
Specialization rate 1.37 (0.75, 2.53) 1.40 (0.76, 2.57) 
Specialization rate squared 0.49 (0.27, 0.88) 0.48 (0.27, 0.86) 
Market characteristics   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  1.36 (0.98, 1.89) 0.69 (0.21, 2.31) 
HMO penetration rate 0.81 (0.54, 1.21) 0.83 (0.56, 1.25) 
PPO penetration rate 0.79 (0.52, 1.19) 0.84 (0.55, 1.29) 
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000 1.02 (0.97, 1.08) 1.13 (0.95, 1.34) 
# of primary care physicians per 100,000 1.00 (0.99, 1.00) 0.99 (0.99, 1.00) 
# of general surgeons per 100,000 1.01 (0.99, 1.03) 0.98 (0.93, 1.03) 
Log-transformed population size 1.04 (0.99, 1.10) 0.97 (0.86, 1.11) 
% of the population above age 65 0.59 (0.05, 6.90) 0.55 (0.05, 6.47) 
% of the population below age 65 
without health insurance 0.12 (0.04, 0.30) 0.11 (0.04, 0.28) 
Year dummies   
Year 2005 (reference)   
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Table 15 (continued) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Year 2006 0.98 (0.91, 1.05) 0.98 (0.91, 1.05) 
Year 2007 1.01 (0.95, 1.08) 1.01 (0.95, 1.08) 
Propensity score  0.31 (0.04, 2.30) 
# of Observations 1,278,886 1,278,886 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 10,693,596 10,693,645 
 
consistent with the model of serious gastrointestinal event. At the facility level, specialization 
rate squared was significantly associated with lower odds for other gastrointestinal events. But 
other facility-level variables were not significant. At the market level, the number of primary 
care physicians per 100,000 population and the uninsured rate were associated with lower odds 
for other gastrointestinal events. 
Results for 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or 
hospitalization. 
As with other models, the results discussed below relate to the model with propensity 
score adjustment. For the adjusted model of other non-gastrointestinal events resulting in 30-day 
ED visit or hospitalization, there was no significant difference in the odds among patients treated 
at a physician-owned ASC and those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility (Table 16). In 
addition, the effect of physician ownership on quality of care was not influenced by the 
competition level in the market. 
Similar to the prior model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, at the patient level, 
many factors influenced the adjusted odds for other non-gastrointestinal events. For example, the 
odds of experiencing other non-gastrointestinal events among patients in age group 50-64 was 
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Table 16  
Results of Multilevel Models for Non-gastrointestinal Events within 30 Days Resulting in ED 
visit or hospitalization (2005-2007) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Key Independent Variables   
Physician ownership 1.05 (0.99, 1.12) 1.05 (0.99, 1.11) 
Physician ownership*HHI 0.95 (0.77, 1.17) 1.00 (0.80, 1.24) 
Patient characteristics   
Patient age   
18-49 (reference)   
50-64 0.92 (0.87, 0.97) 0.92 (0.87, 0.97) 
65-74 1.51 (1.41, 1.61) 1.51 (1.41, 1.61) 
75-84 2.41 (2.25, 2.57) 2.41 (2.25, 2.57) 
85 or greater 3.89 (3.58, 4.23) 3.89 (3.58, 4.24) 
Patient gender   
Male (reference)   
Female 0.92 (0.89, 0.95) 0.92 (0.89, 0.95) 
Patient race/ethnicity   
White (reference)   
Black 1.25 (1.16, 1.34) 1.25 (1.16, 1.34) 
Hispanic 0.98 (0.94, 1.03) 0.98 (0.94, 1.03) 
Other 0.51 (0.48, 0.54) 0.51 (0.48, 0.54) 
Payer   
Medicare 1.34 (1.28, 1.40) 1.34 (1.28, 1.40) 
Medicaid 1.58 (1.47, 1.70) 1.58 (1.47, 1.70) 
Private insurance (reference)   
Self-pay 1.44 (1.26, 1.64) 1.44 (1.26, 1.64) 
Other payer 1.32 (1.22, 1.44) 1.32 (1.22, 1.44) 
Median household income quartile 
(ZIP code level)   
Lowest quartile of income 1.15 (1.09, 1.21) 1.15 (1.09, 1.21) 
Second lowest quartile of income 1.13 (1.08, 1.18) 1.13 (1.08, 1.18) 
Second highest quartile of income 1.07 (1.03, 1.12) 1.07 (1.03, 1.12) 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million, 
reference)   
Metropolitan areas (<1 million) 1.02 (0.97, 1.08) 1.03 (0.97, 1.08) 
Micropolitan areas 0.99 (0.87, 1.13) 0.98 (0.86, 1.12) 
Non-urban areas 1.08 (0.92, 1.28) 1.08 (0.92, 1.27) 
Charlson Comorbidity Index 1.49 (1.48, 1.50) 1.49 (1.48, 1.50) 
# of previous ED visits and 
hospitalizations 1.30 (1.28, 1.31) 1.30 (1.28, 1.31) 
Colonoscopy type   
Diagnostic colonoscopy 
(reference)   
Colonoscopy and biopsy 1.16 (1.11, 1.20) 1.16 (1.11, 1.20) 
Lesion removal colonoscopy 1.26 (1.21, 1.30) 1.26 (1.21, 1.30) 
Organizational characteristics   
Facility colonoscopy volume group   
30-430 cases per year (reference)   
431-1333 cases per year 0.86 (0.81, 0.93) 0.86 (0.81, 0.93) 
>= 1334 cases per year  0.82 (0.77, 0.88) 0.82 (0.76, 0.88) 
Specialization rate 1.09 (0.75, 1.58) 1.07 (0.74, 1.56) 
Specialization rate squared 0.76 (0.53, 1.09) 0.78 (0.54, 1.11) 
Market characteristics   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  1.42 (1.15, 1.74) 2.29 (1.14, 4.57) 
HMO penetration rate 1.08 (0.84, 1.39) 1.06 (0.82, 1.37) 
PPO penetration rate 1.03 (0.80, 1.34) 0.99 (0.76, 1.29) 
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000 1.02 (0.99, 1.05) 0.95 (0.86, 1.05) 
# of primary care physicians per 
100,000 1.00 (1.00, 1.00) 1.00 (1.00, 1.00) 
# of general surgeons per 100,000 1.00 (0.99, 1.01) 1.02 (0.99, 1.05) 
Log-transformed population size 1.06 (1.03, 1.10) 1.11 (1.03, 1.20) 
% of the population above age 65 1.34 (0.30, 6.04) 1.38 (0.31, 6.22) 
% of the population below age 65 
without health insurance 0.46 (0.26, 0.84) 0.49 (0.27, 0.88) 
Year dummies   
Year 2005 (reference)   
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Table 16 (continued) 
Variable 
Basic Model 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Year 2006 0.95 (0.91, 0.99) 0.95 (0.91, 0.99) 
Year 2007 0.96 (0.92, 1.00) 0.96 (0.92, 1.00) 
Propensity score  2.28 (0.73, 7.15) 
# of Observations 1,278,886 1,278,886 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 9,500,756 9,500,846 
significantly lower than among those in age group 18-49. Being 75 or older was associated with 
elevated odds of experiencing other non-gastrointestinal events. Medicaid and self-pay patients 
had higher odds of experiencing other non-gastrointestinal events compared with privately 
insured patients. Patients from ZIP codes with second highest income quartile had elevated odds 
for other non-gastrointestinal events compared with those from the highest income quartile. 
Having higher Charlson Comorbidity Index and a larger number of ED visits and 
hospitalizations in the 6 months prior to the colonoscopy were associated with higher odds for 
other non-gastrointestinal event. At the facility level, higher facility volume was associated with 
lower odds for other non-gastrointestinal event. At the market level, higher Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), i.e., lower competition level in the market was associated with 
significantly higher odds of other non-gastrointestinal events. The log-transformed population 
size was associated with elevated odds for other non-gastrointestinal events. The year dummy 
2006 was statistically significant, meaning the odds for other non-gastrointestinal events were 
higher in 2006 than in 2005.  
Different from the model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, the odds of having other 
non-gastrointestinal events was significantly higher among patients aged 65-74 years, compared 
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with patients aged 18-49. Female gender and being African-American were associated with 
reduced odds for other non-gastrointestinal events. Being covered by Medicare and other payer 
were associated with elevated odds of other non-gastrointestinal events. This pattern was seen in 
the model of other gastrointestinal events. Patients from the lowest and second lowest income 
quartiles had elevated odds of other non-gastrointestinal events. Receiving colonoscopy with 
biopsy or lesion removal was associated with higher odds for other non-gastrointestinal event. At 
the market level, the uninsured rate and the year dummy 2007 were associated with lower odds 
of non-gastrointestinal events.  
In sum, as presented in Table 17, after accounting for patient, organizational, and market 
characteristics, nested data structures, and physician selective investment, the odds for same day 
ED visit and/or hospitalization and other non-gastrointestinal events within 30 days of outpatient 
colonoscopy were not different among patients treated at a physician-owned ASC and those 
treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility. However, according to the adjusted models, 
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had significantly higher odds for serious 
gastrointestinal events and other gastrointestinal events within 30 days of outpatient colonoscopy, 
in comparison to those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility. In all the four adjusted 
models, the interaction term between physician ownership and competition level in the market 
was not statistically significant. 
The differences in odds for adverse events after colonoscopy are illustrated more directly 
in Table 18, which presents the adjusted rate (incidence per 1,000 procedures) for different types 
of adverse events, stratified by location of care. After accounting for patient-, facility-, market-
level factors, the nested data structures, and physician selective investment, the adjusted rates for 
same day transfer (2.82 per 1,000 procedures vs. 2.98 per 1,000 procedures) and the adjusted rate
    
 
 
122 
Table 17  
The Effects of Physician Ownership and Its Interaction Term with HHI on Quality of Outpatient Colonoscopy 
Variable Same day ED visit or Hospitalization  
30-day Serious 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other Non-
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting 
in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 0.95 (0.66, 1.35) 1.62 (1.32, 1.98)*** 1.27 (1.15, 1.40)*** 1.05 (0.99, 1.11) 
Physician ownership*HHI 2.20 (0.56, 8.61) 0.59 (0.27, 1.29) 1.00 (0.70, 1.42) 1.00 (0.80, 1.24) 
Note: The results are from basic models plus propensity score adjusting for market selection. Odds ratios are reported with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in brackets. ***Significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 18  
Adjusted Rate per 1,000 procedures for an Adverse Event by Location of Care 
Variable 
Same day ED visit 
or Hospitalization 
Rate (95% CI)  
30-Day Serious 
Gastrointestinal 
Event 
Resulting in ED Visit 
or Hospitalization 
Rate (95% CI) 
30-Day Other  
Gastrointestinal Events 
Resulting in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization Rate 
(95% CI) 
30-Day Other Non-
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization Rate 
(95% CI) 
Physician-owned ASC 2.82 (2.07, 3.84) 1.78 (1.34, 2.36)*** 5.94 (5.21, 6.77)*** 16.78 (15.49, 18.18) 
Hospital-based 
outpatient facility 2.98 (2.15, 4.13) 1.10 (0.82, 1.48) 4.69 (4.09, 5.37) 16.05 (14.79, 17.42) 
Note: The results are from basic models plus propensity score adjusting for market selection. Adjusted rate is reported with 95% Confidence Intervals in 
brackets. ***Significant at the p<.01 level. 
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for other non-gastrointestinal events within 30 days (16.78 per 1,000 procedures vs. 16.05 per 
1,000 procedures) are not significantly different across physician-owned ASCs and hospital-
based outpatient facilities. But for the other two outcome measures, significant differences exist 
across location of care. The rate for serious gastrointestinal events was 1.78 per 1,000 procedures 
if the patient received the procedure at a physician-owned ASC while the number was 1.10 per 
1,000 procedures if the patient was treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility. Similarly, the 
rate for other gastrointestinal events was 5.94 per 1,000 procedures if the patient received the 
procedure at a physician-owned ASC and the number was 4.69 per 1,000 procedures if the 
patient was treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Physicians’ decision to invest in an outpatient surgical facility may be influenced by the 
characteristics of the market where the facility is located. Therefore, basic models plus a 
propensity score adjusting for physician selective investment in outpatient surgical facilities were 
presented as the main analysis in the sections above. However, referral of patients to physician-
owned ASCs or hospital-based outpatient facilities may also be a nonrandom process. Physician 
owners may select relatively healthier and better insured patients (those covered by private 
insurance and Medicare) for ASCs in which they invest. The main analysis is thus supplemented 
with a sensitivity analysis to determine whether the direction and statistical significance of the 
relationships vary when a different propensity score that adjusts for patient selection is used. As 
discussed in the last chapter, all patient-level factors are used to construct the propensity score. 
Two series of models, one with a propensity score adjusting for physician selective 
investment and another for patient selection, for the four dependent variables were compared. 
For most models, the findings for the key independent variables were consistent across the two 
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methods of propensity score adjustment. One exception is that the model with a propensity score 
adjusting for physician selective investment did not show a significant relationship between 
physician ownership and the occurrence of other non-gastrointestinal events while the model 
with a propensity score adjusting for patient selection did (Table 19).  
While the estimation of facility-level factors remained largely unchanged in the two 
models with different propensity scores, differences were found among estimates of patient-level 
factors, market-level factors, and sometimes year dummy variables (data not shown). 
Substituting the propensity score adjusting for physician selective investment with the one that 
adjusts for patient selection led to some market factors (such as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), the number of primary care physicians per 100,000 population, the number of general 
surgeons per 100,000 population, the log-transformed population size, and the uninsured rate) 
becoming insignificant. In addition, some patient factors (such as being African American, being 
covered by Medicare, self-pay, or being covered by other payer, and urban/rural location 
variables) gained statistical significance. The interpretation of control variables thus appears to 
be sensitive to the propensity score method used.  
A second sensitivity analysis focused on whether the direction and statistical significance 
of key independent variables varied when a lagged quality indicator was included (Table 20). 
The lagged quality indicator was operationalized as the unadjusted adverse event rate (per 1,000 
procedures) for a given facility in the prior year. Because the lagged quality indictor was missing 
for all colonoscopy cases performed in 2005, only 819,126 cases were included in the analysis 
for the years 2006 and 2007. Table 20 presents the results of the model with a propensity score 
adjusting for physician selective investment and a model with the lagged quality indicator added. 
The direction and statistical significance of the odds ratios for most key independent variables
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Table 19  
Sensitivity Analysis Comparing Two Models with Different Propensity Score Adjustments 
Dependent Variable Key Independent Variable 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score Adjusting 
for Market Selection 
Basic Model Plus 
Propensity Score Adjusting 
for Patient Selectiona 
Odds Ratio  (95% CI) Odds Ratio  (95% CI) 
Same Day ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 0.95 (0.66, 1.35) 1.05 (0.74, 1.49) 
Physician ownership*HHI 2.20 (0.56, 8.61) 1.14 (0.31, 4.23) 
Propensity score >999.99 (42.62, >999.99) 0.00 (<0.001, 0.01) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-
Likelihood 11,935,483 11,957,307 
30-Day Serious 
Gastrointestinal Events 
Resulting in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 1.62 (1.32, 1.98) 1.66 (1.35, 2.03) 
Physician ownership*HHI 0.59 (0.27, 1.29) 0.56 (0.27, 1.16) 
Propensity score 1.83 (0.04, 89.89) <0.001 (<0.001, 0.00) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-
Likelihood 12,764,218 18,831 
30-Day Other 
Gastrointestinal Events 
Resulting in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 1.27 (1.15, 1.40) 1.29 (1.17, 1.41) 
Physician ownership*HHI 1.00 (0.70, 1.42) 1.07 (0.77, 1.49) 
Propensity score 0.31 (0.04, 2.30) <0.001 (<0.001, <0.001) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-
Likelihood 10,693,645 10,781,797 
30-Day Non-Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in ED Visit 
or Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 1.05 (0.99, 1.11) 1.08 (1.01, 1.14) 
Physician ownership*HHI 1.00 (0.80, 1.24) 0.95 (0.77, 1.16) 
Propensity score 2.28 (0.73, 7.15) <0.001 (<0.001, <0.001) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-
Likelihood 9,500,846 9,567,860 
aThe procedure GLIMMIX did not converge for the model examining 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. 
Therefore, the procedure logistic was used instead for this outcome measure.  
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Table 20  
Sensitivity Analysis Comparing Models With and Without the Lagged Quality Indicator  
Dependent Variable Key Independent Variable 
Model with Propensity 
Score Adjusting for 
Market Selection 
Model with Propensity Score 
Adjusting for Market 
Selection and Lagged Qualitya 
Odds Ratio  (95% CI) Odds Ratio  (95% CI) 
Same Day ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 0.95 (0.66, 1.35) 0.92 (0.77, 1.09) 
Physician ownership*HHI 2.20 (0.56, 8.61) 1.23 (0.60, 2.50) 
Propensity score >999.99 (42.62, >999.99) 31.46 (1.36, 727.98) 
Lagged quality - 1.01 (1.01, 1.01) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 11,935,483 23,959 
30-Day Serious 
Gastrointestinal Events 
Resulting in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 1.62 (1.32, 1.98) 1.55 (1.17, 2.04) 
Physician ownership*HHI 0.59 (0.27, 1.29) 0.73 (0.25, 2.12) 
Propensity score 1.83 (0.04, 89.89) 1.19 (0.01, 194.23) 
Lagged quality - 1.01 (0.96, 1.06) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 12,764,218 8,124,484 
30-Day Other 
Gastrointestinal Events 
Resulting in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 1.27 (1.15, 1.40) 1.23 (1.09, 1.39) 
Physician ownership*HHI 1.00 (0.70, 1.42) 1.01 (0.65, 1.57) 
Propensity score 0.31 (0.04, 2.30) 0.20 (0.01, 2.80) 
Lagged quality - 1.02 (1.01, 1.03) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 10,693,645 6,864,247 
30-Day Non-
Gastrointestinal Events 
Resulting in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Physician ownership 1.05 (0.99, 1.11) 1.08 (1.00, 1.16) 
Physician ownership*HHI 1.00 (0.80, 1.24) 1.14 (0.88, 1.49) 
Propensity score 2.28 (0.73, 7.15) 5.07 (1.30, 19.67) 
Lagged quality - 1.01 (1.01, 1.01) 
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood 9,500,846 6,106,330 
a The procedure GLIMMIX did not converge for the model examining same day ED visit or hospitalization. Therefore, the procedure logistic was used 
instead for this outcome measure.  
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were similar in both models for all 4 dependent variables with one exception. The relationship 
between physician ownership and the incidence of other non-gastrointestinal events became 
significant after including the lagged quality indicator with individuals treated in these facilities 
having higher odds of 30-day other non-GI events resulting in an ED visit or hospitalization 
relative to individuals treated in hospital-owned outpatient facilities. The lagged quality indicator 
had a positive and statistically significant effect in three of the models. The odds ratios ranged 
from 1.01 to 1.02, which means a one unit increase in the rate of a specific type of adverse events 
in the previous year increased the odds of patient having a particular adverse event by 1% to 2%. 
The estimation results support the idea that quality of care is autocorrelated, i.e., the value of the 
measure in the previous period can affect the value in the following period.  
In sum, the results from the sensitivity analysis were generally consistent with those from 
the main analysis, suggesting the findings are robust to changes in propensity score adjustment 
approach and to the inclusion of a lagged quality indicator.   
Summary 
This chapter presented the results of descriptive and multivariate analyses. Findings of 
this study indicate that physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities served 
different patient population, had different organizational characteristics, and were located in 
health care markets with different characteristics. When examining the unadjusted occurrence of 
adverse events, physician-owned ASCs had lower incidence of these events relative to hospital-
based outpatient facilities. But when controlling for variables at the patient, facility, and market-
levels, nested data structures, and potential physician selective investment in outpatient surgical 
facilities, the results suggested that physician-owned ASCs had similar or worse performance 
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compared to hospital-based outpatient facilities.  The main analysis suggested poorer 
performance for physician owned facilities on two indicators (30-day serious gastrointestinal 
events and 30-day other gastrointestinal events, both of which resulted in ED visit or 
hospitalization).  Sensitivity analysis found similar results for these two measures and also 
suggested poorer performance for the 30-day non- gastrointestinal events that resulted in ED 
visit or hospitalization among physician owned facilities. The interaction term between physician 
ownership and competition level in the market was not statistically significant.  
These results lend support for Hypothesis 3, but not for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. 
This implies that physicians may be taking advantage of information gaps faced by patients and 
providing lower quality colonoscopy care in their outpatient facilities. The next chapter will 
provide a more detailed summary of research findings. It will also discuss some of the 
managerial, policy, and research implications of this study. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
Physicians’ investment in ASCs (along with their investment in specialty hospitals, 
diagnostic imaging centers and other health care facilities) has attracted the attention of both 
policy makers and researchers for a number of years. Physician-owned ASCs provide largely 
identical services to hospital-based outpatient facilities. A number of studies report that 
physician ownership is associated with patient “cherry picking” and overutilization of services 
due to self-referral (Gabel et al., 2008; Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Strope et al., 2009). However, 
limited empirical evidence exists on the potential relationship between physician ownership and 
patient quality of care. Some have argued that physician-owned ASCs provide better quality of 
care and their patients should have better outcomes because physician ownership may enhance 
physicians’ accountability (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009; Office of 
Inspector General, 1999). By contrast, others contend that quality of care may be compromised 
at physician owned facilities because physician ownership creates financial conflicts of interest 
(Mitchell & Sass, 1995; Mitchell, 2010; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012). A small number of studies have 
compared patient outcomes in ASCs (combining physician-owned and non-physician-owned 
facilities) to those in hospital-based outpatient facilities, but these studies have yielded mixed 
results (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, 
Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Hollingsworth et al., 2012).  
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This study examined the relationship between physician ownership and quality of care by 
comparing patient outcomes for outpatient colonoscopy in physician-owned ASCs versus those 
treated in hospital-based outpatient facilities, while controlling for factors at patient, 
organizational and market levels. Using a licensing requirement change that occurred in 
California due to a court decision, the study was able to identify ASCs with whole or partial 
physician ownership. Procedure-related adverse events that developed after the procedure were 
used to measure patient outcomes. Four categories of adverse events were examined: same day 
ED visit and/or hospitalization, 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or 
hospitalization. 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, and 
30-day other non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. This chapter 
begins with a summary of the research findings. Then it reviews the limitation of the study, 
followed by a discussion of the implications of the study for theory, policy and practice, and 
future research. The last section concludes the study.    
Summary 
Findings of the descriptive analysis. 
During the study period, physician-owned ASCs delivered slightly more than half of 
outpatient colonoscopy in California. Overall, outpatient colonoscopy patients were more likely 
to be age 50 or above, female, and non-Hispanic white, covered by Medicare or private insurance, 
from the top two income quartiles, living in metropolitan areas, and largely healthy. The 
composition of different types of outpatient colonoscopy procedures (diagnostic, with biopsy, 
and with lesion removal) furnished in physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient 
facilities were largely the same. However, there were significant differences among patients 
treated by physician-owned ASCs and those by hospital outpatient facilities. The former were 
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less likely to be racial/ethnic minorities and Medicaid recipients. This is consistent with the 
finding of previous studies (Gabel et al., 2008; O’Sullivan, 2007). In addition, patients treated by 
physician-owned ASCs were more likely to be covered by Medicare or private insurance and 
come from more affluent neighborhood and metropolitan areas. They also had significantly 
lower Charlson Comorbidity Index and lower propensity to use medical services as measured by 
inpatient and emergency department service use in the six months before their colonoscopy.  
At the organizational level, physician-owned ASCs on average had a significantly higher 
colonoscopy volume compared with hospital outpatient facilities. In addition, they had a 
significantly larger proportion of colonoscopy procedures compared with hospital-based 
outpatient facility. At the market level, there was a great variation as to the representation of 
physician-owned ASCs across different geographic areas. Health care markets (counties) with a 
low percentage of study observations that were represented by physician-owned ASC facilities 
rather than hospital-based outpatient facilities had lower levels of outpatient surgical care 
competition, a lower HMO penetration rate, lower gastroenterologists per 100,000 population, 
higher primary care physicians per 100,000 population, and higher general surgeons per 100,000 
population. Such markets tended to have a smaller population size and higher percent of the 
population aged 65 or above. 
The unadjusted incidence rates for adverse events that resulted in an ED visit or 
hospitalization within 30 days of outpatient colonoscopy were low. Physician-owned ASCs had 
lower rates of same day ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting 
in ED visit or hospitalization, and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or 
hospitalization than hospital-based outpatient facilities. There was no difference in the rate of 30-
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day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization across outpatient 
surgery settings.  
Summary of multivariate analysis. 
This study drew on agency theory as a conceptual framework to examine the association 
between physician ownership and quality of care. Patients treated at a physician-owned ASC 
were hypothesized to have better outcomes (lower rates of adverse events after colonoscopy) 
than those receiving treatment at a hospital-based outpatient facility, with the assumption that 
patients are able to assess quality of care difference across outpatient surgical facilities. In 
addition, the quality advantage associated with physician ownership was hypothesized to be 
stronger in more competitive health care markets. Alternatively, if patients do not have the 
ability to assess quality differences and if physician owners exploit this information void, 
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC were hypothesized to have higher rates of adverse 
events, holding other factors constant. To better isolate the relationship between physician 
ownership and outcomes of care, three-level generalized hierarchical linear models (GHLM) 
were used to control for confounding factors at patient, facility, and market levels.  
The study found that after risk adjustment, colonoscopy patients treated at a physician-
owned ASC had similar odds of experiencing same day ED visit or hospitalization and 30-day 
non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization as those treated in a hospital-
based outpatient facility. But the former had significantly higher odds of experiencing 30-day 
serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization and 30-day other 
gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. This suggests that the odds of 
experiencing certain adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy vary by site of care, with 
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physician-owned ASCs having similar or worse performance when compared to hospital-based 
outpatient facilities on the measures of colonoscopy quality of care examined in this study.  
The study results do not support the hypotheses that physician ownership leads to better 
patient outcomes and that this effect is more prominent in relatively competitive health care 
markets. Instead, they lend support to the hypothesis that patients treated at physician-owned 
ASCs may have higher incidence of adverse events because they may not have the ability to 
assess quality differences across sites of care and physician owners may be exploiting this 
information void. While this variation in surgical quality across settings was statistically 
significant, it is important to note that the occurrence of these events tend to be very low, 
especially for same day ED visit or hospitalization and for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events 
that result in an ED visit or hospitalization.  
The study also found several interesting associations between some control variables and 
quality measures (Table 21). Some factors had a consistent effect on the outcome measures 
examined in this study. For example, compared with being in the age group 18-49, being in the 
age group 50-64 was associated with lower odds for all outcome measures. By contrast, being 
aged 75 and above was associated with higher odds for three outcome measures: same day ED 
visit or hospitalization, 30-day other gastrointestinal events, and 30-day non-gastrointestinal 
events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Compared with privately insured patients, 
Medicaid patients were associated with higher odds for all four outcome measures while self-pay 
patients were associated with higher odds for the first, third and fourth quality measures. Increase 
in the Charlson Index or the number of ED visits or hospitalizations in the prior six months was 
associated with higher odds for all four quality measures. Receiving more invasive procedures 
(Colonoscopy and biopsy or Lesion removal colonoscopy) versus diagnostic colonoscopy was  
    
 
 
134 
Table 21  
Summary of Significant Associations of Control Variables with Measures of Quality of Outpatient Colonoscopy 
Variable 
Same day ED 
visit or 
Hospitalization  
30-day Serious 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other Non-
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting 
in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Patient characteristics     
Patient age     
18-49 (reference)     
50-64 - - - - 
65-74  - - + 
75-84 +  + + 
85 or greater +  + + 
Patient gender     
Male (reference)     
Female + + + - 
Patient race/ethnicity     
White (reference)     
Black    + 
Hispanic  + -  
Other - - - - 
Payer     
Medicare   + + 
Medicaid + + + + 
Private insurance (reference)     
Self-pay +  + + 
Other payer   +  
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Table 21 (continued) 
Variable 
Same day ED 
visit or 
Hospitalization  
30-day Serious 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other Non-
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting 
in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Median household income quartile 
(ZIP code level)     
Lowest quartile of income    + 
Second lowest quartile of 
income    + 
Second highest quartile of 
income +   + 
Highest quartile of income 
(reference)     
Urban/rural location     
Metropolitan areas (>=1 
million, reference)     
Metropolitan areas (<1 million)   -  
Micropolitan areas +  +  
Non-urban areas     
Charlson Comorbidity Index + + + + 
# of previous ED visits and 
hospitalizations + + + + 
Colonoscopy type     
Diagnostic colonoscopy 
(reference)     
Colonoscopy and biopsy  + + + 
Lesion removal colonoscopy  + + + 
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Table 21 (continued) 
Variable 
Same day ED 
visit or 
Hospitalization  
30-day Serious 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting 
in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting 
in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other Non-
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting 
in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Organizational characteristics     
Facility colonoscopy volume group     
30-430 cases per year (reference)     
431-1333 cases per year -   - 
>= 1334 cases per year  - -  - 
Specialization rate     
Specialization rate squared   -  
Market characteristics     
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  +   + 
HMO penetration rate     
PPO penetration rate     
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000 -    
# of primary care physicians per 
100,000 +  -  
# of general surgeons per 100,000 +    
Log-transformed population size +   + 
% of the population above age 65     
% of the population below age 65 
without health insurance   - - 
Year dummies     
Year 2005 (reference)     
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Table 21 (continued) 
Variable 
Same day ED 
visit or 
Hospitalization  
30-day Serious 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other 
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting in 
ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
30-day Other Non-
Gastrointestinal 
Events Resulting 
in ED Visit or 
Hospitalization 
Year 2006 +   - 
Year 2007       - 
 
Note: +: implies a significant odds ratio greater than 1.00; -: implies a significant odds ratio that is less than 1.00. All 
relationships noted above were significant at the p<.05 level. The results reported here come from primary models that 
included propensity score adjustment for physician market selection. 
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associated with higher odds for three quality measures with same day ED visit or hospitalization 
as an exception. Among organizational-level factors, having moderate or high facility 
colonoscopy volume was associated with lower odds for two to three of the four quality 
measures. Similar findings have been reported (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, 
Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). At the market level, higher HHI index (lower 
competition level in the market) was associated with higher odds for same day ED visit or 
hospitalization and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. 
The uninsured rate was associated with lower odds for 30-day other gastrointestinal events 
resulting in ED visit or hospitalization and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED 
visit or hospitalization. These findings indicate that future studies of quality of care should 
consider a systematic exploration of relevant factors at multiple levels.  
The relationship between some control variables and outcome measures was found to be 
inconsistent. For example, female gender was associated with higher odds for the first three 
quality measures but lower odds for the last quality measure. This may be due to the fact that 
females tend to have lower rate of cardiovascular diseases, which represented a large part of the 
30-day non-gastrointestinal events. In addition, being Hispanic was found to be associated with 
higher odds for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization but 
lower odds for 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. 
Higher number of primary care physicians per 100,000 population was associated with higher 
odds for same day ED visit or hospitalization and lower odds for 30-day other gastrointestinal 
events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Higher log-transformed population size was 
associated with higher odds for same day ED visit or hospitalization and lower odds for 30-day 
other gastrointestinal events and non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or 
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hospitalization. These inconsistent patterns suggest that the different types of adverse events 
represented by outcome measures examined in this study have different determinants.  
Some factors were not found to be significant. For example, the specialization rate (the 
percentage of colonoscopy procedures to all outpatient surgeries provided by a facility) was not 
significant in any models. Other examples included HMO and PPO penetration and the 
percentage of the population above age 65. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study has several limitations that merit discussion. First, this study was based on 
administrative data. Details about the surgical procedure, such as type of anesthesia, operating 
room time, or monitoring were not available in the data and thus, could not be controlled. It is 
also possible that physicians may choose certain locations to treat their patients based on 
information not available in the administrative data. Additionally, other than facility volume and 
specialization, there are other organizational characteristics that may affect quality of care that 
could not be examined, such as number of operating rooms, number of support staff, number of 
physicians providing care at the facility, the number of years the facility was in operation, etc. 
Moreover, the accuracy of the analysis was limited to the accuracy and completeness of the 
coding in the data files. There may have been coding errors in CPT codes and ICD diagnosis 
codes. Finally, an existing study reported that fewer secondary diagnoses are present among 
cases treated in ASCs than those in a hospital-based outpatient facility (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, 
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). This study added diagnosis information from linked 
inpatient and emergency department records around the procedure date when conducting risk 
adjustment. But the comorbidities of those cases without linked inpatient or emergency 
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department records may be underestimated, which may undermine the observed quality of care 
provided by physician-owned ASCs. 
Additionally, this study was only able to identify physician ownership at the facility level 
and compared the quality of colonoscopy procedures furnished in physician-owned ASCs and 
hospital-based outpatient facilities. It is possible that some physicians who perform procedures in 
ASCs may not be owners. But it was not possible to identify individual physician owners. In fact, 
the California data do not include physician identifiers. The study dropped colonoscopy cases 
performed in non-physician-owned ASCs because there were too few observations to examine. It 
is also noteworthy that hospital-based outpatient facility category included both hospital 
outpatient departments as well as free-standing ASCs wholly owned by hospitals.  
Third, this study dealt with selection issues (both physician investment and patient 
referral) through the use of propensity matching techniques. However, these techniques only 
control for observable characteristics. It could be that unobservable factors that the study could 
not measure are influencing these decisions and as a result, estimated effects could be biased to 
some degree by residual selection issues.    
Fourth, the generalizability of the findings of this study is restricted for three reasons. 
First of all, this study relied on data strictly for the State of California. The California health care 
market likely differs from those of other states.  In particular, California lacks certificate of need 
requirements for new ASCs, its HMO penetration rate is relatively high, and it has a high 
percentage of its population that is uninsured. These differences may make it hard to generalize 
findings from California to other geographic areas. A second factor is that the study used 
counties to define health care markets. Although prior studies suggest that changing the 
definition of health care markets do not substantially affect the results (Krauchunas, 2011; 
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McLaughlin, Normolle, Wolfe, McMahon, & Griffith, 1989), using counties as the boundaries of 
health care market in this study may add some bias because counties are extremely wide 
geographically in California. Finally, the study chose to examine the quality of care of outpatient 
colonoscopy. While it enabled the study to examine procedure-specific quality measures, 
focusing on one type of outpatient surgery makes it difficult to generalize the conclusions to 
patients receiving other types of outpatient surgical procedures.  
Implications of the Findings 
Implications for theory. 
This study used agency theory to conceptualize physician ownership and its potential 
relationships to quality of care, examining two different agency relationships: the one between 
other owners of an ASC (principals) and physicians (agents) who perform surgical procedures in 
the facility and the one between patients (principals) and physicians (agents). Agency theory 
does not specifically predict whether physician ownership would improve or detract from the 
quality performance of an outpatient surgical facility. Depending on the extent to which 
consumers are able to assess quality of care differences across settings of care, physician 
ownership can function as a mechanism to improve quality or as a deterrent to quality. The study 
results support the latter, namely physician ownership may be a deterrent to quality in practice.  
There are several reasons why the hypothesis of physician ownership as a mechanism to 
improve quality and the mediating effect of market competition were not supported. Lack of 
information on clinical aspects of care quality may limit the ability of patients and their referring 
physicians to make decisions about care setting for colonoscopy procedures. Additionally, 
patients may be more focused on amenities and convenience when they talk to other patients 
about potential sites of care. As a result, physician owners may not have the motivation to 
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improve technical aspects of the quality of care, even if they have the knowledge and expertise to 
do so. In a competitive health market, physician owners of ASCs may also decide to compete 
with hospital-based outpatient facilities on factors such as amenities, convenience, shorter 
waiting times, or other factors that patients value in health care services.  Finally, given existing 
reimbursement policies, physician owners may be willing to sacrifice aspects of the quality of 
care to the degree that these are not noticeable to the patients so that they can lower operating 
costs and enhance facility profits.   
Implications for policy and management. 
Quality and cost represent two important considerations in health policy decision-making. 
Quality of care has drawn enormous attention after the seminal Institute of Medicine report 
Crossing the Quality Chasm was published (Institute of Medicine, 2001). The Affordable Care 
Act calls for the establishment of a value-based purchasing (VBP) for Medicare payments paid to 
ASCs (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). The VBP program represents an 
important step for Medicare to move from rewarding volume toward rewarding better value and 
outcomes. Although much of the discussion about physician ownership has been focused on 
uncovering its impact on patient selection and service overutilization, this study and a few other 
studies (Mitchell & Sass, 1995; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012) have directed the attention toward the 
relationship between physician ownership and patient outcomes.  
From a policy perspective, Medicare as well as private payers may consider more 
stringent physician financial interest disclosure policies based on the findings of this study. To 
qualify for safe harbor protection under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, a physician with an 
ownership interest in an ASC must “fully inform” the patients of his or her ownership interest 
when he or she refers patients to that facility (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), 
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HHS, 2007). While further research is needed, the findings of this study and other earlier studies 
(Hollingsworth et al., 2009; Hollingsworth et al., 2010a; Mitchell, 2010; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012; 
Strope et al., 2009) suggest that the disclosure of physician ownership to a larger audience may 
be warranted. For example, if financial disclosure information on referring physicians becomes 
available for monitoring and research purposes, the potential effects of physician investment can 
be further studied and controlled. Moreover, the study may some implication for California’s 
corporate practice of medicine prohibition. The prohibition precludes hospitals from directly 
employing physicians with the intention of preventing unlicensed persons from interfering with 
or influencing the physician’s professional judgment. Evidence from this study implies that 
physician’s professional judgment may be influenced by many other factors even when they 
have the ownership or control of the business. When hospitals partner with physicians to provide 
outpatient colonoscopy, the quality of care is as good as or better than the quality of care 
provided in physician-owned ASCs. Therefore, further studies of the ban on the corporate 
practice of medicine may be needed.  
Medicare and other payers should adopt strategies to collect quality of care data and 
make them available to the patients to encourage evidence-based decision-making about where 
to receive care. In 2012, CMS launched the ASC Quality Reporting System (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 2011). ASCs are required to report five quality 
measures beginning October 1, 2012, for calendar year (CY) 2014 payment determination. These 
five measures, in addition to two structural measures, will be used for the CY 2015 payment 
determination. This study suggests that it is worthwhile to use procedure-specific quality 
measures. Using only generic measures such as same day ED visit or hospitalization may miss 
some meaningful quality variations across location of care.  
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From a clinical or management perspective, the study provides useful information about 
how to identify patient subgroups that are prone to develop certain type of adverse events after 
outpatient colonoscopy. For example, senior age, female gender, being covered by Medicaid, 
high Charlson Comorbidity Index, a history of using medical services six month prior to the 
surgery, receiving colonoscopy procedures with biopsy or lesion removal were identified as risk 
factors for developing other gastrointestinal events such as intestinal obstruction and abdominal 
pain that result in ED visit or hospitalization within 30 days of the surgery. The information can 
be used to focus adverse event prevention efforts. Additionally, such information should be made 
available to physicians, health care facility managers, and patients to reduce the occurrence of 
adverse events. In this sense, the study findings may help to improve postoperative care and the 
smooth transition from the outpatient surgical settings to other settings. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
This study represents an initial effort to assess the effect of physician ownership of ASCs 
on the quality of care. There are some suggestions for future studies given the limitations 
identified above. This study operationalized the quality of outpatient colonoscopy using adverse 
events developed after the surgery due to limitations of the data. However, the American Society 
for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE) and the American College of Gastroenterology (ACG) 
proposed quality indicators for colonoscopy that encompass the preprocedure, intraprocedure, 
and postprocedure periods (Rex et al., 2006). Future studies should further examine technical 
indicators of quality of outpatient colonoscopy, such as colonoscopy withdrawal time, polyp 
detection rate, and cecal intubation. It is also important to explore process of care measures and 
patient experience measures.  
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As discussed previously, the current study was only able to identify physician ownership 
at the facility level. A comparison of quality of care at the physician level will be of interest. 
More detailed information about physician ownership, such as an individual physician's 
ownership share of an ASC should be included if the data are available.  
In addition, research is needed on other types of outpatient surgical services. For example, 
it is worthwhile to compare outcomes of patients who receive urological procedures in 
physician-owned ASCs and those treated in hospital-based outpatient facilities. Moreover, more 
studies need to be conducted in different states in different time periods to see if the findings are 
robust and generalizable to other markets.  
Conclusions  
Physician ownership is common among ASCs. This study using a large, diverse patient 
population and found that physician ownership of ASCs was not associated with better quality of 
care for colonoscopy patients. Instead, patients treated by physician-owned ASCs had 
significantly worse outcomes in two quality measures and similar outcomes in two other 
measures when compared to colonoscopy patients treated by hospital-based outpatient facilities. 
However, ASCs are believed to provide more convenient location, shorter waiting time, and 
more patient-center care with a lower price (American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 
2010; Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009). Thus, it may be difficult to compare 
the value of care provided by physician-owned ASCs and that by hospital-based outpatient 
facilities. As more complex procedures are shifted from hospital-based outpatient facilities to 
ASCs, expanded efforts to monitor and report quality of care will be worthwhile. 
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